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ABSTRACT
Household Behaviour and Intrahousehold Resource Allocation: An Empirical
Analysis
by
Aminur Rahman
This thesis analyses intrahousehold resource allocation issues related to nutrition and food dis-
tribution, nutrient demand, and child health and nutrition outcomes in rural Bangladesh using
relevant microeconometric methods and their application to household surveys. Using a measure
of bargaining power | spouses' assets at marriage | that is culturally relevant and (weakly) ex-
ogenous to household decision making process, I nd strong evidence of intrahousehold bargaining
on nutrient allocation and on distribution of food from relatively expensive sources. In this regard,
a wife's bargaining power positively aect the allocation of the adult females at the expense of that
of adult males. The bargaining eects are signicant even after controlling for unobserved house-
hold characteristics and potential health-nutrition-labour market linkages. Spouses' preference and
bargaining also tend to vary at dierent income levels. At the low income level, a wife prefers
preschooler boys to preschoolers girls while the preschooler girls to preschooler boys at the middle
income level in intrahousehold food distribution. Son-preference in intrahousehold food distribution
is also guided by cultural norms and appears to be prominent in non-poor households as opposed to
poor households in Bangladesh. Using a characteristic demand framework, I also nd that individ-
uals' intakes of calorie, macronutrients, and a set of micronutrients are inelastic to implicit calorie
price while the own and cross implicit price elasticities for a range of critical micronutrients are
highly elastic to implicit micronutrient prices. Calorie intake appears to be highly inelastic for both
poor and non-poor while both the macro and micronutrient intakes of the poor compared to that
of the non-poor are more responsive to implicit macro and micronutrient prices. Finally, analysing
the eect of household structure on child outcomes, I nd that child education, but not health
outcomes, to be substantially better in nuclear families than in extended families. These ndings
have important implications in terms of malnutrition, food policy, and human capital formation in
a poor rural economy.
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to my wife, Lisa, my daughters, Azrin and Arin, my parents,
and my late father-in-law,
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The thesis analyses intrahousehold resource allocation issues related to nutrition and food dis-
tribution, individual demand for nutrients, and household structure and child health and nutrition
outcomes in rural Bangladesh using relevant microeconometric methods and their application to
household surveys. Chapter 2 analyses the role of gender in intrahousehold nutrient allocation in
a bargaining framework, while Chapter 3 focuses on the role of intrahousehold bargaining on the
distribution of food from dierent sources varying in terms of costs and nutrient contents. Chapter
4 analyses the role of culture in son-preference in intrahousehold food distribution by analysing
the case of two agrarian economies |- Bangladesh and the Philippines | with contrasting cul-
tural norms related to gender. Chapter 5 shifts the focus from intrahousehold food distribution
to individual nutrient demand using a characteristics demand framework to analyse demand for
nutrients after eliminating the non-nutritive features of food. Finally, Chapter 6 moves away from
food and nutrition, and focuses on child health and education outcomes in nuclear and extended
families that vary in headship { an important feature of family formation in poor countries like
Bangladesh. While the thesis focuses on Bangladesh, the case of the Philippines is used in Chapter
4 as an identication purpose regarding the role of culture in intrahousehold resource allocation.
Each of the thesis topics bear important policy implications for individual wellbeing in Bangladesh
where poverty often shows itself in malnutrition leading to low level of human capital formation
and growth, and thus repeats the cycle of poverty.
In the last few decades, the intrahousehold resource allocation literature has advanced sub-
stantially1. However, the progress has been limited on understanding the role of intrahousehold
bargaining on individual food allocation, which is an important area in light of the growing concern
of micronutrient malnutrition as a serious public health problem. Limited exploration in this area
is primarily driven by the unavailability of individual dietary intake data and reliable measures of
intrahousehold bargaining that are exogenous to household decision making processes. Chapters
1Specic citations are kept at the minimum in this introductory chapter to maintain brevity and to avoid dupli-
cation with the literature review of subsequent chapters.
1
22 and 3 attempt to ll this gap in the literature. Another area of limited progress is the lack of
application of a single analytical framework across dierent socio-cultural contexts to understand
the role of the later on intrahousehold resource allocation. Chapter 4 attempts to contribute to the
literature in this regard.
While the literature on food demand is rich, it does not explore to what extent demand for
food is driven by the nutrient contents of food vis-a-vis its non-nutritive aspects, such as taste,
aroma, and class appeal. This understanding is important for designing eective and ecient food
policies to ght hunger and malnutrition. While there is an extensive literature on characteristics
demand, this topic is not explored in that literature either. Chapter 5 attempts to bridge the gap
between these two streams of demand literature and highlights important policy implications for
food-subsidy policies in a poor country like Bangladesh. Finally, while the topic of extended family
has been analysed in the literature, Chapter 6 adds a dierent dimension by examining the eect
of headship on child outcomes in nuclear and extended families.
Household Surveys
The thesis uses a number of innovative features of a unique household survey in rural Bangladesh
conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The IFPRI survey was
conducted in four rounds at four month intervals during 1996-97 in 47 villages from three sites
covering four districts of Bangladesh. The objective was to evaluate the impact of commercial
vegetable production in Saturia (site 1), polyculture sh production in household-owned ponds
in Mymensingh (site 2), and polyculture sh production in group-managed ponds in Jessore (site
3) on household income, nutrition, and time allocation of individual household members. Along
with the usual information related to demography and household composition, health, education,
morbidity, household expenditure, landholding, agricultural production, and other income earning
opportunities, a key feature of IFPRI survey that is utilised in Chapters 2-5, is the individual food
intake data collected using a 24-hour recall methodology. Similar information on individual dietary
intake is also used from another IFPRI survey of 448 households (consisting 2,880 individuals) in
the predominantly rural southern providence of Bukidnon, Philippines for the analysis in Chapter
4.
While the objective of most development policies is individual wellbeing, that wellbeing is often
inferred from the household aggregates due to lack of individual information in the household
surveys. For private goods like food, such an inference could be misleading amidst intrahousehold
inequality. In this regard, the IFPRI survey is particularly useful.
Apart from the few exceptions of natural experiments that aim to use public policy changes
to identify the eect of bargaining power on intrahousehold resource allocation, the literature on
3intrahousehold resource allocation faces the challenge of nding convincing measures of bargaining
power. Various proxy measures of bargaining power used in the literature include the income
share of women, unearned income, current assets, inherited assets, spouses' education, and assets
brought to marriage. However, most of these measures suer from various degrees of endogeneity.
Moreover, appropriate indicators of bargaining power should not only be exogenous to household
decision making processes, but also be culturally relevant.
The IFPRI Bangladesh survey is useful in this context as it collects information about assets
at marriage by the head and his spouse using a marriage module in one round of survey. The
module also collects a range of information on head's and spouse's marriage history and their
parental backgrounds, such as parents' landholdings and education. Moreover, a qualitative survey
was undertaken that led the development of the quantitative marriage module, and the ndings
of that survey indicates that the assets brought to marriage is a culturally relevant indicator for
intrahousehold bargaining in Bangladesh. Both in Chapters 2 and 3, I argue that assets at marriage
is an attractive proxy for bargaining power because apart from their cultural relevance, these
proxies are (weakly) exogenous to decisions made within marriage, such as intrahousehold nutrient
allocations. While they could be correlated to unobserved characteristics of the head and his spouse
that might led to household formation, to a great extent these unobserved household specic eects
that tend to be time invariant can be removed through household xed eect estimation due to
multiple rounds of the survey - another useful feature of IFPRI survey.
Combining individual food intake data with the food expenditure data on hundreds of nely
disaggregated food items consumed by dierent households in 47 villages over four dierent rounds
enables me to use the spatial variation in village prices of food items and to analyse people's demand
for nutrients in a hedonic demand framework in Chapter 5. Finally, the marriage module of the
survey enables me to create a number of instruments to predict devolution of headship in Chapter 6,
and thus to measure the eect of household structure on child outcomes using instrumental variable
approach in addition to OLS method.
Findings and Implications
Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan, 1990, henceforth PRH, is an inuential work on intrahousehold
food distribution. Based on the individual food intake data of rural Bangladesh, they argue that
individual calorie2 intake is a sucient statistic for dierent nutrient intakes of individuals given
the simplicity of the Bangladeshi diet and nd no indication of intrahousehold inequality in food
distribution. The focus on total calorie intake, unfortunately, does not explain the growing problem
of micronutrient malnutrition and its gender dimensions. Several billion people around the world
2Throughout the thesis energy and calorie (a measure of energy) is used interchangeably.
4suer from micronutrient malnutrition in one form or another, and Bangladesh is no exception where
40 million people (27% of its population) suer from micronutrient malnutrition (?). Women and
children are particularly prone to micronutrient malnutrition because of their higher requirement
due to reproductive functions and growth.
Chapter 2 illustrates that the calorie is neither a sucient statistic for other nutrients nor a good
metric to understand micronutrient malnutrition or intrahousehold inequality in food distribution.
This is because, as the nutrition literature argues, given the wide range of food sources to meet one's
calorie need, under normal circumstances an individual can satisfy his/her calorie needs, which in
turn motivates the principle of calculating the calorie-adequacy ratio in the nutrition literature
(WHO 1985). Moreover, while calorie intake is a direct function of calorie expenditure, the intakes
of other nutrients are not; hence, the dierence in energy intensity of dierent activities of males
and females of dierent ages does not necessarily explain the dierences in intakes of the nutrients
(other than total calorie intake) for dierent age-gender groups.
Converting food intake data into individual intakes of calorie and dierent nutrients and com-
paring these intakes to age-gender specic requirements and using spouses' assets at marriage as
measures of bargaining power, Chapter 2 demonstrates the evidence of intrahousehold bargaining
for the allocation of a range of critical nutrients in rural Bangladesh. While there is lack of sex
disparity in calorie adequacy ratio, the disparity is prominent in the allocation for many of these
nutrients within children, adolescents, and adult groups. Pregnant and lactating women also tend
to receive much less of these nutrients compared to their requirements. A wife's bargaining power,
as opposed to her husband's, signicantly and positively aects the allocation of dierent nutrients
for children and adolescents of both sexes and of adult females. The bargaining eects are signicant
even after controlling for unobserved household characteristics and the potential nutrition-health-
labour market linkage. Individual xed eect estimates of health technology also tend to imply
that perhaps the nutrition-health-labour market linkage as a key explanation for intrahousehold
food distribution in rural Bangladesh has been overemphasised in the previous literature.
The policy implication of Chapter 2 fundamentally diers from that of PRH, and for that matter
past literature, based on the unitary framework. While the latter seeks to resolve intrahousehold in-
equality in food distribution through increasing (energy-intensive) labour market opportunities for
women or to achieve economic development by transforming work activities (of males and females)
to those in which linkages between food consumption and productivity are weak. Conversely, I ar-
gue that for any given level of economic development and household income, gender disparity (both
between the sexes and within the adult women group) will be reduced through increased women's
bargaining power within the household achieved through various legal and policy changes that grant
women more control of resources. Consistent with a number of studies on intrahousehold bargain-
ing and resource allocation, Chapter 2 thus brings a new dimension in addressing micronutrient
5malnutrition problems in Bangladesh through the lens of the role of gender within the household.
In a similar bargaining set-up and focusing beyond the total calorie intake, Chapter 3 explores
another dimension of intrahousehold food distribution { the allocation of food from relatively ex-
pensive and inexpensive sources. The chapter argues that total calorie intake, the focus of many
previous studies, does not necessarily reveal the household behaviour of intrahousehold food distri-
bution. For example, consider an extreme case of a two-member household, in which two identical
members receive exactly the same amount of calories but the cost and content of their calories are
quite dierent. One may consume a larger share of calories from the cheap and/or poor-tasting
foods, while the other may consume a larger share of calories from food items that are more expen-
sive, better tasting, of better quality, and/or have more class appeal. This type of discrimination,
as is reected in various ethnographic studies in Bangladesh, is not revealed if only the total calorie
but not its content or composition are the focus of analysis. Focusing on individuals' actual food
intakes from dierent sources, and using a number of measures of food distribution, Chapter 3
demonstrates evidence of signicant intrahousehold bargaining between adult males and females
on the allocation of calories from animal and dairy products, which are the most expensive sources
of calories. A wife's assets positively aects adult females' allocation but negatively aects adult
males' allocation from the animal and dairy sources. Intrahousehold bargaining is also evident to
some extent for the food allocation for elderly and pregnant women within the household. These
eects are signicant both with and without the control for health and occupational proxy measures
to account for the potential nutrition and labour market linkages and unobserved household xed
eects.
How does this gender disparity in food distribution vary across dierent levels of household
income? While a few studies have attempted to explore this question, a key deciency there is
that those studies used some aggregate measure of inequality (such as Gini coecient) and hence,
did not examine which demographic groups in particular are in a disadvantaged position within
the household, and whether and how their wellbeing improves with the improvement of aggregate
household wellbeing. Dividing the households into low, middle, and high income groups based
on their monthly per capita expenditure, Chapter 3 nds that at the low income level, the wife's
bargaining power favors sons to daughters within the preschooler group, while at the middle income
level, daughters are favoured over sons. Similarly, a wife's bargaining power positively aects the
allocation from expensive food group for adult females, and negatively aects the allocation for adult
males at low income level, but such bargaining is not evident as the household income increases.
These ndings also have nutritional implications as animal, sh, dairy, and plant products are
much richer sources of micronutrients than cereals. In this connection, the ndings of Chapter 3 is
consistent with that of Chapter 2 that demonstrates strong evidence of intrahousehold bargaining
on the allocation of protein and a range of critical micronutrients, particularly for the adult females
6within the household.
Chapter 4 takes a dierent angle in evaluating intrahousehold inequality by focusing solely on
the children and analysing the evidence from Bangladesh and the Philippines in a case-study setting.
Focusing on children eliminates the potential eects of labour market outcomes on intrahouse-
hold food distribution as elaborated in the literature. The chapter argues that both intrahousehold
allocation and bargaining power can be inuenced by extrahousehold parameters, such as cultural
norms related to gender. For instance, cultural norms can dictate a woman's mobility and the abil-
ity to possess and control resources, which in turn aect her bargaining power within the household.
While the past literature on intrahousehold resource allocation focuses on the eect of intrahouse-
hold bargaining, the absence of replication of a single analytical framework across dierent cultural
settings (with a few exceptions) limits our understanding on how the eects of the bargaining power
of a husband vis-a-vis a wife vary in dierent cultural contexts. Rejection of the unitary model sug-
gests that targeting policy to husband or his wife can have dierential eects within the household.
However, it is equally important to know how these dierential eects vary in dierent cultural
settings.
Based on the cost and content of individual calorie intake, Chapter 4 nds evidence of son-
preference in food distribution in rural Bangladesh and not in the rural Philippines, which is
consistent with the contrasting cultural norms about females in these two agrarian economies.
In Bangladesh, consistent with purdah culture, few females participate in the labour market and
gender dierence in wage rate is prominent, while transfer at marriage from a bride's family exceeds
that from a groom's family. There, village wage rate of adult female positively and that of adult
male negatively aect a girl's allocation from animal food group, while village average value of
transfers from grooms' families in recent marriages positively aect a girl's allocation. In contrast
to previous literature, gender disparity seems not due to scarcity. While a higher birth ordered child
fare worse than a lower birth ordered one in both countries, a higher birth ordered girl does worse
than a higher birth ordered boy in Bangladesh but not in the Philippines. Finally, the chapter nds
that a village access to television in Bangladesh - a proxy for liberal social norms towards females,
positively aects girls' allocation from animal group.
Chapter 5 focuses on a dierent but interrelated issue, i.e., the responsiveness of people's nutrient
intakes to nutrient prices. This issue is important to analyse for at least four reasons : (i) to design
and implement eective government policies to prevent hunger and malnutrition and to evaluate
various government price subsidy and nutrition intervention programmes, in which a substantial
amount of resources are devoted in many developing countries including Bangladesh; (ii) to ght
against micronutrient malnutrition; (iii) to determine the agricultural marketing potential of foods
produced through new technologies; and (iv) to achieve better endowed human capital for overall
economic development.
7Using a characteristics demand framework and utilising spatial and time variation in house-
hold unit values of food items as proxy for village food prices, the chapter estimates implicit
nutrient prices and analyses the responsiveness of individual nutrient intakes to implicit nutrient
prices controlling for unobserved individual xed eects. It nds that individual intakes of calories,
macronutrients, and a set of micronutrients are inelastic to implicit calorie price, while the own and
cross implicit price elasticities for a range of critical micronutrients are highly elastic to implicit
micronutrient prices. Moreover, comparing the nutrient intake behaviour of poor and non-poor,
it nds that calorie intake is highly inelastic for both groups, while micronutrient intakes are not.
Both the macro and micronutrient intakes of the poor compared with that of the non-poor are more
responsive to implicit macro and micronutrient prices. These ndings suggest that the conventional
way of addressing people's hunger and nutrition needs by subsidising one or two key staples should
be revisited.
The thesis concludes with Chapter 6, which focuses beyond food and nutrition and on the eect
of headship on child education and health outcomes. The chapter compares child outcomes in
nuclear families with that in extended families using both OLS and 2SLS. This is an important
topic in the context of a developing country, where a great number of children live under the rubric
of the extended family for at least a part of their childhood.
The nuclear family has long characterized the European family. In Asia, by contrast, the
extended family has been the norm. An important but unexplored dierence between these two
family forms is the allocation of headship vested in a child's father in the nuclear family, but in
the child's grand-father in the extended family. The chapter explores whether children are better
o in nuclear than extended families. A reason this might be the case is that the father is more
likely to be around when the child reaches adulthood, and therefore better positioned to benet
from investments made in the child's human capital, than the grand-father. On the other hand,
extended families may provide better household public goods as discussed in the past literature.
The chapter nds child education, but not health, to be substantially better in nuclear families.
These ndings are potentially important for the literature as the past literature has noted that
the extended family provides for the elderly, while its consequences for investments in child human
capital has received little attention.
CHAPTER II
Does A Wife's Bargaining Power provide more
Micronutrients to Females? Evidence from Rural
Bangladesh
Abstract: Using spouses' assets at marriage as measures of bargaining power, I nd evidence of
intrahousehold bargaining for the allocation of a range of critical nutrients in rural Bangladesh. While
there is lack of sex disparity in calorie adequacy ratio, the disparity is prominent in the allocation for
many of these nutrients within children, adolescents, and adult groups. Pregnant and lactating women also
tend to receive much less of these nutrients compared to their requirements. A wife's bargaining power,
as opposed to her husband's, signicantly and positively aects the allocation of dierent nutrients for
children and adolescents of both sexes and of adult females. The bargaining eects are signicant even
after controlling for unobserved household characteristics and the potential nutrition-health-labour market
linkage. Individual xed eect estimates of health technology also tend to imply that perhaps the nutrition-
health-labour market linkage as a key explanation for intrahousehold food distribution in rural Bangladesh
has been overemphasised in the previous literature.
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92.1 Introduction
Micronutrient malnutrition is a critical problem in many developing countries1, and Bangladesh
is no exception. Women and children are most vulnerable due to their elevated micronutrient
requirements for reproduction and growth. Approximately 60% of Bangladeshis suer from various
micronutrient deciencies, of which deciencies in vitamin A (a prime cause of night blindness),
iron, and iodine are the most common (Government of Bangladesh, 1997). There is a growing
concern about riboavin, vitamin C, vitamin D, and zinc deciencies (IFRPI-BIDS-INFS, 1998).
About 70% of the women of age 15-45 years and children of 0-14 years, and 80% of the pregnant
and lactating women have blood hemoglobin levels below the acceptable limit and suer from
anemia (Government of Bangladesh, 1995), which accounts for about 25% of all female deaths in
Bangladesh (IFRPI-BIDS-INFS, 1998).
To better understand the age-gender dimension of micronutrient malnutrition, it is important
to understand how nutrients are allocated within the household. Viewing calorie3 as a sucient
statistic for nutrients, Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan, 1990 (henceforth, PRH), an inuential work
on intrahousehold food distribution in rural Bangladesh, argue that gender inequality in calorie
distribution is due to gender inequality in energy-intensity of occupations. In a subsistence econ-
omy, men engage in energy-intensive occupations in which health and food consumption inuences
productivity and wage rates (Strauss, 1986; Deolalikar, 1988), while women are mostly conned in
(less energy-intensive) household activities. These gender-segregated occupational choices (given by
social norms) in turn inuence a household's decision to allocate more calories to men as opposed
to women, while there is not much gender disparity in calorie allocation among children. PRH
estimates also imply that the households are inequality averse as men, despite being involved in
energy-intensive activities, compensate their nutrient allocations in favor of women.
Although useful, PRH framework does not provide much insights to the micronutrient malnu-
trition problem. Contrary to PRH view, as this chapter demonstrates, calorie is not a sucient
statistic for dierent nutrients4. Calorie adequacy often exists alongside micronutrient deciency
1Nearly three billion people (including 56% of the pregnant and 44% of the nonpregnant women) suer from iron
deciency anemia (IDA), and one-third of the world's population suer from zinc deciency2. Twenty percent of
the maternal deaths in Africa and Asia are due to IDA (Ross and Thomas, 1996). One in every three preschool-
aged children in the developing countries are malnourished (Smith et al., 2003). Undernutrition, coupled with
infectious diseases, accounts for an estimated 3.5 million deaths annually (See, Scaling Up Nutrition, A Framework
for Action, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NUTRITION/). At levels of malnutrition found in South
Asia, approximately 5% of GNP is lost each year due to debilitating eects of iron, vitamin A, and iodine deciencies
alone (World Bank, 1994).
3While calorie is a measure of energy, I use calorie and energy interchangeably throughout the thesis. Calorie
implies kilocalories (kcal).
4The simple rice-dominated diet with low intakes of vegetables, animal and dairy products, typically consumed
by rural Bangladeshis, meets the calorie need of the people but does not fulll all the micronutrient requirements as
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(Bouis et al., 1992). Moreover, while calorie intake is a direct function of calorie expenditure, as
the principles of nutrition suggest, the intakes of various macro- and micro-nutrients are not (World
Health Organization, 1985). Despite men's (as opposed to women's) engagement in energy-intensive
activities, the requirements for many micronutrients are higher for women, particularly, for pregnant
and lactating women, and children than men due to reproduction and growth requirements.
Moreover, PRH and previous studies on intrahousehold nutrient allocation have applied a uni-
tary framework. A number of studies in recent decades fail to accept the fundamental assumption of
the unitary model |- resource pooling |- in a range of outcomes, such as household expenditure,
agricultural production, schooling, and health in developed and developing countries.
Applying a bargaining framework5, I demonstrate that (i) while there is lack of gender disparity
in calorie adequacy ratio, for a range of critical nutrients, the disparity is prominent within children,
adolescents, and adult groups; (ii) pregnant and lactating women receive much less of these nutrients
vis-a-vis their requirements; (iii) there is evidence of signicant intrahousehold bargaining with a
wife's bargaining power, as opposed to her husband's6, signicantly and positively aecting the
allocation of various nutrients for children and adolescents of both sexes and adult females; and (iv)
these ndings combined with the estimates of health technology imply that perhaps the nutrition-
health-labour market linkage as a key explanation for gender disparity in PRH is overemphasised.
I thus attempt to contribute to the literature in four ways. First, I expand PRH analysis
from calorie allocation to the allocation of a number of critical nutrients. While calorie has been
the focal point in previous literature, it neither addresses the growing concern of micronutrient
malnutrition, nor provides adequate understanding of gender-role in alleviating malnutrition. Al-
though, some studies (Behrman, 1988b; Behrman and Deolalikar, 1990) focused on nutrients other
than calorie, they applied a unitary framework. If individuals have dierent preferences, and the
household decision-making process is aected by the bargaining power of dierent members, then
designing policies relying on a unitary framework can be misleading. My second contribution is
the demonstration of intrahousehold bargaining (in addition to typical income and price eects)
on nutrient allocations. Third, previous studies have demonstrated intrahousehold bargaining on
various outcomes other than individual nutrient intakes. I add to this literature by focusing on
nutrient intakes using an innovative panel dataset of rural Bangladesh. Fourth, with the exception
of a few natural experiments, previous studies have used bargaining measures that are endogenous
to decisions made within marriage. While my measure of bargaining power|husband's and wife's
rice is not a signicant source of many essential nutrients, such as, vitamin A, vitamin C, iron, calcium, and zinc
(IFRPI-BIDS-INFS, 1998).
5To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the rst exercises that applies a bargaining framework to analyse
intrahousehold nutrient allocation based on actual individual dietary intakes.
6I use household head or husband and his wife or spouse interchangeably throughout the thesis unless otherwise
specied.
11
asset at marriage|-is culturally relevant and exogenous to the decisions made within marriage,
it can be endogenous to marriage due to marriage market selection. Failure to control for such
eect can result in erroneous rejection of unitary model (Foster, 1998). A number of standard
covariates (in the empirical literature of unitary or collective framework), such as, household size
and composition could be also potentially correlated with unobserved household characteristics,
such as fertility preference. Applying household xed eect estimates (henceforth, HFE), I thus
demonstrate evidence of intrahousehold bargaining that should not be contaminated by marriage
market selection eect and other unobserved household characteristics.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briey reviews the literature. Section
2.3 discusses the theoretical framework. Section 2.4 lays out the econometric methodology. Section
2.5 describes the data and provides descriptives. Section 2.6 discusses the empirical results, and
section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Related Literature
Gender disparity in nutrition is a salient feature of many low-income economies, particularly
in Asia (Bardhan, 1974; Sen and Sengupta, 1983; Sen, 1984; Behrman, 1990). Although South
Asia (SA) perform better than Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) on many long-accepted determinants of
child nutrition (i.e., national income, democracy, food supplies, health services, and education), the
malnutrition prevalence is much higher in SA than SSA. Women's low status in SA is viewed as a
key cause for such regional disparity in malnutrition (Ramalingaswami et al., 1996; Smith et al.,
2003). Girls (boys) seem to be nutritionally favored than boys (girls) in SSA (SA). Arguably, this is
due to the dowry system in SA that requires families to pay bridegrooms to marry their daughters
as opposed to the norm in SSA that bridegrooms pay a bride-price (Quisumbing, 2003).
Using a unitary framework (Becker, 1973), several studies attempt to explain this gender dis-
parity. As mentioned, PRH explain that gender dierences in calorie consumption is due to men's
engagement in more energy-intensive occupations than women. While occupational choices can be
endogenous, PRH view that these choices are given by social norms. Bardhan (1974) and Rosen-
zweig and Schultz (1982) demonstrate the relationship between sex dierences in infant mortality
rates and sex dierences in labor-market participation rates. However, Behrman (1988b) does not
nd any relationship between expected labour market opportunities and sex disparity in children's
nutrient consumption. Behrman (1988b) nds that households compensate for girls' nutrient allo-
cations during the agricultural surplus season, but reinforce boys' endowments during lean seasons,
which is more evident for lower-caste households. Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) nd that females
eat less when food is scarce and the marginal value of food is high, and vice versa.
Considerable evidence against the unitary framework (Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Haddad et al.,
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1997) has made collective framework (Chiappori, 1988, 1992; Bourguignon et al., 1993, 1994) at-
tractive. Using the latter, Thomas (1990) nds a mother's unearned income has greater impact on
daughters' anthropometric outcomes than that of sons, while a father's unearned income has the
opposite eect. Using household food expenditure data, he also nds that the estimated impact
of women's unearned income is about seven times that of men's unearned income for (per capita)
calorie and protein consumptions. Schultz (1990) nds that women's unearned income has signi-
cantly dierent eect (i.e., reduces more) than men's unearned income on women's labour supply,
and women's but not men's unearned income has a signicant positive eect on fertility. Hallman
(2003) uses maternal shares of current assets, premarital assets, and marriage payments as proxy
measures for resource controls, and nds that a mother's assets are generally more benecial for
girls and a father's for boys as far as child morbidity is concerned, which is consistent with (Thomas,
1994). She further nds that a greater share of marriage payments directed towards the husbands
reduce child morbidity, regardless of the child's sex. This is consistent with Rao (1997), who shows
that lower dowries increase wife-beating and reduce child calorie intake during marriage. Targeting
mothers for cash-transfers seem to signicantly increase secondary school enrollment, particularly
girls, and has positive eects on child's health, nutrition, and food consumption (Skouas and Mc-
Claerty, 2003; Adato et al., 2003). Pitt and Khandker (1998) nd that household consumption
and child nutritional status and education are signicantly better when the micro-credit borrowers
are women. None of these studies using collective framework, however, focus on individual nutrient
intakes, which is the topic of this chapter.
While collective models provide useful insights, often it is dicult to distinguish (empirically)
their predictions from those of unitary model (Behrman, 1990, 1997). For instance, a unitary model
will predict that better schooled women are more ecient in household production and knowledgable
about health and child bearing technology. A collective model will argue that the better schooled
women bargain more eectively over household resources, and that women are more interested
in nutrition than their husbands. Empirically, it is often dicult to distinguish between these
alternative mechanisms. Moreover, sometimes education of spouses may be correlated with other
unobserved factors, such as marriage market selection (Foster, 1998), and may pick up unobserved
wealth or income eects. Similarly, using a unitary framework, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982)
empirically demonstrate the existence of a relationship between sex dierences in infant mortality
rates and sex dierences in labor-market participation rates, while Folbre (1984) argues that this
relationship is supportive of a non-unitary framework in which women who have greater incomes
have greater inuence in intrahousehold allocations that leads to greater investments in daughters.
Finding convincing measures of bargaining power is a challenge. The measures should reect
bargaining power but should be exogenous to the outcomes under consideration. Income share of
women (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995), unearned income (Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990), current
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assets (Doss, 1999), inherited assets (Quisumbing, 1994), spouses' education (Quisumbing and
Maluccio, 2003), and assets at marriage (Thomas et al., 2002; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003)
are used as bargaining measures in the literature. A few studies also use natural experiments to
identify the eect of bargaining power on intrahousehold resource allocation (Lundberg et al., 1997;
Qian, 2008).
With the exception of natural experiments, the above measures are arguably endogenous.
Women's income includes labour income that reects time allocation and labour force participa-
tion decision of the household, and is thus endogenous to the household decision-making processes.
Unearned income, as observed in Thomas (1990) and Schultz (1990), may include income from
pensions, social security, unemployment benets, or earnings from accumulated assets, which are
related to past labour market activities and thus wages and productivity. Moreover, women's un-
earned income on recent fertility (as measured in terms of co-resident children under ve years of
age) in Schultz (1990) may reect reverse causality if women with younger children do not partic-
ipate in the labour market and are likely to be compensated by transfers from their families and
other sources (Behrman, 1997). Similarly, current asset holdings are aected by the asset accumula-
tion decisions made during marriage. While inherited assets and assets at marriage are less likely to
be inuenced by decisions within marriage, these are also problematic if correlated with individual
unobserved characteristics (such as taste, human capital) that tend to inuence the outcomes under
study (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). These measures could be also endogenous to marriage due to
marriage market selection (Foster, 1998).
2.3 Theoretical Framework
Consider a collective model where preferences of husband (h) and wife (w) matter. Each cares
about his/her own and other N   1 (i 2 N) household members' consumption of nutrients (C),
health outcomes (H), and eort level (e). Thus, husband's and wife's utility functions are:
Uh = Uh(Ci;Hi; ei;Z);
Uw = Uw(Ci;Hi; ei;Z);
where, Z is a vector of household characteristics7. For all Pareto-ecient outcomes, there exists
some weight  for which the household's objective function becomes:
(2.1) Max Uh(Ci;Hi; ei;Z) + (1  )Uw(Ci;Hi; ei;Z)
7Bold-faced arguments in the utility functions are in vector notations
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where, , also known as the sharing rule, is a function of husband's and wife's relative bargaining
power:
 = (ah; aw)
The higher is the bargaining power of the individual, the greater the weight his/her utility
function carries in the household's maximisation problem8. The household maximises its objective
function subject to the following constraints:
(2.2) Hi = H(Ci; ei; i)
(2.3) wi = w(Hi; ei)
(2.4) v +
X
i
wi = Y =
X
i
PC
The health outcomes of an individual i (equation 2.2) are functions of intakes of dierent nu-
trients, his/her eort level (assumed to deplete health), and his/her health endowment (i). Indi-
viduals are dierentiated by their health endowments, which are known to all household members.
Wage (wi) equation (2.3) implies that eort is rewarded in the labour market with returns to eort
increasing with individual's health status. Equations 2.2 and 2.3 capture the essential assumption
of the eciency wage literature that food consumption aects labour market productivity through
health (Stiglitz, 1976; Leibenstein, 1957). While the eciency wage literature assumes purely tech-
nological relationship between eort, health and food consumption, these are choice variables in
the above framework. Finally, in household's budget constraint (equation 2.4), Y is total household
income, v is total unearned household income, P is the price vector for dierent nutrients and
leisure, and total labour time is normalized to 1.
Maximising household's objective function, subject to these constraints yields a set of reduced
form nutrient demand functions:
(2.5) Ci = f(P; Y; ; I;Z) = f(P; Y; (ah; aw); I;Z)
8Equation 2.1 converts to a unied household utility function:
U = U(Ci;Hi; ei;Z); 8i = 1; :::; N
when one person is the dictator (i.e.,  is 0 or 1) or when both persons have the identical preferences, Uh = Uw. The
household decision making process in the collective framework can also be viewed as a two-stage budgeting process,
in which at the rst stage, the individuals pool all their income and allocate it according to the weight or sharing
rule, . Then, at the second stage, each individual maximises his/her own utility given his/her share or weight within
the household.
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where, I is a vector of individual characteristics, such as, age, gender, endowment, etc., and Z
is a vector of household characteristics, such as, household size and composition.
As is well-known, the key dierence between these reduced form demand function of the collective
framework with those of the unitary framework is that in the case of the former, the sharing rule and
thus the bargaining power of individuals become an explanatory variable for individuals' demand
for nutrients (and for other outcomes) in addition to total household income. Since income pooling
implies that controlling for household income, individual bargaining power does not aect the
demand functions of the household members, using measures of bargaining power of a husband
and a wife, one can test the key assumption of the unitary model { income pooling { vis-a-vis {
intrahousehold bargaining { for nutrient allocation:
(2.6)
@Ci
@ai
= 0; i = h;w
In the case of income pooling, @Ci@ai = 0, whereas in the presence of intrahousehold bargaining,
@Ci
@ah
6= @Ci@aw .
2.4 Econometric Framework
To analyse intrahousehold bargaining in nutrient allocation, I use the following empirical spec-
ication of equation 2.5:
(2.7) lnykijvst = 
k
0 + 
k
1Aijvst + 
k
2ijvs + 
k
3Xhjvst + 
k
4lnPvst + 
k
5Rt + 
k
6Ss
+k7Xmjvs + 
k
8Xwjvs + 
k
9(Aijvst Xmjvs) + k10(Aijvst Xwjvs) + kijvst
where, k indexes a nutrient (e.g., calorie, protein, iron, etc.), i individual, j household, v village,
s survey location (v 2 s), t survey round, and ln, natural log. The dependent variable, yk is an
individual's adequacy ratio of nutrient k (see section 2.5 for variables' denitions and descriptives).
The covariates are: a vector of dummy variables indicating the age-sex group (with adult male
as omitted category) and pregnancy and lactating status of an individual (Aijvst), a measure of
individual's health endowment, ijvs (described below), which, based on PRH, is used to control for
any potential nutrition, health, and labour market linkages, time variant and invariant household
characteristics (Xhjvst), village food prices (Pvst), dummy variables for survey round (Rt) and sites
(Ss), and characteristics of household head (Xmjs) and his wife (Xwjs).
Controlling for individual and household characteristics, gender dierence in nutrients' adequacy
ratios will be reected in the coecient vector k1. Controlling for household composition, any po-
tential household scale (dis)economies (Deaton and Paxson, 1998) that might make individuals of
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larger household (worse)better-o in nutrient consumption (at the same level of per capita expen-
diture) will be captured by household size. Controlling for aggregate household resources, spouses'
characteristics are of interest from intrahousehold bargaining perspective.
2.4.1 Health Endowment and Occupation
A challenging issue is to obtain consistent estimate of an individual's unobserved health endow-
ment to control for nutrition-health-labour market linkage. I follow PRH approach of estimating
endowment through a residual approach rst used by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) in which the
health technology (equation 2.2) is estimated directly and based on the technology parameter esti-
mates and actual resources consumed or expended by individuals, individual-specic endowments
are computed. However, in estimating the technology, I dier from PRH in terms of econometric
method. A problem with the residual approach, as PRH argued, is that the consistent estimates of
the technology parameters could not be obtained using OLS as estimated technology parameters
could be biased if Ci, and ei are correlated with unobserved individual endowment, i in equation
2.2. So PRH followed a 2SLS approach to estimate a health production function similar to the
following form:
(2.8) ln(hijst) = 1 + 2lncijst + 3Dijst + 4Xhjst + 5(ageijst) + 6(age
2
ijst)
+7sexijs + 8(sex age)ijst + ijst
where,
ijst = ijs + js + ijst
The notations for i, j, s, and t are the same as above, h is an individual's weight for height, c is
calorie intake, D is a vector of dummy variables indicating whether or not individual's occupation
is highly energy intensive and whether the individual is pregnant or lactating, X is a vector of
household characteristics, and ijst is a random error term. In terms of household characteristics,
PRH used household's drinking water source. While the error term, ijst could contain unobserved
time-invariant household specic eect (js), such as spouses' taste and fertility preference, which
can aect both calorie allocation and health outcome, PRH estimated equation 2.8 instrumenting
calorie intake, energy intensity of occupation, pregnancy, and lactating status by household head's
age and schooling, household landholding, and their interactions with food prices to address the
correlation between individual endowment (ijs) and the covariates ignoring unobserved household
characteristics embodied in ijst.
While PRH did not present any analysis of the strength and validity of their instruments, many
of these instruments, such as household landholding and head's schooling could directly aect indi-
vidual's health outcome (such as in the conceptual framework in Behrman (1990)) and these could
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be correlated with wife's schooling and age (not controlled for and thus are embodied in ijst), which
could also inuence health outcomes. Eect of spouses' characteristics on individuals' health and
nutrition could be also biased due to marriage market selection eects. Similarly, pregnancy (which
in turn inuences lactating status) of individuals could be inuenced by household's unobserved
fertility and sex-preference (arguably, in this case, age and sex of children are also endogenous),
which could also inuence allocations for individuals' nutrients and health outcomes. Spouses'
bargaining power (embodied in their characteristics, observed and unobserved) can aect fertility
decision ((Rasul, 2008)) and thus household size and composition as well as individuals' health and
nutrition outcomes. It is thus dicult to obtain valid instruments to account for endogeneity of
the above variables.
Hence, instead of a 2SLS, I estimate the health technology using individual xed eect estimate
(IFE), which should eliminate all individual, household, and location xed eects and provide con-
sistent estimates for calorie intake coecient9. However, the downside of IFE is that the eect of
individual characteristics (i.e., sex) and time invariant household characteristics on health outcome
will remain unmeasured. To go around this problem, I measure the technology parameters sepa-
rately for males who are engaged in highly energy-intensive occupations and those who are not,
and for females. Obtaining an estimate for endowment through this approach, however, relies on a
number of assumptions. First, I assume that as far as individual's attributes are concerned, other
than his/her unobserved health endowment, calorie intake, age, sex, pregnancy and lactating status,
and occupation, there is no other individual characteristics that aect his/her weight-for height in
the short-run. Second, similar to PRH, I assume that occupational choices are predetermined10.
While occupational choice can be endogenous, PRH argued that they are given by social norms
that limit females' outside labour market participation, while men are engaged in energy-intensive
labour market activities. Thus, few women are engaged in plowing in India, while in Bangladesh
no women are observed to pull rickshaw11. As a consequence of gender-segregated occupations,
9Weight-for-height in the short-run is supposed to be inuenced by only calorie intake and calorie expenditure.
PRH demonstrated that controlling for calorie intake, other nutrient intakes do not have signicant inuence on this
short-term measure of health.
10I require these PRH assumptions of predetermined gender-segregated occupational choices because an individual's
occupation data is collected only once in the survey (in rst round and for new members only in subsequent rounds
when they rst appear in the household). If I had time-varying occupation data, I could obtain consistent estimate
of its impact on health using IFE without these assumptions.
11Morris (1997) nd that traditions in Bangladesh often inhibit a woman's ability to obtain employment outside
the home. Purdah, or female seclusion, is an Islamic tradition routinely practiced in Bangladesh among the Muslim
majority. Purdah literally means "curtain" or "veil," but the term is used guratively to designate the proper mode of
behavior for women. Its strictest adherents are conned to their homes. When they leave, they are veiled from head
to toe. This "protects" the women's modesty, while also protecting her husband's family's "izzat" (respectability).
Occupational purdah or the types of work considered "appropriate" and "respectable" severely restrict women to
seek wage labor. Chapter 4 of this thesis cites more literature on "purdah" culture that limits women's labour market
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as PRH demonstrated, health endowment in the labour market matters only for males. Behrman
and Deolalikar (1989) and Sahn and Alderman (1988) also nd health and calorie consumption to
have signicant positive eects on the wage rates for men but not for women. So for females, I
estimate the technology without dierentiating them based on the energy-intensity of their occupa-
tion. Moreover, consistent with PRH assumption, there are only a very few females engaged in high
energy intensive occupations in the data (see Section 2.5). Thus, for each of these three categories,
I estimate the following health technology function using IFE:
(2.9) ln(hijst) = 1IFE + 2IFEln(ageijst) + 3IFE[ln(ageijst)]
2+
4IFEXhjst +
X
t
tRt +uijst
where, household characteristic vector, Xhjst, includes monthly per capita expenditure and its
square, per capita household landholding, and household size, all in logs, share of dierent demo-
graphic composition of the household, Rt are survey round dummies to control for any potential
seasonal eects on health outcomes, and  indicates deviation of an individual's observation in a
given round from its mean (over four rounds). In estimating equation 2.9 for females, I also include
pregnancy and lactating dummies.
Applying IFE estimates of the parameters for calorie intake, age and its square, and household
characteristics from equation 2.9 to the individual data of the corresponding variables, I obtain
estimated log weight for height ( ^ln(h)) for each individual who belongs to any of the three above
sex-occupation categories. Deducting this estimated value from the observed value of log weight for
height (lnh) yields a health measurement that includes an individual's unobserved health endow-
ment () and an aggregate unmeasured eect of time-invariant household characteristics () (e.g.
the eect of spouses' characteristics, such as education, assets, unobserved preferences, and house-
hold landholding, short-run time-invariant living and hygiene conditions, drinking water source,
etc. as discussed above):
ln(h)  ^ln(h) = +  = 
As I have four rounds of data for an individual, I average  over four rounds and use it as
a proxy measure for an individual's health endowment in equation 2.7. Obviously, estimating
equation 2.7 using OLS will be problematic as the health measure  will include the eect of
unmeasured household characteristics, but these should be eliminated by estimating equation (2.7)
using household xed eect. Thus, the measure  along with other factors discussed below motivates
HFE estimation of equation 2.7.
participation and provide evidence from this survey data about limited labour market participation of females.
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2.4.2 Test of Unitary Model and Household Fixed Eect
Based on OLS estimate of equation 2.7, a test for unitary model will be the tests of the restric-
tions that for an individual's nutrient allocation (conditional on individual and household char-
acteristics), the eect of a head's characteristics will be same as the eect of the corresponding
characteristics of his wife. Thus, for the adult male (omitted category), the restrictions are:
(2.10) k7e = 
k
8e ; e = assets; education
for each of the remaining age-gender category (g 2 G):
(2.11) k7e + 
k
9eg
= k8e + 
k
10eg
for adolescent (adolf) and adult (adulf) pregnant (preg) and lactating (lact) women:
(2.12) k7e + 
k
9ed
+ k9ep = 
k
8e + 
k
10ed
+ k10ep ; d = adolf; adulf ; p = preg; lact
and, for each of the age-gender-pregnancy-lactating category, relative to adult males:
(2.13) k9eg = 
k
10eg
k9ed
+ k9ep = 
k
10ed
+ k10ep
The OLS estimates, however, have a number of econometric concerns, which in turn motivate
HFE estimation. In addition to the eect of  in the endowment measure , household size and
composition could be potentially endogenous to household's unobserved fertility preference that
could also inuence the nutrient allocation decisions. If households have preference for sons and
follow a male-biased stopping rule that could inuence household size and composition resulting
girls living in bigger families (with more siblings) than boys (?). As already mentioned, bigger
families may have scale (dis)economies that can aect individuals' nutrient intakes. To the extent
the unobserved fertility preference is time-invariant, it could be eliminated by HFE method. House-
hold income (proxied by expenditure) is also potentially endogenous as both nutrient consumption
and health endowment of individuals may aect household income. In the literature, household
expenditure is often instrumented by household landholding. However, Behrman and Deolalikar
(1990) distinguish the eect of current income vis-a-vis permanent income on nutrient intakes, ar-
guing that if households protect their nutrient intakes from short-term uctuations, the income
elasticities of nutrient intakes would be biased downward relative to the true household response
to permanent income changes. However, they nd that the eect of nutrient intake responses to
permanent income are also quite small. Following Behrman and Deolalikar (1990), I use both cur-
rent and permanent income (proxied by per capita landholding) measures as explanatory variables.
If a household's nutrient allocation decision based on individuals' endowment and labour market
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productivity is time invariant, then this unobserved household characteristic that might inuence
household income is eliminated in HFE estimates.
Spouses' assets and education at marriage could be correlated with their unobserved character-
istics, such as their preference for children's (of particular sex) nutrition and health, which in turn
could be correlated with household formation through marriage market selection. For instance,
a man (woman) who wants healthy children may also choose an educated and/or wealthy wife
(husband). So a wife's (man's) education and/or asset may appear to inuence a child's nutrition,
even if for the same man(woman) changes in wife's (husband's) assets or education would not aect
the child's outcome. Thus eect of a wife's (husband's) bargaining measures on child's nutritional
allocation will be overestimated if husband (wife) with a high taste for children's nutrition tend
to choose educated and/or wealthier spouse, and thus could lead to erroneous rejection of unitary
model in favor of intrahousehold bargaining. Thus, another motivation for HFE is to eliminate
spouses' time-invariant unobserved characteristics that could be correlated with their bargaining
measures and could inuence individuals' nutrient allocations.
The survey, as described in the next section, was conducted in four rounds. Using within
household variation of individuals' nutrient intakes in dierent rounds, and variation of time varying
household characteristics across rounds, I estimate the following HFE version of equation (2.7):
(2.14) lnykijvst = 
k
0FE + 
k
1FEAijvst + 
k
2FEXnijvst + 
k
3FEXhjvst + 
k
4FElnPvst
+k5FERt + 
k
9FE(Aijvst Xmjvs) + k10FE(Aijvst Xwjvs) + kijvst
where,  indicates deviation of observations from household mean. However, eliminating house-
hold xed eects also eliminate time-invariant observable household characteristics, in my case
which include spouses' bargaining measures. Therefore, to assess intrahousehold bargaining, I can
now only test the restrictions in equation 2.13. Moreover, the data are collected over four rounds
within a year, so there will be very limited variation of household size, demographic composition,
and per capita landholding (as landholding data is only from rst round) across rounds. So the
eects of these variables could be imprecisely estimated. The HFE estimates will also be based on
a restricted sample of households that have at least one member of each of the age-sex group under
consideration. Also, the noise to signal ratio is likely to increase due to dierencing.
Finally, as I analyse intrahousehold bargaining for a number of nutrients, the likelihood that
no gender dierences are found along any margin is very low and so the results might be biased
towards nding discrimination. Moreover, individuals' consumptions of one nutrient may aect
the consumptions of others as typically they consume a food-bundle in which dierent food items
contain dierent nutrients in dierent proportions. To address these issues, adequacy ratio for all
nutrients under level specication 2.7 and HFE specication 2.14 are estimated simultaneously in a
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework (henceforth, referred to as SURLS and SURHFE ,
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respectively).
2.5 Data and Descriptives
I use an innovative household survey data from the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI). The data comes from four rounds of surveys at four month intervals during 1996-97 (Round
1: June-September, 1996; Round 2: October-December, 1996; Round 3: February-May, 1997; and
Round 4: June-September, 1997) in 47 villages from three sites in four districts of Bangladesh12.
The survey objective was to evaluate the impact of commercial vegetable production in Saturia (site
1), polyculture sh production in household-owned ponds in Mymensingh (site 2), and polyculture
sh production in group-managed ponds in Jessore (site 3) on household income, nutrition, and
time allocation. In each site, villages were categorized into program villages (A villages) where the
technology was already introduced and comparable control villages (B villages) where the technology
was yet to be introduced. From each of these categories, surveyed A and B villages were randomly
selected. A household census was conducted in all the randomly selected A and B villages, from
which households of two categories (adopters and non-adopters in A villages, and households who
expressed interest to adopt if the technology is introduced and who were uninterested in B villages)
were selected.13.
The survey questionnaire was administered to 5,541 individuals in 955 rural households in
each round who were selected through this multi-stage sampling approach. The survey collected
detailed information on demographic characteristics, agricultural production, other income-earning
activities, expenditure patterns, time allocation, individual food intakes, health, morbidity, and
education. It also collected information on family background, marriage history, assets at marriage,
transfers at marriage, inheritance, women mobility, and empowerment.
IFPRI sampling required that the households were representative of adopters and non-adopter
households in A villages and likely adopters and likely non-adopters in B villages, and not necessarily
representatives of rural Bangladeshi households. Nonetheless, a comparison of IFPRI sample with
that of 1995-96 National Household Expenditure Survey (HES) of Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
of the Government of Bangladesh indicates that the IFPRI sample is broadly comparable to na-
tionally representative HES rural sample of 5,020 households based on household size, per capita
expenditure, landholding, and poverty rates (Table 2.1).
12Bangladesh is divided into six divisions. A division is then divided into districts. A district is composed of
several thanas. Thanas are divided into unions. A union is composed of several villages.
13The IFPRI evaluation concluded that adoption of these programs, had neither improved the micronutrient status
of the adopting households through better quality diet nor increased their incomes. For a detailed description of the
survey, see (IFRPI-BIDS-INFS, 1998).
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2.5.1 Variables and their Descriptives
Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis,
and the variables are described below.
Survey round and site dummies: Survey round dummies (with 4th round omitted) are
included to control for any agricultural seasonality that may aect nutrient consumption as in lean
seasons there may be lack of food availability and labour market activities that can aect household
food expenditure, and income. As there are two major rice cultivation seasons, there are also two
lean seasons that reduce employment and income earning opportunities. The major lean season is
from mid-September to mid-November preceding the Aman harvest, which falls in round 2. The
other lean season falls in round 3, which is from mid-March to mid-April, prior to Boro harvest14.
Site dummies (with Jessore as omitted site) are included to control for any location specic eects,
such as infrastructure, location endowment, market condition, and health facility, etc., which may
aect income earning opportunities, food availability and prices, health, and nutrition.
Village prices: The survey collected data on household food expenditure and quantity pur-
chased of a wide range of food items, which were further classied into 17 dierent food groups.
Village prices are proxied by village level mean unit value for each of these food groups, which are
constructed by averaging the household level unit value of these food groups within each village15.
I control for log village price of rice, pulses, big sh, small sh, and egg in regression functions16.
Table 2.1 indicates substantial variation of village prices across rounds, while high and low prices
of dierent food groups are observed in dierent time of the year. For instance, while the mean rice
price is lowest in round 2 and highest in round 3, for pulses the highest is observed in round 2 and
lowest in round 4, implying seasonality (if any) diers for dierent food groups.
Household size and composition: Household size is based on number of individuals present
in the household in each round. Consistent with nutritional requirements at dierent stages of
life-cycle and activity patterns, males and females are categorized into: children (< 10 years),
adolescents (10  age < 18 years), and adults ( 18 years). Dummy for each of these six age-sex
categories (with adult male as omitted category) and dummy for whether a female is pregnant or
not, or lactating or not in a given round are used in econometric analysis. Log household size and
share of males and females in each of these age groups (with adult males' share as omitted category)
are used to control for household size and composition. Compared to HES sample, on average an
IFPRI sample household is consists of 1-2 more people with highest share of individuals in the
adult category. As expected, there is very limited variation of household size and composition
14Aman is the rice grown in monsoon season, while Boro is the rice grown in dry season.
15Chapter 5 provides evidence that village level unit values are reasonable proxy for village prices in this Bangladeshi
sample of households.
16A comprehensive set of village prices were initially included. Subsequently, I have included the food prices that
appear to be signicant most of the times for the set of nutrients analysed in this chapter.
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across rounds within one year. The lactating women outnumbered pregnant women and these
statuses vary across rounds.
Household landholding, expenditure, and poverty: Household landholding is a time
invariant variable for which information was collected in the rst round. While the share of landless
households (about 5%) are similar in IFPRI and HES samples, the distribution of landholding is
less unequal in IFPRI sample compared with HES sample with higher share of households with
1-7.5 acres in IFPRI sample. The mean per capita landholding in IFPRI sample is 0.23 acre (which
varies slightly across rounds due to limited variation in household size).
Both samples are also similar in terms of mean per capita monthly expenditure, which varies
signicantly across rounds (p-value of t-tests are not reported) in IFPRI sample with the lowest
value observed in round 2 and highest value in round 3.
The absolute and hard core poverty lines based on direct calorie intake (DCI) method are 2122
kcal and 1805 kcal per person per day, based on which the poverty incidence is higher in IFPRI
compared to HES sample. HES regional upper and lower poverty lines based on cost of basic needs
(CBN) approach in 1995-96 are Takas 593 and 492 in site 1, 529 and 484 in site 2, 592 and 499
in site 3, and 591 and 499 for national rural households. Comparison of HES sample with site
specic poverty incidence based on CBN gives a mixed picture with some sites in some rounds
having higher poverty rates compared to national rural average and vice versa. Similar to monthly
per capita expenditure, poverty incidence varies substantially across rounds. Based on CBN, the
highest poverty incidence in all sites are observed in round 2, while based on DCI, the poverty
peaks in round 3. As mentioned, round 2 contains the major lean season, while round 3 the minor
one.
Spouses' characteristics - age, education, and assets at marriage: On average, husbands
are about 8 years older than their wives. To focus on bargaining between husbands and wives,
following Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003), I restrict the sample to monogamous households17
with husband and wife present and with no change in marital status (i.e., divorce, separation, re-
marriage, death, etc.) during the survey period. The resulting sample selection bias (if any) would
lead to a conservative estimates of bargaining eects as households in which the disagreement
between the spouses are the strongest would be more likely to split and are thus absent in this
sub-sample.
The marriage module of the survey asked the heads and their wives the assets they owned at
the time of their wedding. These assets included land, cattle, housing, food items, and durable
(jewelery, watch, clothes, and household utensils). The reported values of these assets at the time
171% of households have two wives, while 4.5% are female headed with no husband and 3% have head without his
wife, and 91% households are intact with both head and his spouse. Based on data availability of assets at marriage,
my analysis contains almost 98% of these intact households, or, roughly 89% of the all surveyed households.
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of marriage were converted in 1996 taka using national consumer price index. Bangladeshi wives
had far less assets at the time of their marriage than their husbands primarily because their value of
landholding, housing, and cattle were much less than those of their husbands (see Table 2.1). The
assets at marriage may suer from measurement errors due to recalling information, particularly for
longer marriages. One option is to instrument spouses' assets by their respective family background
information, such as the wealth of their parents. However, those measures may also suer from
recall errors. Hence, I do not instrument these bargaining measures. To the extent the measurement
errors are white noise, the evidence of bargaining (if any) will be an underestimation of the true
bargaining eects. Education is measured by years of schooling. The mean years of schooling of
husbands is almost double of that of wives.
While spouses' assets at marriage are my key bargaining measures, following Quisumbing and
Maluccio (2003), in the empirical analysis, I also include spouses' age and age square to control for
cohort eects and for the possibility that their age dierence could be another source of bargaining
power that may be correlated with the education and assets measures. While spouses' education
are included as a potential bargaining source, its caveats are already discussed (see section 2.2).
My focus, however, is not to evaluate intrahousehold bargaining based on education, but to control
for any potential correlation between education and asset measures of bargaining.
Individual health and occupation: There is limited variation across rounds even in the short-
term health outcome measure, an individual's weight (in kilograms) for height (in centimeters). Boys
tend to do better than girls and adult males better than adult females, while this gender dierence
reverses for the adolescent group. This might be indicative of some transitory catch-up for females
as they past childhood, which later disappears as they progress toward adulthood.
As mentioned before, individuals' occupation information were collected once in the survey.
These were coded into 47 dierent occupations. Based on the metabolic constant (mc) provided for
a detailed list of activities for male and female in World Health Organization (1985), I classify the
energy intensity of occupations into high (mc > 4), medium (2:5 < mc  4), and low (mc  2:5)
category18. Energy intensity of occupation of dierent age-sex group vis-a-vis their energy intake
are further discussed below. As described in Section 2.4, both the energy intensity of occupation
and health outcome are utilized to construct the health endowment measure.
Calorie intake and energy-intensity of occupation: A useful feature of IFPRI survey is
that it provides individual food intake data for each round using a 24-hour recall methodology asking
the person with primary responsibility for preparing meals, about recipes prepared, ingredients for
18PRH cited the same source for classication of energy intensity of occupations but did not describe dierent
cut-o points of mc they used for their classication. Basal metabolic rate (BMR) for an individual is the amount of
energy expended when the person is in sleep. Energy requirement for dierent activities per minute is BMR times
the mc of that activity. For instance, mc for cleaning house for a female is 3, while that for digging earth for male is
5.7.
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those recipes and amounts eaten by various family members and guests. The survey has information
of quantity of individual intakes of about 200 food items (categorised into 17 food groups), which
are converted into calories, protein, and micronutrients (vitamin A, vitamin C, vitamin D, niacin,
riboavin, thiamine, folate, iron, and calcium).
Calorie intake data broadly resembles to PRH claim that gender dierence in calorie allocation
is age-dependent and so is the gender dierence in energy-intensity of occupations. To replicate
PRH nding in IFPRI sample, I rst use PRH's age-group classication ((age<6, 6age<12, and
age12). The mean calorie consumption (averaged over four rounds) across age-groups are higher
in IFPRI than in PRH sample (see Table 2.2). However, there is no signicant gender dierence for
the group less than <6 years. Conversely, consistent with PRH, I nd signicant gender dierence
for the age-group  12 years. While PRH does not nd any signicant gender dierence for the
age-group 6-12 years, I nd this dierence is small but signicant. In line with PRH, the within-
household inequality in calorie distribution, measured by the coecient of variation, is higher among
males than females (the dierence is signicant) for age-group  12 years, while this inequality is
not signicant for the groups <6 years and 6  12 years.
Based on my age-group classication, I nd that boys have about 100 calories more than girls
(the dierence signicant at 5% level). There is neither a marked dierence in energy requirement
of occupations for children, nor any signicant dierence between intrahousehold inequality among
boys compared to the inequality among girls based on coecient of variation. The gender dierence
in calorie allocation increases almost three-folds for adolescents compared with that of children.
Compared to 1% adolescent females, 18% adolescent males are engaged in high energy-intensive
occupation. Within household inequality for adolescent males is about 23% higher than that for
the adolescent females (signicant at 5% level). Adult males receive about 700 calories more than
adult females, which reects the fact that more than half of the adult males compared with only 2%
adult females are engaged in high energy-intensive occupations. Thus, the broad linkages between
work-activity and calorie distribution as observed by PRH tends to hold for these age-groups as
well.
Nutrient Adequacy Ratio: While PRH's focus was only on individual calorie intake, individ-
uals' intakes of calorie and dierent nutrients19 are not very useful unless compared against their
requirements. I thus construct nutrient adequacy ratio for each of the k nutrients:
yki =
Cki
RDAki
19All foods are made up of a combination of macronutrients (protein, fat, carbohydrate) and micronutrients
(vitamins and minerals). Macronutrients form the bulk of the diet and supply all the energy needed for the body
for body functions, growth, and physical activities. Macronutrients provide dierent amounts of energy, expressed
in kilocalories (loosely termed as calorie as well). Fat provides approximately twice as much energy (9Kcals/g) as
the same amount of protein or carbohydrate (4Kcals/g).
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where, yki is individual i's adequacy ratio of nutrient k, C
k
i is his/her daily consumption of nutrient
k, and RDAki is his/her recommended daily allowance (or requirement) of nutrient k based on
age, sex, pregnancy, and lactating status. The appendix provides a detailed description of how the
RDA gures for calorie and dierent nutrients are constructed. As discussed in the appendix, for
protein and iron, not only quantity but also quality matters. Protein from animal sources are good
quality protein, while iron from animal sources (also termed as haem-iron) have high bio-availability
and promotes bio-availability of iron from non-animal sources. Hence, in addition to individual's
nutrient adequacy ratio, I also use an individual's intake of animal protein as a share of protein
requirement and intake of haem iron as a share of total iron requirement as dependent variables in
the empirical analysis.
2.5.2 Nonparametric Analysis
Sex dierence in adequacy ratio of dierent nutrients at each age are nonparametrically (using
locally weighted regression method, lowess with bandwidth 0.8) shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, which
illustrate a number of points. First, sex disparity in adequacy ratio is least observed for calorie
and among the micronutrients, for niacin. As mentioned, calorie requirement gures for children
and adolescents are based on NCHS standard and not based on actual energy expenditure because
of lack of data on time allocation for these age groups. Only for these groups, the adequacy ratio
seems to be less than 1. This might imply that perhaps these groups are having calories based
on their actual energy expenditure (which is unobserved in the data), but still they are having
calories less than the NCHS standards to meet their full long-term growth potentials. On the
other hand, for the adults for which the requirements are based on actual energy expenditure, the
adequacy ratio for both males and females are at or above 1. Calorie intakes of all ages are also most
stable (compared to other nutrients) across dierent rounds (as requirement gures are xed, any
movement in adequacy ratio across rounds implies uctuation in intakes). All these are consistent
with the view in nutrition literature that given the wide variety of sources to meet one's calorie
need, in normal circumstances (i.e., without famine) an individual can always meet his/her calorie
need (World Health Organization, 1985).
Second, for most of the other nutrients, sex disparity is prominent, persistent, and some times
widens for adolescents and adults compared with children. Although for vitamin A and D in some
rounds, at a relatively high age (above 70 or so), female adequacy ratio crosses over that of the
male, the sample observations are very limited at those ages (with number of males higher than
females). So this cross-over should be interpreted with due caution. Third, with the exception of
protein and vitamin C, nutrient deciency is prominent across ages for most of the other nutrients
with adequacy ratio lower than 1. The situation is most alarming for iron, where both males and
females across ages are in deciency, with females' deciency worse than males'. While protein
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adequacy ratio is above 1 across all ages (with males' ratio higher than females'), the good quality
protein (i.e., protein from animal, dairy, and sh, jointly termed as animal protein) as a share of
required protein is very low. The situation is even worse for haem iron. Finally, (vertical) shift of
these age-adequacy proles for most of the nutrients (and changes in shapes for some nutrients)
across rounds imply variation of individual intakes of these nutrients across rounds.
To illustrate the role of bargaining in intrahousehold nutrient allocation, lowess graphs of calorie
and calcium adequacy of dierent age-sex groups, as examples, are shown in Figure 2.3. The left
(right) panel shows intakes of dierent age-sex group at dierent levels of wife's (head's) assets at
marriage when head's (wife's) assets at marriage is zero. For calorie, most contrasting pattern is
reected for female child. Her calorie adequacy ratio tends to increase with wife's assets but declines
with husband's assets. The rate of decline of female adolescent's adequacy ratio is also much faster
with the increase in head's assets as opposed to his wife's assets. While male adult's adequacy ratio
increases with the increase in head's assets, a v-shaped pattern appears for this adequacy ratio and
wife's assets.
For calcium, adult female's intake initially increases and adult male's intake decreases with
the increase in head's assets. After a point, the female's intake sharply declines while opposite is
observed for the male's intake. Conversely, the initial rate of increase of adult female's intake is
faster with the increase in wife's assets, and after a point the intake declines at a slower rate with the
increase in wife's assets (compared to the increase in head's assets). Adult male's intake appears to
be negatively related with wife's assets. While the male child's intake increases with head's assets,
initially with the increase in wife's assets, it increases slightly and then tends to decline.
All these contrasting relationships between individuals' intakes and spouses' assets at marriage
motivate a more detailed empirical analysis of intrahousehold bargaining on individual nutrient
allocations in the following section.
2.6 Estimation
2.6.1 Calorie intake and health technology
Table 2.3 presents the estimates of the health technology (equation 2.9) for males engaged in
highly energy intensive occupations (HEIO) (as dened in the preceding section) and males who
are not, and for females. OLS estimates are presented along with IFE estimates for comparison
purpose. The results imply three points. First, the role of calorie intake on individual's health
outcome is much limited once unobserved individual and household xed eects are accounted for.
For each of the three categories of individuals, the eect of calorie intake on health outcome is much
higher in OLS than IFE estimates, indicating upward bias in OLS estimates driven by unobserved
individual endowment and household characteristics (such as spouses' tastes). For males in HEIO,
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doubling calorie intake will increase their weights for heights by 5% in OLS estimate, while the
corresponding increase is only 0.67% in IFE estimate. Second, this eect of calorie intake varies
only marginally across individuals based on their energy intensity of occupations. Doubling the
calorie intake of males who are not engaged in HEIO and of females will increase their weight for
height by 0.54% compared to the corresponding increase is 0.67% for males in HEIO based on
IFE estimates. Third, comparison of IFE results with that of PRH (in which, doubling calorie
intake will increase the weight for height of individuals by about 13.6% in 2SLS estimate and
3% in OLS estimate), implies that PRH's 2SLS estimate of calorie elasticity is potentially biased
upward. Regarding the concern of the validity of PRH instruments (as discussed above), head's
schooling seems to have a signicant direct eect on males (not in HEIO) health outcome, while
wife's education (not controlled in PRH) seems to positively and signicantly20 aect females'
health outcomes in OLS estimates. These eects are not identiable in IFE estimates as they are
absorbed in household xed eects. Another PRH instrument, household landholding seems to
signicantly aect males' (in HEIO) health outcomes in IFE estimate. All these in turn may imply
that perhaps the inequality in calorie distribution due to inequality in energy intensity of labour
market activities is overemphasized in PRH analysis.
As regards other variables, economies of scale (in terms of household size, holding the household
composition constant) in health production is observed for males (particularly for those who are in
HEIO) but not for females. Health outcomes for males in HEIO only slightly worsens (by 3%), while
that for males not in HEIO and females slightly improves (by 1-3%) in round 1 and 2 compared
with round 4 (results not shown). As discussed above, IFE estimates of the coecients of the health
technology are used to construct a measure of unobserved health endowment, , which is used in
the nutrient demand equations discussed below.
2.6.2 Intrahousehold Bargaining and Nutrient Allocation
Calorie, Protein, and Vitamin A: Table 2.4 presents the SURLS and SURHFE estimates
of intrahousehold bargaining and allocation of calorie, protein, protein from animal sources (i.e.,
good quality protein), and vitamin A for boys, girls, male adolescents, female adolescents, female
adults, male adults (omitted category), pregnant and lactating females. As SURLS estimates could
be biased (see Section 2.4), the analysis focuses on SURHFE estimates, while SURLS estimates are
provided for comparison purposes. Spouses' assets at marriage and schooling are interacted with
each of these age-gender-physical status categories to analyze whether head's bargaining measures
have signicant dierent eects on the allocation of these nutrients for each of these categories
of individuals than the corresponding eects of wife's bargaining measures. Given the caveats
20Throughout the thesis, "signicant" implies statistical signicance at 10% level or lower, unless specically
mentioned otherwise.
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associated with education as a bargaining measure, my analysis focuses on bargaining based on
assets measures although I use spouses' education and their interactions with each of the age-gender-
physical status categories to control for any potential correlation between education and assets of
spouses. While boys' calorie adequacy ratio is about 29% lower than that of the adult males in
SURHFE estimate, girls' calorie adequacy ratio is 26% lower than that of the adult males, implying
girls have about 3% higher calorie adequacy ratio than boys. While adolescent males' calorie
adequacy ratio are about 5% lower than that of the adult males, there is no signicant dierence
among the adequacy ratio of adolescent females, adult females and adult males. This pattern of
within age-group gender dierence, however, reverses for the allocation of protein, good quality
protein21 and vitamin A. Within each of the age-groups, female's adequacy ratio is signicantly
lower than that of the male for each of these nutrients. Compared to calorie adequacy ratio,
the adequacy ratio for each of these nutrients of pregnant and lactating women are much lower
compared to the corresponding adequacy ratio of adult males (with the exception of pregnant
women's vitamin A adequacy ratio). A wife's assets signicantly and positively aect the calorie
and protein adequacy ratio of girls, calorie adequacy ratio of male adolescents, protein and vitamin
A adequacy ratio and allocation of good quality protein for female adolescents, and protein and
vitamin A adequacy ratio of female adults. For example, doubling a wife's assets would increase
the allocation of good quality protein for female adolescents by 6%. A head's assets, on the other
hand, negatively and signicantly aect the allocation of good quality protein for boys, girls, male
adolescents, and female adolescents, and calorie adequacy ratio of male adolescents. For instance,
doubling a head's asset would reduce the allocation of good quality protein for girls by 3% in
household xed eect estimates. Tests of unitary model for the equality of the eects of head's and
wife's assets 22 (bottom panel of Table 2.4) provide evidence of signicant intrahousehold bargaining
for allocation of calorie, protein, and good quality protein for girls, calorie and good quality protein
for male adolescents, total protein and good quality protein for female adolescents, and calorie
and total protein for female adults with a positive association between a wife's assets and these
allocations.
The eect of individual health endowment () implies compensation for protein and vitamin A
allocations with no signicant eect on calorie allocation. Doubling an individual's endowment will
roughly reduce the adequacy ratio of protein by 1.7% and vitamin A by 1.6%. Apart from vitamin
21The term "adequacy ratio" is loosely used for good quality protein and haem-iron, for which it measures intake
of good quality protein as a share of total protein requirement, and intake of haem iron as a share of total iron
requirement.
22I test the complete set of restrictions for bargaining described in equations 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13 for education
and asset measures for each of the age-sex-pregnancy-lactating group, which are available upon request. As already
mentioned, the chapter focuses on assets as the key bargaining measure, and thus the analysis concentrates on
the restrictions in equation 2.13 based on assets as they are comparable between OLS and FE estimates in SUR
framework.
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A, at the initial level of income, individual intakes of these nutrients increase with the increase in
household income. The increase is most prominent for good quality protein. Although inelastic,
the expenditure elasticity at the initial level of income is higher for total protein than total calorie
intake. Household economies of scale appears to be signicant for individuals' calorie and protein
(in OLS estimates) and for vitamin A (in HFE estimates). In terms of agricultural seasonality,
individuals' intakes of calorie, protein and good quality protein appears to be lowest in round 3.
Vitamin C, D and Iron: Table 2.5 presents the results of intrahousehold bargaining and
individual allocation of vitamin C, D, iron, and haem iron. The adequacy ratio of all the age-sex
groups and pregnant and lactating women are signicantly lower than that of adult males for each
of these nutrients. Within each age-group, the adequacy ratio of males are signicantly higher than
that of females for each of these nutrients, while pregnant and lactating women have signicant
lower adequacy ratio than that of the adult males. For instance, based on xed eect estimates
adult females' iron adequacy ratio are about 93% lower than that of adult males, while the former's
allocation of haem iron as a share of total iron requirement is 108% lower than that of adult males.
A pregnant woman's iron adequacy ration is 170% lower than that of an adult male, while her haem
iron allocation (as a share of her total iron requirement) is about 177% lower than the corresponding
allocation for an adult male. Similarly, a female adolescent's iron adequacy ration is about 18%
lower than that of a male adolescent, while her allocation of haem iron as a share of her total iron
requirement is about 24% lower than the corresponding share of a male adolescent. This degree of
sex-disparity regarding iron is comparatively lower within children as a boy's iron adequacy ration
is about 6% higher than that of a girl, while his haem iron share is about 9% higher than that of
a girl. Within children, the magnitude of sex-disparity appears to be higher for vitamin C and D
than iron adequacy ratio.
Based on the p-values of equality of restrictions of the eect of a wife's and head's assets at
marriage (bottom panel of Table 2.5), signicant intrahousehold bargaining is observed for the
allocation of haem iron as a share of individual's total iron requirement for boys, male and female
adolescents, and for lactating adolescents. A head's assets negatively aect the haem iron allocation
for boys and adolescents, while a wife's assets has the opposite eect. While both head's and wife's
assets are positively associated with the haem iron allocation for lactating adolescents, the eect of
wife's assets is about 6 times higher than that of head's assets. Similarly, while doubling wife's assets
would increase the haem iron (as a share of total iron requirement) by 10% for female adolescents,
the corresponding increase in head's assets would decrease it by 1.5%.
The eect of  implies that households tend to compensate for lower endowments. Doubling an
individual's endowment would reduce his/her adequacy ratio of vitamin C by 1%, vitamin D by 2%,
iron by 3%, and haem iron share by 2%, approximately. Among these nutrients, the expenditure
elasticity seems to be highest for vitamin D at the initial level of income, while household economies
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of scale appears to be signicant for vitamin C and iron intakes. Consumption of vitamin C appears
to be signicantly lower in all three rounds compared with round 4, while consumption of vitamin
D is about 16% lower in round 1, and 39% lower in round 3 compared to that in round 4. while
Households appears to compensate for individual endowments.
Calcium, Niacin, Riboavin, Thiamin, and Folate: Table 2.6 presents the results for
these last set of nutrients. Based on xed eect estimates, calcium adequacy ratio of boys' are 15%
higher than that of girls, that of male adolescents are 11% higher than that of female adolescents,
and adult females' adequacy ratio are 32% lower than that of adult males. Compared with adult
males, the situation of pregnant (83% lower) and lactating females (74% lower) are even worse.
While female adults' niacin adequacy ratio are not signicantly dierent from that of male adults,
both pregnant and lactating women have 19% and 14% lower niacin adequacy ratio than that of
adult males. Sex disparity is also signicant with males having higher niacin adequacy ration than
females within children and adolescent groups. While pregnant women's riboavin adequacy ratio
are not signicantly dierent from that of adult males, lactating women's adequacy ratio are 8%
lower and female adults' ratio 13% lower than that of adult males. Boys' and male adolescents'
adequacy ratio are 9% and 11% higher than girls' and female adolescents', respectively. Similar
pattern of sex disparity across all age-sex-physical status groups observed for thiamin and folate as
well. For folate, while girls' adequacy ratio is not signicantly dierent from that of adult males,
boys' adequacy ratio are about 10% higher than that of adult males (and girls).
Evidence of signicant intrahousehold bargaining appears (bottom panel of Table 2.6) for cal-
cium allocation for male and female adolescents and female adults and riboavin and thiamin
allocations for male adolescents. A wife's assets as opposed to head's assets, positively aect each
of these allocations. For instance, doubling a wife's assets would increase the calcium adequacy
ratio for adult females by 4%, while the eect of corresponding increase in head's assets is not
signicantly dierent from zero.
Similar to the case of other nutrients, allocation of these set of nutrients also imply that house-
holds tend to compensate for low individual health endowments. Although inelastic, intakes of
niacin and thiamin are positively associated with the increase in household expenditure at lower
level of expenditure. OLS estimates also indicate signicant economies of scale for individual con-
sumption of these nutrients within the household. There does not appear to be a consistent pattern
of seasonality, perhaps because seasonality varies for dierent foods. Compared to round 4, calcium
intake is about 6% higher in round 1, niacin intake is about 7% higher in round 2 and 4% higher
in round 3, riboavin intake is 6.5% lower in round 3, folate intake is about 13% lower in round 3,
and thiamin intake is about 9% higher in round 3.
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2.7 Summary and Conclusion
In light of growing concern of micronutrient malnutrition as a critical public policy issue, this
chapter attempts to extend the previous literature on intrahousehold food distribution by analysing
intrahousehold nutrient allocation in a bargaining framework. While the focus of the previous work
has been on calorie allocation, this chapter attempts to demonstrate that calorie intake may not
necessarily be a sucient metric of nutrient adequacy as micronutrient deciency can co-exist with
calorie adequacy. The gender disparity is more prominent in the allocation of a range of critical
nutrients than in calorie allocation within the household. Pregnant and lactating women appear
to be most vulnerable as their intakes fall far short of their elevated requirements, which in turn
might lead to nutrient deciency of the newborns.
Previous work on intrahousehold food distribution has adopted a unitary framework, which has
been rejected empirically for a wide range of outcomes in recent decades. PRH, an inuential work
in this genre, further have demonstrated that food distribution in a poor economy like Bangladesh
is due to gender-disparity in energy intensity of labour market activities in which health inuences
labour market productivity and returns for males but not for females. However, the individual xed
eect estimates of health technology in this chapter indicate that PRH claim might be overempha-
sized as their estimate of the eect of calorie on individual's health outcomes might be biased
upward due to unobserved household xed eects. These unobserved eects also raise concerns
about the validity of the instruments used by PRH to reach to their conclusion. Moreover, as the
nutrition literature suggests, while calorie intake is a direct function of calorie expenditure and thus
of energy intensity of labour market activities, various nutrients analysed in this chapter need not.
In a bargaining framework, controlling for potential marriage market selection and unobserved
household xed eects, I demonstrate evidence of intrahousehold bargaining and positive eect of
a wife's bargaining power as opposed to her husband's in the allocation of various nutrients for
children and adolescents of both sexes, and for adult females. Thus, the policy implication of this
chapter fundamentally diers from that based on a unitary framework. Based on PRH in a unitary
framework, a key policy paradigm is to increase energy-intensive labour market opportunities for
women, or to achieve economic development by transforming work activities to those in which
linkages between food consumption and productivity are weak, which however, might increase
within-group inequality for women due to wider variation in their economic activities. On the
other hand, my ndings imply that for any given level of economic development and household
income, gender disparity (both between the sexes and within the adult women group) could be
potentially reduced through increased women's bargaining power within the household achieved
through various legal and policy changes that grant women more control over resources. This
policy implication is consistent with a number of studies that provide evidence that more control of
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resources by women leads to an improvement in child health, nutrition, education, and on women's
own well-being. Moreover, women's participation in the labour market, a key policy lever in the
unitary framework itself is endogenous and is an outcome of intrahousehold bargaining.
However, the change in a woman's bargaining power may aect the marriages (and perhaps
divorces). The measure of bargaining power used in this chapter (assets at marriage) is largely
determined by parental wealth, and in this society the norm is that parents arrange the marriages
for their osprings. Thus, future work perhaps could focus on how the policy change leading to
increased female controls of resources could potentially aect household formation and dissolution
and not just intrahousehold allocation in a traditional poor rural society.
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Figure 2.1: Adequacy Ratio, Lowess Fit, Bandwidth=0.8
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Figure 2.2: Adequacy Ratio, Lowess Fit, Bandwidth=0.8
36
.6.811.21.4
calorie adequacy ratio
0
20
40
60
w
ife
’s 
as
se
ts
 (in
 00
0 t
ak
a),
 he
ad
’s 
as
se
ts=
0
.6.811.21.4
calorie adequacy ratio
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
he
ad
’s 
as
se
ts
 (in
 00
0 t
ak
a),
 w
ife
’s 
as
se
ts=
0
.2.4.6.81
calcium adequacy ratio
0
20
40
60
w
ife
’s 
as
se
ts
 (in
 00
0 t
ak
a),
 he
ad
’s 
as
se
ts=
0
m
ch
ld
fc
hl
d
m
a
do
l
fa
do
l
m
a
dl
t
fa
dl
t
.2.4.6.81
calcium adequacy ratio
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
he
ad
’s 
as
se
ts
 (in
 00
0 t
ak
a),
 w
ife
’s 
as
se
ts=
0
m
ch
ld
fc
hl
d
m
a
do
l
fa
do
l
m
a
dl
t
fa
dl
t
Figure 2.3: Adequacy Ratio & Spouses' Assets, Lowess Fit, Bandwidth=0.8
Note: mchld, male child, fchld, female child mdol, male adolescent, fadol, female adolescent, madlt, male adult, fadlt, female adult
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of IFPRI and HES Samples
Variables IFPRI HES
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Rural
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean
HH size 6.57 2.98 6.54 2.94 6.46 2.79 6.40 2.79 5.25
Share of
Boy 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13
Girl 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13
Madol 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.14
Fadol 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12
Male adult 0.30 0.13 0.29 0.13 0.29 0.13 0.30 0.13
Female adult 0.27 0.11 0.27 0.11 0.27 0.11 0.27 0.11
Preg 71 64 55 67
Lact 286 303 299 251
W/H (kg/cm)
Boy 0.139 0.026 0.141 0.025 0.141 0.026 0.142 0.045
Girl 0.135 0.026 0.135 0.026 0.137 0.025 0.136 0.025
Madol 0.221 0.044 0.225 0.046 0.228 0.045 0.227 0.044
Fadol 0.231 0.048 0.233 0.047 0.233 0.045 0.233 0.047
Male adult 0.299 0.036 0.298 0.036 0.298 0.035 0.300 0.053
Female adult 0.280 0.038 0.277 0.038 0.279 0.038 0.282 0.040
Mcapx 676.35 465.01 607.46 454.36 716.17 471.34 697.14 642.33 662.00
Lpc (acre) 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.27
VUV of
Rice 10.87 0.83 9.79 0.70 11.41 1.10 10.00 0.79
Pulses 31.52 2.92 34.23 3.78 32.52 2.46 29.84 3.91
Big sh 77.07 13.05 60.40 10.40 68.34 10.20 85.42 17.51
Small sh 65.67 8.98 46.69 6.63 64.72 13.73 68.77 12.64
Egg 64.95 7.29 78.03 10.31 65.32 8.22 69.24 9.48
Pov rate Share of Individual Below the Poverty Line
Abs poor 67.57 66.48 71.81 59.48 47.1
Hcore poor 42.53 45.69 48.82 37.46 24.6
Pov rate (CBN) Share of Individual below
UPL LPL UPL LPL UPL LPL UPL LPL UPL
Site 1 0.54 0.36 66.81 53.25 50.24 32.02 54.65 38.86 55.2
Site 2 0.43 0.37 59.52 51.01 38.68 32.39 46.18 39.34 LPL
Site 3 0.53 0.33 62.29 47.58 51.72 37.98 54.37 35.74 38.5
Time Invariant Household Characteristics
Landless 4.75 5.5
< 1 acre 48.75 61.3
1 - < 2.5 acres 25.27 19
2.5 - < 7.5 acres 19.13 12
 7.5 acres 2.1 2.2
Spouse charc. Mean Std Mean Std
Age Head 46.48 12.16 Wife 37.63 11.04
Education Head 3.50 4.16 Wife 1.74 2.79
Assets Head 32,266 149,113 Wife 2,683 10,704
of which,
housing Head 2,364 6,624 Wife 184.29 2,044.36
cattle Head 7,178 29,758 Wife 479.74 3,322.83
durables Head 2,874 8,956 Wife 1,205.12 4,388.96
food Head 0 0 Wife 382.29 930.86
land Head 20,284 139,639 Wife 604.35 7,972.25
Note: HH, household; Madol, male adolescent; Fadol, female adolescent; preg, pregnant; lact, lactating; W/H, weight for height;
Mcapx, monthly per capita expenditure; lpc, land, per capita; vuv, village unit values;
pov, poverty; abs, absolute; hcore, hardcore; charc, characteristics; STD, standard deviation
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Table 2.3: Estimation of Health Technology: OLS and IFE
Variables Dependent Variable: L (Individual's weight for height)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male, HEIO Male, not HEIO Female
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
L calorie 0.0513*** 0.0067*** 0.1097*** 0.0054** 0.0760*** 0.0054***
intake (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
preg 0.1197*** 0.0333***
nant (0.010) (0.004)
lact 0.0653*** -0.0077**
ating (0.008) (0.004)
L mcapx 0.0827 0.0049 0.1384* 0.0078 0.0570 -0.0239
(0.076) (0.019) (0.076) (0.024) (0.057) (0.015)
(L mcapx)2 -0.0044 -0.0003 -0.0085 -0.0007 -0.0024 0.0017
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
L land 0.0108 0.0229* 0.0142 -0.0140 -0.0141 -0.0050
per capita (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011)
L household 0.0453*** 0.0295** 0.0319** -0.0079 0.0098 -0.0040
size (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012)
share of -0.0798* -0.0142 -0.2174*** -0.0464 -0.1576*** -0.0589**
boys (0.043) (0.026) (0.047) (0.031) (0.040) (0.026)
share of -0.0748* -0.0565** -0.0330 -0.0178 -0.2523*** -0.0673***
girls (0.043) (0.024) (0.050) (0.032) (0.039) (0.025)
share of -0.0033 -0.0309 -0.0891* 0.0031 -0.1077*** -0.0700***
madol (0.047) (0.025) (0.048) (0.029) (0.040) (0.024)
share of -0.0062 -0.0490** -0.0750 -0.0011 -0.0870** -0.0063
fadol (0.041) (0.021) (0.047) (0.028) (0.035) (0.020)
share of 0.0425 0.0084 0.1949*** 0.0418 -0.0003 -0.0129
madlt (0.046) (0.023) (0.052) (0.031) (0.044) (0.024)
head's 0.0017 0.0033*** 0.0012
schooling (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
wife's 0.0011 0.0025 0.0046***
schooling (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
head's -0.0087*** 0.0019 0.0028
age (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
head's 0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0000
age2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
wife's 0.0059* -0.0067 -0.0046
age (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
wife's -0.0001** 0.0001 0.0000
age2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L hvpwed -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
L wvpwed 0.0073* 0.0003 0.0007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant -5.6971*** -8.3137*** -3.8445*** -2.2452*** -3.6609*** -2.5293***
(0.344) (0.919) (0.278) (0.115) (0.198) (0.112)
Adj.R2 0.370 0.125 0.821 0.128 0.753 0.146
Observations 2,815 2,815 4,565 4,565 7,305 7,305
Individuals 858 858 1436 1,436 2152 2,152
Note: HEIO, high energy intensive occupation; L natural log, mcapx, monthly per capita expenditure; madol, male
adolescent; fadol, female adolescent; madlt, male adult; hvpwed, 1+head's assets; wvpwed, 1+wife's assets (both in 000;
taka); additional controls are log age and its square; survey rounds and site dummies; robust standard errors are in
parentheses clustered at individual level; *** signicant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 1% level.
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Table 2.4: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Calorie, Protein, and Vitamin
A Allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Lcal Lcal Lprot Lprot Lanimprot Lanimprot Lvita Lvita
SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE
boy -0.305*** -0.292*** -0.167*** -0.164*** -0.193*** -0.211*** -0.550*** -0.460***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.025) (0.063) (0.050) (0.061) (0.050)
girl -0.256*** -0.259*** -0.205*** -0.225*** -0.221*** -0.266*** -0.643*** -0.585***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.067) (0.054) (0.071) (0.057)
madol -0.046* -0.050** -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.333*** -0.355*** -0.361*** -0.322***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.056) (0.046) (0.054) (0.044)
fadol -0.030 -0.044 -0.358*** -0.373*** -0.556*** -0.512*** -0.376*** -0.383***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.022) (0.061) (0.049) (0.057) (0.045)
fadlt 0.005 0.000 -0.146*** -0.143*** -0.344*** -0.297*** -0.115*** -0.089**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.049) (0.041) (0.042) (0.036)
preg -0.106*** -0.111** -0.281*** -0.317*** -0.451*** -0.518*** -0.081 -0.014
(0.041) (0.046) (0.039) (0.044) (0.171) (0.132) (0.138) (0.124)
lact -0.048* -0.010 -0.333*** -0.338*** -0.250*** -0.412*** -0.451*** -0.386***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.077) (0.059) (0.074) (0.057)
L hast  0.006 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.049*** -0.024* 0.006 -0.009
boy (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.017)
L wast  -0.016 -0.009 -0.015 -0.003 0.012 0.047 -0.001 -0.000
boy (0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.042) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035)
L hast  0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 -0.034 -0.030* -0.008 0.018
girl (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017)
L wast  0.027 0.040* 0.010 0.031* 0.034 0.057 0.059 0.051
girl (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.049) (0.041) (0.049) (0.045)
L hast  -0.014** -0.013** -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 -0.027** -0.004 -0.001
madol (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
L wast  0.029* 0.029* 0.021 0.018 0.023 0.035 0.035 0.022
madol (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.036) (0.027) (0.030) (0.024)
L hast  -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.019 -0.028* 0.014 0.010
fadol (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012)
L wast  0.015 0.030* 0.002 0.029** 0.060* 0.060** 0.002 0.057*
fadol (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.036) (0.028) (0.035) (0.031)
L hast  -0.007 -0.007 0.006 0.004 0.005 -0.008 0.012 0.015
fadlt (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
L wast  0.013 0.020 0.021* 0.027** 0.040 0.033 0.034 0.039*
fadlt (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021)
L hast  0.027 0.022 0.016 0.017 0.069 0.084* -0.032 -0.054
preg (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.054) (0.046) (0.070) (0.069)
L wast  0.016 0.022 -0.006 0.020 0.002 0.055 -0.024 -0.032
preg (0.029) (0.036) (0.026) (0.032) (0.135) (0.135) (0.093) (0.087)
L hast  0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.013* -0.017 0.006 -0.019 -0.025
lact (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.018)
L wast  -0.022 -0.049* -0.003 -0.030 -0.005 0.010 -0.055 -0.064
lact (0.022) (0.030) (0.021) (0.029) (0.055) (0.051) (0.057) (0.047)
L hast 0.001 -0.001 0.023** 0.015
(0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010)
L wast -0.028** -0.022** -0.007 -0.014
(0.012) (0.011) (0.024) (0.022)
kappa 0.000 0.001 -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
L mcapx 0.435*** 0.300* 0.478*** 0.526*** 2.074*** 1.405* 0.509 0.019
(0.152) (0.168) (0.168) (0.181) (0.575) (0.748) (0.444) (0.608)
(L macapx)2 -0.026** -0.016 -0.030** -0.032** -0.126*** -0.089 -0.032 0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.043) (0.055) (0.033) (0.045)
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Table 2.4: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Calorie, Protein, and Vitamin
A Allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Lcal Lcal Lprot Lprot Lanimprot Lanimprot Lvita Lvita
SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE
L landpc 0.052*** -0.067 0.025 -0.142 0.021 -0.236 -0.072 0.457
(0.018) (0.107) (0.017) (0.113) (0.057) (0.436) (0.055) (0.407)
L hhsz 0.030* 0.048 0.041** -0.032 0.074 -0.249 0.049 0.824*
(0.018) (0.108) (0.020) (0.121) (0.064) (0.496) (0.057) (0.452)
round1 -0.021 -0.020 0.027* 0.019 0.166*** 0.123** 0.020 0.051
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.057) (0.062) (0.056) (0.060)
round2 0.036 0.054** 0.057** 0.062** 0.177** 0.008 -0.206** -0.239**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.081) (0.089) (0.085) (0.095)
round3 -0.080*** -0.083*** -0.045** -0.064*** -0.146** -0.215*** -0.137** -0.098
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.067) (0.079) (0.065) (0.075)
Constant -2.413*** -2.309*** -1.303* -2.192*** -5.716** -4.652 -5.875*** -5.709*
(0.611) (0.766) (0.673) (0.832) (2.481) (3.571) (2.030) (3.148)
Observations 10,555 10515 10,555 10515 10,555 10515 10,555 10515
test of equation 2.13 for L hast=L wast, for :
boy 0.429 0.701 0.557 0.956 0.193 0.065 0.867 0.820
girl 0.282 0.103 0.610 0.103 0.221 0.059 0.220 0.513
madol 0.012 0.015 0.123 0.152 0.402 0.045 0.235 0.416
fadol 0.412 0.108 0.886 0.046 0.057 0.009 0.761 0.150
fadlt 0.189 0.084 0.283 0.064 0.279 0.196 0.404 0.318
preg, fadol 0.902 0.484 0.490 0.419 0.933 0.684 0.975 0.554
preg, fadlt 0.806 0.513 0.821 0.491 0.824 0.936 0.800 0.681
lact, fadol 0.679 0.669 0.894 0.702 0.213 0.126 0.482 0.881
lact, fadlt 0.742 0.533 0.370 0.813 0.350 0.324 0.771 0.705
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
cal, calorie adequacy ratio; prot, protein adequacy ratio; animprot, animal protein intake/total protein requirement;
vita, vitamin A adequacy ratio; L, natural log; madol, male adolescent; fadol, female adolescent; fadlt, female adult;
preg, pregnant; lact, lactating; hast, 1+husband's assets; wast, 1+wife's assets; mcapx, monthly per capita expenditure
landpc, per capita land; hhsz, household size; additional controls (not shown) are discussed in section 2.4.
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Table 2.5: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Vitamin C, D, and Iron Allo-
cations
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
VARIABLES Lvitc Lvitc Lvitd Lvitd Liron Liron Lanimiron Lanimiron
SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE
boy -0.350*** -0.293*** -1.026*** -0.942*** -0.673*** -0.624*** -0.630*** -0.636***
(0.054) (0.045) (0.096) (0.077) (0.035) (0.035) (0.065) (0.055)
girl -0.471*** -0.401*** -1.087*** -1.055*** -0.740*** -0.713*** -0.690*** -0.722***
(0.059) (0.054) (0.112) (0.097) (0.042) (0.040) (0.072) (0.058)
madol -0.103** -0.103*** -0.135* -0.132** -0.516*** -0.506*** -0.512*** -0.559***
(0.041) (0.036) (0.072) (0.059) (0.036) (0.037) (0.061) (0.054)
fadol -0.164*** -0.197*** -0.379*** -0.341*** -0.699*** -0.690*** -0.833*** -0.804***
(0.045) (0.037) (0.082) (0.062) (0.041) (0.041) (0.065) (0.058)
fadlt -0.328*** -0.322*** -0.350*** -0.323*** -0.951*** -0.925*** -1.122*** -1.082***
(0.035) (0.030) (0.064) (0.051) (0.029) (0.029) (0.051) (0.044)
preg -0.438*** -0.351*** -1.598*** -1.589*** -1.678*** -1.710*** -1.777*** -1.776***
(0.114) (0.119) (0.209) (0.168) (0.076) (0.072) (0.164) (0.135)
lact -0.394*** -0.296*** -1.202*** -1.188*** -0.365*** -0.358*** -0.254*** -0.409***
(0.057) (0.047) (0.108) (0.086) (0.038) (0.036) (0.079) (0.058)
L hast  0.046** 0.018 0.008 -0.012 0.008 -0.005 -0.056*** -0.031**
boy (0.020) (0.015) (0.030) (0.025) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.016)
L wast  -0.024 -0.021 -0.013 0.007 -0.005 -0.010 0.039 0.037
boy (0.036) (0.034) (0.078) (0.070) (0.021) (0.022) (0.042) (0.036)
L hast  0.015 -0.001 -0.014 -0.025 0.006 0.006 -0.025 -0.023
girl (0.020) (0.018) (0.035) (0.028) (0.011) (0.010) (0.022) (0.016)
L wast  0.057 0.074* -0.084 -0.021 -0.005 0.021 0.025 0.045
girl (0.043) (0.044) (0.093) (0.092) (0.023) (0.021) (0.051) (0.045)
L hast  -0.009 0.003 -0.006 -0.028* -0.015 -0.013 -0.030* -0.033**
madol (0.014) (0.011) (0.020) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.014)
L wast  0.047* 0.033* 0.019 -0.004 0.041* 0.024 0.027 0.045
madol (0.025) (0.018) (0.046) (0.036) (0.023) (0.022) (0.038) (0.033)
L hast  0.010 0.018* -0.002 -0.009 0.027** 0.018 -0.010 -0.015
fadol (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017)
L wast  -0.039 0.029 0.075 0.053 0.027 0.050* 0.111*** 0.096***
fadol (0.034) (0.027) (0.047) (0.038) (0.029) (0.028) (0.040) (0.035)
L hast  0.018* 0.022** 0.010 0.008 0.002 0.001 -0.008 -0.015
fadlt (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
L wast  0.056** 0.058*** 0.012 0.013 -0.006 -0.003 0.018 0.005
fadlt (0.022) (0.021) (0.033) (0.032) (0.014) (0.014) (0.026) (0.026)
L hast  -0.024 -0.025 0.106 0.186*** -0.001 0.007 0.073 0.077
preg (0.059) (0.056) (0.085) (0.065) (0.039) (0.034) (0.054) (0.047)
L wast  0.062 0.034 0.153 0.132 -0.009 0.041 -0.115 -0.048
preg (0.077) (0.079) (0.138) (0.117) (0.039) (0.040) (0.162) (0.172)
L hast  -0.007 -0.038** 0.060* 0.019 -0.006 -0.013 -0.017 0.004
lact (0.020) (0.016) (0.035) (0.031) (0.012) (0.011) (0.025) (0.019)
L wast  -0.101* -0.089* 0.000 -0.015 -0.001 -0.021 -0.006 0.026
lact (0.054) (0.048) (0.077) (0.069) (0.029) (0.038) (0.057) (0.052)
L hast 0.010 -0.010 -0.006 0.021*
(0.009) (0.018) (0.006) (0.012)
L wast -0.038* -0.027 -0.009 0.006
(0.020) (0.039) (0.013) (0.024)
kappa -0.003 -0.013*** -0.019* -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.015** -0.016**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
L mcapx 0.878** 0.620 2.797*** 2.512** 0.492* 0.150 2.060*** 0.917
(0.397) (0.485) (0.939) (1.169) (0.254) (0.262) (0.586) (0.721)
(L macapx)2 -0.056* -0.040 -0.186*** -0.178** -0.029 -0.006 -0.122*** -0.052
(0.030) (0.036) (0.071) (0.088) (0.019) (0.019) (0.044) (0.054)
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Table 2.5: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Vitamin C, D, and Iron Allo-
cations
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
VARIABLES Lvitc Lvitc Lvitd Lvitd Liron Liron Lanimiron Lanimiron
SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE
L landpc -0.028 0.605* -0.022 0.204 0.022 0.005 -0.023 -0.172
(0.046) (0.337) (0.083) (0.584) (0.026) (0.173) (0.060) (0.421)
L hhsz 0.042 0.999*** 0.054 0.406 0.068** 0.085 0.062 -0.308
(0.049) (0.369) (0.099) (0.651) (0.028) (0.181) (0.067) (0.476)
round1 -0.249*** -0.236*** -0.083 -0.160* 0.039* 0.022 0.146** 0.092
(0.044) (0.047) (0.086) (0.090) (0.023) (0.024) (0.058) (0.061)
round2 -0.423*** -0.375*** 0.025 -0.123 -0.013 0.008 0.207** 0.061
(0.066) (0.071) (0.124) (0.139) (0.035) (0.037) (0.084) (0.092)
round3 -0.130** -0.096* -0.296*** -0.390*** 0.014 -0.009 0.004 -0.094
(0.051) (0.058) (0.110) (0.121) (0.030) (0.031) (0.066) (0.076)
Constant -7.229*** -6.942*** 1.876 0.430 -3.344*** -3.220*** -9.033*** -7.312**
(1.698) (2.515) (3.828) (5.076) (1.017) (1.201) (2.535) (3.393)
Observations 10,555 10,515 10,555 10,515 10,555 10,515 10,555 10,515
P-value of the tests of equation 2.13 for L hast=L wast, for :
boy 0.076 0.286 0.811 0.801 0.574 0.852 0.053 0.085
girl 0.404 0.130 0.494 0.968 0.679 0.530 0.385 0.170
madol 0.067 0.189 0.636 0.554 0.028 0.131 0.194 0.034
fadol 0.189 0.703 0.156 0.126 0.991 0.267 0.008 0.005
fadlt 0.121 0.117 0.961 0.880 0.596 0.775 0.407 0.495
pregnant, fadol 0.711 0.487 0.476 0.950 0.905 0.253 0.701 0.945
pregnant, fadlt 0.204 0.337 0.773 0.729 0.788 0.585 0.351 0.581
lactating, fadol 0.021 0.437 0.863 0.706 0.880 0.583 0.084 0.029
lactating, fadlt 0.221 0.704 0.399 0.656 0.930 0.725 0.476 0.367
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
vitc, vitamin C adequacy ratio; vitd, vitamin D adequacy ratio; iron, iron adequacy ratio; animiron, animal iron
intake/total iron requirement; L, natural log; madol, male adolescent; fadol, female adolescent; fadlt, female adult;
preg, pregnant; lact, lactating; hast, 1+husband's assets; wast, 1+wife's assets; mcapx, monthly per capita expenditure
landpc, per capita land; hhsz, household size; additional controls (not shown) are discussed in section 2.4.
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Table 2.6: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Calcium, Niacin, Riboavin,
Thiamin, and Folate Allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Vars Lcalci Lcalci Lniac Lniac Lribo Lribo Lthia Lthia Lfola Lfola
SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE
boy -0.795*** -0.772*** -0.463*** -0.446*** -0.431*** -0.411*** -0.434*** -0.415*** 0.046 0.096***
(0.039) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.041) (0.034)
girl -0.945*** -0.922*** -0.520*** -0.508*** -0.525*** -0.503*** -0.490*** -0.473*** -0.040 -0.013
(0.047) (0.044) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.045) (0.038)
madol -0.690*** -0.679*** -0.312*** -0.311*** -0.316*** -0.311*** -0.251*** -0.241*** -0.159*** -0.135***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.035) (0.029)
fadol -0.787*** -0.793*** -0.240*** -0.253*** -0.239*** -0.247*** -0.186*** -0.197*** -0.109*** -0.118***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.038) (0.030)
fadlt -0.330*** -0.320*** -0.028 -0.010 -0.145*** -0.128*** -0.098*** -0.075*** -0.190*** -0.166***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.029) (0.025)
preg -0.837*** -0.830*** -0.134** -0.188*** -0.093 -0.103 -0.144*** -0.192*** -0.975*** -0.953***
(0.098) (0.091) (0.053) (0.055) (0.064) (0.064) (0.050) (0.053) (0.096) (0.090)
lact -0.774*** -0.743*** -0.132*** -0.142*** -0.087*** -0.078*** -0.136*** -0.131*** -0.367*** -0.358***
(0.047) (0.036) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.047) (0.038)
L hast  0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.011 0.005 0.007 -0.007
boy (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
L wast 0.013 0.024 -0.017 -0.018 -0.002 0.013 -0.016 -0.007 -0.025 -0.006
boy (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
L hast  0.000 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.013
girl (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
L wast 0.068* 0.064* 0.005 0.023 0.053** 0.046** 0.004 0.028 0.017 0.037
girl (0.035) (0.034) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.033) (0.030)
L hast  -0.003 -0.008 -0.012* -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 -0.012 -0.009
madol (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008)
L wast 0.043** 0.042** 0.017 0.015 0.030** 0.029** 0.025* 0.015 0.032 0.013
madol (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.022) (0.015)
L hast  0.016 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.003
fadol (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008)
L wast -0.007 0.054** -0.014 0.010 -0.006 0.029 -0.013 0.015 -0.041 0.014
fadol (0.028) (0.025) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.027) (0.020)
L hast  0.014* 0.010 0.015** 0.015** 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.014* 0.015**
fadlt (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
L wast 0.038** 0.043*** 0.014 0.019 0.022* 0.026** 0.019 0.024** 0.027* 0.023
fadlt (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015)
L hast  0.004 0.000 0.016 0.023 0.001 -0.003 0.020 0.028 -0.012 -0.003
preg (0.053) (0.049) (0.025) (0.027) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027) (0.023) (0.050) (0.042)
L wast -0.016 -0.013 0.047 0.095* -0.025 -0.002 -0.012 0.033 0.053 0.077
preg (0.058) (0.055) (0.053) (0.052) (0.043) (0.040) (0.044) (0.037) (0.057) (0.057)
L hast  -0.021 -0.025** -0.004 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.003 -0.011 -0.031* -0.036***
lact (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017) (0.013)
L wast -0.039 -0.041 -0.001 -0.031 -0.018 -0.028 0.001 -0.020 -0.037 -0.019
lact (0.038) (0.034) (0.027) (0.037) (0.026) (0.031) (0.023) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035)
L hast 0.010 -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
L wast -0.013 -0.024* -0.020* -0.017 0.000
(0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)
kappa -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.004 -0.010***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
L mcapx 0.638* -0.090 0.911*** 0.591*** 0.720*** 0.367 0.731*** 0.464** 0.393 0.183
(0.328) (0.356) (0.199) (0.209) (0.235) (0.261) (0.221) (0.226) (0.329) (0.382)
(L mac -0.035 0.016 -0.060*** -0.038** -0.044** -0.021 -0.046*** -0.029* -0.018 -0.007
apx)2 (0.025) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.028)
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Table 2.6: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Calcium, Niacin, Riboavin,
Thiamin, and Folate Allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Vars Lcalci Lcalci Lniac Lniac Lribo Lribo Lthia Lthia Lfola Lfola
SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE SURLS SURHFE
L landpc 0.015 0.184 0.036* -0.001 0.014 -0.017 0.017 0.003 0.016 0.157
(0.035) (0.219) (0.020) (0.127) (0.022) (0.166) (0.020) (0.140) (0.036) (0.255)
L hhsz 0.085** 0.374 0.083*** 0.110 0.066*** 0.125 0.064*** 0.121 0.095** 0.254
(0.035) (0.244) (0.024) (0.133) (0.025) (0.192) (0.024) (0.148) (0.040) (0.280)
round1 0.046 0.064* -0.018 -0.035* 0.018 0.015 0.013 -0.003 -0.069* -0.049
(0.034) (0.035) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.036) (0.037)
round2 0.049 0.008 0.053* 0.067** -0.022 -0.017 0.029 0.043 -0.136*** -0.106*
(0.050) (0.053) (0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.038) (0.031) (0.032) (0.051) (0.056)
round3 -0.013 0.012 0.070*** 0.042* -0.058** -0.065** 0.113*** 0.089*** -0.165*** -0.127***
(0.041) (0.044) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.031) (0.025) (0.027) (0.043) (0.047)
Const. -6.956*** -5.018*** -3.636*** -3.516*** -5.121*** -4.479*** -3.328*** -3.245*** -2.211* -0.463
(1.371) (1.781) (0.806) (0.980) (0.951) (1.253) (0.860) (1.032) (1.340) (1.773)
Obs. 10,555 10,515 10,555 10,515 10,555 10,515 10,555 10,515 10,555 10,515
P-value of the tests of equation 2.13 for L hast=L wast, for :
boy 0.717 0.320 0.458 0.486 0.731 0.653 0.260 0.616 0.189 0.984
girl 0.078 0.132 0.957 0.429 0.069 0.151 0.987 0.285 0.801 0.446
madol 0.065 0.016 0.095 0.188 0.017 0.012 0.031 0.089 0.081 0.226
fadol 0.456 0.089 0.330 0.823 0.481 0.195 0.283 0.520 0.092 0.606
fadlt 0.176 0.044 0.946 0.769 0.368 0.148 0.384 0.146 0.465 0.627
preg,
fadol
0.606 0.687 0.880 0.247 0.475 0.654 0.370 0.762 0.863 0.218
preg,
fadlt
0.961 0.800 0.640 0.219 0.801 0.721 0.712 0.622 0.326 0.219
lact,
fadol
0.402 0.468 0.633 0.727 0.505 0.807 0.542 1.000 0.230 0.496
lact,
fadlt
0.878 0.608 0.927 0.689 0.829 0.931 0.495 0.766 0.862 0.466
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
calci, calcium adequacy ratio; niac, niacin adequacy ratio; ribo, riboavin adequacy ratio; thiamin adequacy
ratio; fola, folate adequacy ratio; L, natural log; madol, male adolescent; fadol, female adolescent; fadlt, female adult;
preg, pregnant; lact, lactating; hast, 1+husband's assets; wast, 1+wife's assets; mcapx, monthly per capita expenditure
landpc, per capita land; hhsz, household size; obs, observations; additional controls (not shown) are discussed in section 2.4.
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Appendix
Construction of Adequacy Ratio for dierent Age-Gender Group for Calorie and
Other Nutrients
Calorie Requirement, RDAcali : As is well-known in nutrition literature, among the nutrients
analyzed here, only an individual's calorie requirement depends on his/her energy expenditure.
At a given age, the main component of the energy requirement is the BMR. The relationship of
the energy expenditure of a given level of physical activity to BMR is aected by the metabolic
constant, mc (described above) of that activity, body weight, and age. For ages 18 years and
above, the energy requirement calculation proceeds as follows. First, I calculate the BMR from
body weight of individuals based on the methodology described in World Health Organization
(1985) (henceforth, WHO methodology)23. Utilising 24-hour time allocation data of individuals
(for a subset of individuals, this data is available in the survey), energy requirement for dierent
activities are then calculated as : tamcaBMR, where ta is time (in minutes) spent in an activity,
a. Total energy requirement for individuals of age 18 years and older is the sum of his/her energy
requirement in dierent activities in 24 hours (including sleep). Based on WHO methodology, an
allowance of 285 kcal is given for pregnancy and 500 kcal for lactating status.
Energy requirement for children is estimated directly from the observed intakes of healthy chil-
dren growing normally. These requirements for each age are given in World Health Organization
(1985) and are based on the United States National Center for Health Statistics, NCHS, referenced
children sample24. Finally, as time allocation data is scarce for adolescent group in IFPRI sample,
the calorie requirement data of the reference NCHS adolescent group as reported in World Health
Organization (1985) is used as proxy for calorie requirement of adolescent group in IFPRI data25.
Protein and Micronutrient Requirements: While the main determinants of energy re-
quirement are body weight, age, and physical activity, for protein requirement, the determinants
are only body weight and age, and not physical activity. Moreover, measuring protein quantity is
not enough, as protein quality is also important. Good quality proteins are those that provide ade-
quate amounts of essential amino acids and have a high degree of digestibility. These conditions are
satised by the proteins in egg, milk, meat, and sh26. A correction is required both for digestibility
and amino acid score for protein from all other sources when analysing the protein requirement27.
23BMR (in kilocalories per day) of dierent age-sex groups are predicted based on the following equations: (i)
males (18-30 years): 15:3W + 679, (ii) males (30-60 years): 11:6W + 879, (iii) males (> 60 years): 13:5W + 487;
(iv) females (18-30 years): 14:7W + 496, (v) females (30-60 years): 8:7W + 829, and (vi) females (> 60 years):
10:5W + 596, where W is the body weight in kilograms.
24The rationale for using NCHS referenced sample of children are many. First, for young infants and children,
requirement for growth is a substantial component of the total requirement for energy and there are large variations
within the normal range of the rate of growth among children. Second, for both infants and children, it is not possible
to specify with any condence the allowance that should be made for a desirable level of physical activity. Third, while
time spent in all types of physical activities need to be known in order to calculate total energy expenditure, that
information is generally not available. Finally, while children in many developing countries are smaller at birth than
those in industrialized countries and grow at a slower rate during infancy and early childhood, the evidence suggests
that in young children these dierences are mainly due to environmental factors including inadequate nutrition, and
that genetic and ethnic factors are of lesser signicance. Therefore, young children of dierent ethnic groups should
be considered as having the same or similar growth potentials. Thus, it is desirable that the growth potential of
children be fully expressed and provided for in energy and protein requirements (World Health Organization, 1985).
25if adolescents are engaged in more energy-intensive work in rural Bangladesh, then these requirement gures will
be underestimation of actual requirements for this group.
26For example, while the protein from egg, milk, meat, or sh has 100% digestibility relative to reference proteins
the digestibility of an Indian rice and beans diet is only 82%
27These corrections can be applied either to the requirement or the dietary protein intake. The total protein content
of the diet = total N(nitrogen) 6.25. The biological value of the diet = total protein  digestibility factor  amino
acid score. The digestibility factor is the digestibility relative to that of the reference protein (e.g., egg, milk, meat,
or sh), expressed as a percentage. The amino acid score expresses the amino acid pattern as a percentage of the
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I use the protein requirement gures for dierent age-sex groups (corrected for requirements) with
necessary allowance for pregnancy and lactation from Food and Agriculture Organization (2009)28.
Although required in small amounts, micronutrients are essential for life, and needed for a
wide range of body functions and processes. Age-sex specic RDA gures (with pregnancy and
lactating allowance) for dierent micronutrients are obtained from World Food Programme (2000).
Analogous to quality of protein, sources of iron are important. Iron in meat (haem iron) is more
easily absorbed than iron contained in plant foods (non-haem iron). Trace minerals from the meat
sources have higher bio-availability and contribute to higher bio-availability of iron from plant
sources. Similarly, nutrition literature indicates that minerals and vitamins from meat sources are
more highly bio-available than from plant sources. Moreover, meat consumption can increase the
bio-availability of minerals and vitamins contained in plant products when meats and plants are
consumed concurrently. I use the iron requirement gures that assumes very low iron bioavailability
as observed in South Asian Diet.
appropriate reference pattern for each age group. These corrected intakes are then compared with the requirement.
The corrected requirement in terms of the diet consumed is: standard requirement  1
digestibility
 1
aminoacidscore
.
The corrected requirements are then compared with observed intakes. See World Health Organization (1985) for
further discussions.
28The requirement is based on a diet containing a great deal of cereals, starchy roots and pulses (high bre) and
little complete (animal) protein as in the case of Bangladeshi diet.
CHAPTER III
Intrahousehold Bargaining and Food Distribution in Rural
Bangladesh
Abstract: Using spouses' assets at marriage as proxy for bargaining power and proposing alternative
measures of food distribution that shift the focus from calorie intake to the cost and composition of individ-
uals' diet, I nd evidence of intrahousehold bargaining in food allocation from expensive and nutritionally
rich sources in rural Bangladesh. The bargaining eects remain signicant after eliminating potential mar-
riage market selection eects and various unobserved household xed eects. While adult women fare worse
than adult males in the intakes from the most expensive food group, they tend to be better-o when a
wife as opposed to a head has more bargaining power. The nature of preference and bargaining tend to
vary across income levels. At the low income level, a wife prefers male preschoolers to female preschoolers,
which reverses at the middle income level. In contrast to previous literature, I also nd that nonparametric
Engle curves for food expenditure, calorie, and calorie from animal food-group tend to be not linear but
quadratic in nature.
3.1 Introduction
Some ethnographic studies document gender discrimination in food distribution in Bangladesh.
Women appear to be a "residual category", eating after men and children, and making to do with
what is left (Kabeer, 1998). This practice is believed to ensure the longevity and good fortune of
male guardians, and girls are taught to get used to such deprivation (Naved, 2000).
In contrast, as discussed in Chapter 2, an inuential study of Pitt et al. (1990) (henceforth
PRH), focusing on individuals' calorie intakes, nd that households in rural Bangladesh are in-
equality averse, and that gender disparity in calorie intake reects the gender dierences in the
energy intensities of occupations. Moreover, if there is any discrimination, that tends to be against
males who bear the cost of equalisation of calorie intake more than women, considering that men
participate in high energy intensive occupations. Similarly, Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) nd no
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evidence of gender discrimination in intrahousehold calorie allocation in rural south India1.
This chapter attempts to reconcile these contrasting evidences. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated
that calorie intake - the focus of many past studies including PRH, is not a sucient statistic for
various critical nutrients. In this chapter, I attempt to demonstrate that calorie might not be a good
metric for analysing a household's food distribution behaviour. Consider an extreme case where
two identical individuals in a household receive exactly the same amount of calories. Focusing on
calorie would imply no intrahousehold inequality. However, the cost and content of calorie of the
two individuals could be quite dierent. Given the wide variety of food sources, one individual
could consume a disproportionately larger share of food items, which are more expensive, better
tasting, of better quality, and/or are more prestigious, than the other member to obtain the same
amount of calorie. This type of discrimination, as reected in ethnographic studies, is not revealed
if the focus is only on calorie intake.
Analysing individuals' food intakes from dierent sources, and proposing a number of measures
of food distribution that focus on the cost and composition of one's diet, I demonstrate evidence of
signicant intrahousehold bargaining (particularly between adult males and females) on calorie and
expenditure allocations for sh, animal and dairy products (henceforth, animal products/group),
which are the most expensive sources of calories. A wife's assets2 positively aect these allocations
for adult females but negatively for adult males. Intrahousehold bargaining is also evident to some
extent for the food allocation for elderly and pregnant women within the household. These eects
are signicant both with and without the proxy for health and energy-intensive occupations to
account for the potential nutrition and labour market linkages as illustrated by PRH.
As discussed in Chapter 2, with the exception of a few natural experiments, bargaining measures
used in past studies, are endogenous to decisions made within marriage. My measures|husband's
and wife's assets at marriage|-while could be exogenous to the decisions made within marriage,
it can still be endogenous to marriage due to marriage market selection, failure to control which
could lead to an erroneous rejection of the unitary model. Moreover, some standard controls (in the
empirical literature of unitary or collective framework), such as, household size and composition
could be potentially correlated with unobserved household characteristics, such as fertility prefer-
ence. All these motivate the use of household xed eect (henceforth, HFE) estimates to test the
evidence of bargaining in nutrient allocation without contamination from marriage market selection
and unobserved household characteristics.
How does gender disparity in food distribution varies with household income? A few studies
attempted to explore the relationship between intrahousehold inequality and aggregate household
wellbeing (Haddad and Kanbur, 1992; Kanbur and Haddad, 1994; Haddad et al., 1995), and the
ndings are ambiguous. A key deciency of those studies are that as they use some aggregate
1For a comprehensive survey on intrahousehold inequality in food distribution, see Behrman and Deolalikar (1988)
and Behrman (1990).
2Spouses' assets imply assets at marriage throughout the thesis unless otherwise specically mentioned.
50
measure of inequality (such as Gini coecient), they could not examine which specic age-sex
groups fare worse within the household, and if their wellbeing improve with the improvement of
aggregate household wellbeing, which I attempt to analyse in this chapter. Dividing households
into low, middle, and high income groups based on their monthly per capita expenditure, I nd that
at the low income level, a wife prefers expenditure and calorie allocation from the most expensive
food group for male preschoolers to female preschoolers while this pattern reverses at the middle
income level. Similarly, a wife's bargaining power positively aects the allocation from expensive
food group for adult females and negatively for adult males at low income level, but such bargaining
is not evident as household income increases.
In analysing intrahousehold food distribution, in contrast to previous literature, I also nd that
nonparametric Engle curves for food expenditure, calorie, and calorie from animal food-group tend
to be not linear but quadratic in nature implying that (i) the food budget share tends to decline at
a slower rate with the increase in income at low levels of income but at a higher rate at high levels
of income, (ii) even in this poor country, per capita calorie consumption increases at a decreasing
rate with the increase in income and the calorie demand tends to be saturated at the higher income
level, (iii) even at a very low level of income, the demand for the most expensive food group tends to
increase at an increasing rate with the increase in income, before it start to increase at a decreasing
rate and eventually attens out at an income level, which is higher than at which calorie demand
starts to saturate.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 briey describes the conceptual and
empirical frameworks, which are similar to chapter 2. Section 3.3 provides a descriptive analysis
of intrahousehold food distribution. Section 3.4 provides the empirical analysis, and Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Conceptual and Empirical Frameworks
I use the conceptual framework used in Chapter 2 with the change that instead of a vector of
nutrients (Ci), a vector of foods consumed by individuals (Fi) is in the utility functions, implying
that individuals derive satisfaction from the consumption of dierent foods in addition to the
indirect eects of foods on their health outcomes. All the other notations and interpretations of the
following equations are same as Chapter 2 (see Section 3). In a collective framework, husband (h)
and wife (w) care about his/her own and other N   1 (i 2 N) household members' consumption of
foods (F), health outcomes (H), and eort level (e). For all Pareto-ecient outcomes, there exists
some weight  (where,  = (ah; aw)), for which the household maximises its objective function:
(3.1) Max Uh(Fi;Hi; ei;Z) + (1  )Uw(Fi;Hi; ei;Z)
subject to the following health production function, wage function, and household budget con-
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straints:
(3.2) Hi = H(Fi; ei; i)
(3.3) wi = w(Hi; ei)
(3.4) v +
X
i
wi = Y =
X
i
PF
Maximising household's objective function, subject to these constraints yields a set of reduced
form food demand functions:
(3.5) Fi = f(P; Y; ; I;Z) = f(P; Y; (ah; aw); I;Z)
where, I is a vector of individual characteristics, Z is a vector of household characteristics, and
ah and aw are measures of bargaining power of head's and his spouse. The test for unitary model
is:
(3.6)
@Fi
@ai
= 0; i = h;w
In the case of income pooling, @Fi@ai = 0, whereas in the presence of intrahousehold bargaining,
@Fi
@ah
6= @Fi@aw .
Empirically, using a variety of measures of individual food allocation (see Section 3.3), I estimate
the following empirical specication of equation 3.5:
(3.7) lnyijst = 0 + 1Aijst + 2Iijst + 3Xhjst + 4lnPst + 5Rt + 6Ss
+7Xmjs + 8Xwjs + 9(Aijst Xmjs) + 10(Aijst Xwjs) + ijst
where, lny is log of some measure of food allocation of an individual i of household j in site s
at time t, Aijst, is a vector of individual characteristics dummies including an individual's age-sex
group, pregnancy, and lactating status, Iijst contains individuals' health outcomes (log of weight
for height) and the dummies for high energy intensity of the primary and secondary occupations of
the individual, Xhjst is a vector of both time-variant and time-invariant household characteristics
including log of per capita adult equivalent monthly expenditure and its square, log of household
landholding, and log of adult equivalent household size, lnPst is a vector of log of site prices of
rice, pulses, big sh, small sh, and egg, proxied by mean unit values of households in a given
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site in a given round for these food groups3, and Rt and Ss are the dummies for survey rounds
and sites. Using the same cut-o points of metabolic constant (mc) of dierent activities as in
Chapter 2, individuals' primary and secondary occupations are categorized into high, medium, and
low energy-intensive activities.
As discussed in Chapter 2, OLS estimates of equation 3.7 might be biased as embodied in the
error term (ijst), could be household's or spouses' unobserved fertility (and son) preference that
could inuence household size, composition and could be correlated with sex-specic food alloca-
tions. Similarly, spouses' assets and education at marriage could be correlated with their unobserved
characteristics, such as their preference for children's (of particular sex) nutrition and health, which
in turn could be correlated with household formation through marriage market selection. To the
extent these unobserved eects are time invariant, these could be eliminated through HFE esti-
mate. Occupational choices can be inuenced by unobserved health endowment and ability. Food
allocation can also determine occupational energy intensity, rather than the opposite. However,
I follow the exogeneity assumption of PRH that occupational choices are given by social norms
whereby males tend to engage in energy-intensive labour market activities, while women activities
are essentially circumscribed to low-energy intensive household activities. Health outcomes and
food allocations are potentially determined by their health endowments that are known to house-
holds but not to the researcher. But, if a household's food allocation rule based on individuals'
health endowment and ability (which in turn also aect their occupational choices and labour mar-
ket productivity) is time invariant, then it is absorbed in HFE estimates4. Thus, I also estimate the
above empirical model using HFE estimate. However, time-invariant household characteristics are
also absorbed in household xed eects, which include spouses' bargaining measures. The eects
of the variables with limited variation, such as household size, demographic composition, and per
capita landholding, are likely to be imprecisely estimated. The HFE estimates will also be based
on a restricted sample of households that have at least one member of each of the age-sex group
under consideration, and the noise to signal ratio is likely to increase due to dierencing.
Household income (proxied by expenditure) is also potentially endogenous as both nutrient
consumption and health endowment of individuals may aect household income. While household
expenditure is often instrumented by household landholding, following Behrman and Deolalikar
(1990), I use both current and permanent income (proxied by household landholding) measures
as explanatory variables to measure current and permanent income elasticities. Controlling for
household income, a general test of the unitary framework (i.e., equation 3.6) is that the eect of
a head's assets (and/or education) will be same as the eect of a wife's assets (and/or education)
for the allocation of food for a particular group or individual.
3A comprehensive set of site prices were initially included in the regression functions, and then I have kept the
food prices which appear to be signicant most of the times for the outcomes analysed here.
4In future analysis, I attempt to replace individuals' weight for height with the measure for endowments and
adult equivalent household size with household size and composition to examine (dis)economies of scale in food
consumption as is done in Chapter 2.
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Based on OLS estimates, I test whether a head's and his wife's assets and education have the
same eects on food allocation for the non-pregnant and non-lactating adult women within the
household (the omitted category in age-sex group dummies), i.e., 7q = 8q , (where q = assets,
education) and test for the total eect of a husband's and a wife's assets for each of the other
age-sex-pregnancy-lactating categories, i.e., 7q + 9q = 8q + 10q . As in HFE estimate, spouses'
bargaining measures are eliminated with household xed eects, I can only test if relative to the
omitted category, the bargaining measures of a head have dierential eects than the bargaining
measures of his wife for the food allocation for each of the other age-sex-pregnancy-lactating groups,
i.e., 9q = 10q , which is also done based on OLS estimates for comparison with HFE results. As
discussed in Chapter 2, spouses' education may not necessarily imply bargaining (but eciency),
but I use these proxies to control for any potential correlation between their education and assets
at marriage and thus focus on bargaining eects that are based on spouses' assets. Thus in the
empirical analysis of Section 3.4, I only focus on the bargaining eects (relative to the adult women)
based on assets measure only (given the caveats associated with education as bargaining measure):
9q = 10q , as this set of restrictions can be tested in HFE and can be compared with similar tests
based on OLS estimate.
Further, to analyse how the pattern of intrahousehold bargaining and food distribution varies
across dierent income groups, I augment equation 3.7 by interacting individual characteristics and
bargaining measures with income tercile dummies (t2 = 1 if the household income falls in second
tercile and t3 = 1 if the household income falls in third tercile) with the omitted category being
low income households (t1 = 1). Analogous tests for intrahousehold bargaining are performed for
each of the income groups.
3.3 Data and Descriptives
I use the same IFPRI data set used and described in Chapter 2 (see Section 5), which also
contains description of most of the explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis below.
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the key household characteristics utilized in the
empirical analysis. Based on the monthly per capita expenditure (averaged over four rounds), used
as proxy for per capita income5, I divide the sample into three groups as proxy for dierent income
groups: tercile 1 (low income), tercile 2 (middle income), and tercile 3 (high income), to investigate
how gender dierence in food distribution for a given age group varies across income groups.
The mean per capita expenditure not only varies signicantly across terciles, but also within a
given tercile across rounds (with the exception for tercile 3's mean expenditure between round 3
5As poverty rate (based on Costs of Basic Needs) in Bangladesh is calculated based on per capita not per adult
equivalent household expenditure, I use the same measure for categorising the households into terciles. In empirical
analysis in the following section, I use per adult equivalent household expenditure and adult equivalent household
size.
54
and 4)6. For each tercile, the lowest mean expenditure is observed in round 2, which as mentioned
in Chapter 2, contains the major agricultural lean season. Based on costs of basic needs approach,
the rural national upper and lower poverty lines are taka 591 and 499 (per person per month).
While the mean per capita expenditure for tercile 1 households fall below the lower poverty line,
that for tercile 3 is above the upper poverty line in every round. The mean expenditure of tercile
2, however, falls below the upper poverty line in rounds 2 and 4.
Household landholding (recorded in the rst round and is time invariant in the survey) is posi-
tively associated with income level of the household. The mean landholding of tercile 3 households
are about 3 times higher than that of tercile 1 households and the mean diers signicantly across
terciles.
As described in Chapter 2, wives' bargaining power seem much less than that of their husbands
based on assets (aggregate value at 1996 prices of housing, landholding, cattle, durable, and food
owned individually by the spouses) and education at the time of marriage. Head's assets at tercile
2 and 3 are signicantly higher than that at tercile 1, while the dierence of mean assets between
tercile 2 and 3 are not signicant. The value of head's housing and cattle that he owned at the time
of marriage seems to be positively associated with current household income level as mean values
of these increases at higher terciles, and the dierence between any pair of terciles are signicant.
On the other hand, an inverse U-shape pattern appears in terms of head's landholding at marriage
and household income, with highest mean value observed at tercile 2. The mean value of each of
these asset components of the head dier signicantly across terciles. While the mean value of
wives' assets dier signicantly across terciles, the value of their landholding does not. The value of
wives' cattle do not dier signicantly between terciles 2 and 3 and housing between terciles 1 and
3. Across all terciles, 98-99% of the wives compared to 88-89% of the heads did not own any land or
housing on their own at the time of marriage, while 7-10% of the wives compared to 12-16% of the
heads owned some cattle. As opposed to 45-53% of the husbands, 16-22% of the wives did not have
any asset at marriage as most of the wives owned some food items (which were not owned by any
husband). However, the mean value of total assets is much lower for wives than husbands due to
sex-dierence in ownership pattern of dierent asset components (i.e., only a few wives compared
with the husbands owned any land, housing, or cattle at the time of their marriage). The relative
gap between spouses' bargaining power tends to marginally decline at higher income level. While
at tercile 1, the mean value of a wife's assets is only 8% of that of the husband, at tercile 3, it
increases to 9%. While the average years of wives' schooling are 41% of that of the husbands at
tercile 1, this increases to 53% at tercile 3.
I use a further disaggregated age-gender group than presented in Chapter 2: pre-school male and
female children ( 5 years), male and female children of 5   10 years, male and female adolescents
(10   19 years), male and female adults (19   55 years) and male and female elderly (> 55
years). The omitted group in the empirical analysis is the non-pregnant and non-lactating adult
6P-values of the group mean tests are not reported to conserve space but available upon request.
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women. The demographic composition of the sample (see Table 3.3) indicates a higher proportion of
male and female pre-schoolers and lower proportion of adult and elderly men and women among low
income group (tercile 1), compared to the middle and high income groups. As should be expected,
for a given tercile, there is very limited variation of demographic composition across rounds within a
year. Using adult equivalent scales of Ahmed and Shams (1994) (presented in Table 3.2), I construct
the adult equivalent household size (hhadeq), log of which is used in the empirical analysis. As
expected from demographic composition, hhadeq is highest in tercile 3, followed by tercile 2 and
1. Apart from the household size between tercile 2 and 3 in round 4, in each of the other rounds
the mean hhadeq diers signicantly across terciles. The hhadeq across rounds for a given tercile,
however, does not vary signicantly except for tercile 3 between rounds 2 and 3 and 2 and 4.
Consistent with Engle's law, the per capita monthly food expenditure as a share of per capita
monthly total expenditure declines as income increases. For instance in round 1, the low income
group spends about three-fourth of its total budget on food, while the corresponding food budget
share is 50% for tercile 3 households. For any given round, the food budget share varies signicantly
across terciles. For the high income group, the food budget share remains the same in all rounds
except in round 3 when it declines by 7 percentage points from other rounds. For terciles 1 and 2,
consistent with the phenomenon that monthly per capita expenditure declines in round 2, the food
budget share increases in this round, declines in round 3 in which per capita expenditure increases
(for all terciles) and then in round 4 comes back to the level closer to that observed in round 1,
possibly implying that the household tends to protect their food budget as much as possible from
short-term income uctuations. With the exception for tercile 1 between rounds 1 and 4, for tercile
2 between rounds 2 and 4, for tercile 3 among rounds 1, 2, and 4, the budget share dier signicantly
across all the other rounds for a given tercile.
Figure 3.1 depicts nonparametric (using locally weighted regression method, lowess at bandwidth
0.8) food budget share Engle curves for dierent rounds, which are concave and quadratic implying
that the budget share tends to decline at a slower rate with the increase in income at low levels of
income but at a higher rate at high levels of income. In round 3, when income increases from its
downfall in round 2 that contains the major lean season, for very poor households, the food budget
share tends to increase before it starts to decline with the increase in income. While previous studies
found linear food Engle curves in richer countries, Bhalotra and Atteld (1998) demonstrate that in
poor societies, such as in rural Pakistan, it tends to be quadratic. As they mentioned, a quadratic
Engle curve implies a demand system of rank three. Hence rank two Piglog demand systems,
such as the Almost Ideal Demand System, the Log-Translog model, and the Linear Expenditure
System are inappropriate for demand analysis in rural societies where the Engle curve appears to
be quadratic.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a useful feature of IFPRI survey is the information of individuals'
intakes of more than 200 food items categorised into 17 food groups. For my analysis, I aggregate
these food groups into three broad food groups: cereal, plant, and animal. Plants and animal
56
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8
1 2
3 4
food exp/total exp animal−group exp/food exp
ln monthly per capita expenditure
Graphs by round
Figure 3.1: Food expenditure and animal-group expenditure shares, Lowess Fit, Bandwidth=0.8
Note: exp, per capita expenditure
57
products are much richer sources of micronutrients than cereals. The bioavailability of micronu-
trients in animal products is much higher than that in plant products. The former also promote
the bioavailability of micronutrients in plant foods and cereals. In terms of price, the animal food
group, followed by the plant group, are expensive sources of energy while cereals being the cheapest
source. On average, the amount of money required to purchase 100 calories from plant and animal
groups are almost 5 and 21 times higher than that required to purchase the same amount of calories
from cereal sources. Within-tercile standard deviation for all terciles in any given round appears to
be highest for animal group and lowest for cereal group indicating more varieties of animal prod-
ucts from which the consumption is made, while cereal consumption is primarily dominated by rice
consumption (of more homogeneous nature). A comparison of price of animal calorie across terciles
show that the households at higher income group tend to pay less than those at lower income group.
This could be due to the possibility that higher income group purchase more quantity and get some
sort of bulk discounts, and also the possibility that higher income households tend to live in places
that have better infrastructure and market conditions, which might lower the supply cost and thus
prices. For any given round, the animal group price is signicantly dierent across terciles (with
the exception for terciles 1 and 2 in rounds 1 and 2, terciles 1 and 3 in round 2, and terciles 2 and
3 in round 3). For all terciles, the price appears to be lowest in round 2 and highest in round 3.
The price also diers signicantly across rounds for any given tercile (with the exception for tercile
1 between round 3 and 4, for tercile 2 between rounds 1 and 4, for tercile 3 between rounds 1, 2,
and 4.
The plant group price is not signicantly dierent in round 1 and 2 between terciles 1 and 2,
and in round 3 between terciles 1 and 3. For each of the other rounds, it varies signicantly among
the terciles. Higher income households tend to pay marginally higher than lower income households
for the same amount of plant calories. For tercile 1, the price diers signicantly across rounds.
Apart from the price in round 1 and 4, the price diers signicantly across rounds for tercile 2. For
tercile 3, the price dierence is signicant between rounds 1 and 3, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4.
Among the food groups, the cereal group price varies the least across terciles for a given round.
Nonetheless, this relative small dierence is signicant with the exception in round 1 across three
terciles. The variation of cereal price seems to be higher between consecutive rounds for a given
tercile than across terciles in a given round. For each of the terciles, the price is lower in rounds 2
and 4 than in rounds 1 and 3 and varies signicantly across rounds.
The per capita expenditure on animal group as a share of total per capita food expenditure
tends to increase sharply with the increase in income as Figure 3.1 demonstrates. Despite being
the very costly source of calorie, on average households at tercile 1 spend about 20% of their food
budget on animal group, which increase to 26% for households at tercile 3. For each round, this
share varies signicantly across terciles. For tercile 1, the share varies signicantly across rounds
with the exception between rounds 1 and 4. For tercile 2, with the exception between rounds 3
and 4, the share varies signicantly across all the other rounds. For tercile 3, the expenditure share
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diers signicantly between rounds 1 and 3, 2 and 3, and between 3 and 4.
As expected, bulk of a household's food expenditure is on cereal, which is nearly half of the
total food expenditure for the households at tercile 1 and reduces to about 38% at tercile 3. For
each round, the cereal expenditure share varies signicantly among terciles. The variation in cereal
expenditure share is much higher between any pair of terciles for a given round than across rounds
for a given tercile, implying the higher stability of cereal consumption (compared to consumption
from two other food groups) across rounds7. For tercile 1, the cereal share in a given round
is signicantly dierent from that in any other round with the exception of the share dierence
between rounds 1 and 2 and 3 and 4. On the other hand, for tercile 2, the cereal share in round 2 is
only signicantly dierent from that in round 4. For tercile 3, the share diers signicantly across
rounds other than that between rounds 2 and 3 and 1 and 3.
The absolute and hard core poverty lines based on direct calorie intake (DCI) method are 2122
kcal and 1805 kcal per person per day. The mean household per capita calorie consumption at
tercile 1 is below the hard core poverty line in the rst three rounds. While the per capita calorie
consumption at tercile 2 and 3 are above the hard core poverty lines, the mean consumption does
not exceed the absolute poverty line in any round even for tercile 3 households. For each round, the
mean calorie consumption varies signicantly across terciles. For all terciles, the lowest mean calorie
consumption is observed in round 3 and highest in round 4. For tercile 1, the mean consumption
varies signicantly between rounds apart from that between rounds 1 and 2, and 2 and 3. For
tercile 2, it varies signicantly across all rounds. For tercile 3, other than the dierence between
rounds 1 and 2, mean calorie consumption varies signicantly across all other rounds.
Tercile 1 households meet 86-88% of their calories from cereal sources and only a meager 2%
from the most expensive animal group. While the animal calorie share doubles between tercile 1
and tercile 3, animal group still contribute to only 4% of total calorie at tercile 3. Nonparametric
total calorie and animal calorie Engle curves are presented in Figure 3.2, which imply that at the
lowest level of income (roughly up to log per capita expenditure of 5), while total calorie tends to
increase at a constant rate, the animal calorie at an increasing rate, before both tend to increase
at a decreasing rate with further increase in income. The calorie Engle curve tends to atten at
an income level that is lower than the income level at which the similar attening of the animal
calorie Engle curve occurs, implying that at an income level when the demand for calorie started
to saturate, the demand for animal calorie still increases resulting in an increasing share of calories
from the most expensive animal group at the higher levels of income. In contrast to the previous
literature (Deaton and Subramanian, 1996), the nonparametric calorie Engle curve appears to be
quadratic implying that even for this poor rural society, the demand for calorie tends to diminish
with the increase in income.
7Subtracting the sum of cereal and animal group expenditure and calorie shares from 100 provides the expenditure
and calorie share of plant group.
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Figure 3.2: Nonparametric Calorie and Animal Calorie Engle Curves, Lowess Fit, Bandwidth=0.8
3.3.1 Measures of Intrahousehold Food Distribution
Motivated by the above descriptive analysis, I use a variety of measures to analyse intrahousehold
food distribution. The rst set of measures are an individual's calorie and expenditure share from
animal, cereal, and plant groups, which reect the content and cost composition of an individual's
total calorie intake. I also measure expensiveness of an individual's diet by using the unit cost of
calorie, i.e., the ratio of total food expenditure (si) to total calorie intake (ci) of an individual.
While the unit cost of calorie indicates the costliness of one's diet in absolute sense, to assess the
relative costliness of an individual's diet within the household, I construct the following index of an
individual's spending share over calorie share within the household:
ri =
siP
i si
ciP
i ci
Nutrition literature views that under normal circumstances (i.e., without famine) given the
wide range of food sources, an individual is highly likely to meet his/her calorie need, which in turn
motivates the construction of the calorie adequacy ratio (World Health Organization, 1985). PRH
also make the case of equitable distribution of calorie within the household. Based on the assumption
that calorie is distributed equally within the household as per individuals' requirements, this index
portrays how expensive is the calorie bundle of that individual relative to the other individuals
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within the household. Thus, ri > 1 would indicate a favorable position of individual i within the
household in terms of getting allocation from relatively expensive food items (and vice versa) while
ri = 1 would imply the fair position of the individual. Obviously, this argument breaks down if the
assumption of equitable calorie distribution within the household does not hold.
Table 3.3 summarises the mean value of these measures (averaged over four rounds) of food
distribution for dierent age-sex groups at dierent levels of income. The calorie share of animal
group is the highest for preschoolers, but that hardly exceeds 5% of the total calorie. Within age-
group gender disparity in animal calorie intake is the highest for preschoolers followed by elderly
and adult groups. While female preschoolers on average have slightly more total calories than
their male counterparts, male preschoolers have about 28% more calories from animal sources than
female preschoolers. An almost similar magnitude of gender disparity is observed for the elderly
group, while within the adult group, male calorie intake from animal sources is about 24% higher
than that of females. The calorie share from plant sources, which are much cheaper than animal
sources, but more expensive than cereals are higher for adult and elderly males compared with
adult and elderly females. On the other hand, for younger age groups, the female's plant calorie
share is higher than that of the male.
The pattern of within-age group gender disparity for animal calorie share also varies across
income groups. The gender disparity is highest for preschoolers followed by adults in tercile 1, at
which boys, on average, have 34% more calories from animal sources than girls while adult males
have 25% more calories than adult females. For preschoolers, while animal calorie share increases
from low to middle and to high income households, the gender inequality worsens at tercile 2 (at
which boys get 56% more calories from animal sources than girls) and lessens at tercile 3 (at which
a boy's share is only 11% more than a girl's). The animal calorie share of adult males is 25% higher
than that of adult females at terciles 1 and 2, while this disparity reduces to 20% at tercile 3. While
the disparity within the elderly group is nonexistent at tercile 1, it increases sharply at tercile 2
and 3. Within children and adolescents, the gender disparity is relatively modest.
Figure 3.3 nonparametrically shows how animal calorie share vis-a-vis the calorie adequacy
ratio8 varies with per capita expenditure for preschoolers and adults. While for the most of the
per capita expenditure range, a girl's calorie adequacy ratio appears to be higher than that of a
boy, the opposite appears for animal calorie share. For the adult group, while the gender disparity
tends to reduce with the increase in income (over the mid range of per capita expenditure), over
the same income range, the disparity tends to persist for animal calorie share with a male's share
higher than a female's.
An inverse-U relationship between income levels and gender disparity also appears for expendi-
ture share for animal group for preschoolers. At tercile 1, the animal expenditure share of boys is
14.5% higher than that of girls. The dierence further increases to 22% at tercile 2, but declines
8Dened as an individual's calorie intake as a share of his/her calorie requirement, see Section 5 and Appendix
of Chapter 2 for a detailed description of the construction of adequacy ratios.
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Figure 3.3:
Nonparametric Calorie Adequacy Ratio and Animal Calorie Share Curves, Lowess Fit,
Bandwidth=0.8
to only 6% at tercile 3. The gender dierence within the adult group decreases monotonically with
the increase in income level.
The gender disparity in terms of the unit cost of calorie is highest for the adult group followed
by the elderly. On the basis of one's expenditure share over calorie share, the gender disparity is
highest among the elderly, followed by the adult and preschooler groups. The pattern of gender
disparity across the age-groups is broadly similar across three terciles. However, the disparity within
the elderly category tends to increase with the income level of the household.
3.4 Estimation
To analyse intrahousehold bargaining and food distribution, I estimate equation 3.7 using OLS
and household FE estimates for log of the intrahousehold food distribution measures discussed in
the preceding section9. Table 3.4 presents the results of the key parameters of interest for log calorie
share from animal, plant, and cereal groups.
9I have also analysed variations of this empirical model for each of the dependent variables controlling for only
bargaining measures based on assets and with and without the control for health and occupational measures using
both OLS and FE estimates. To conserve space, I do not report those results as the pattern of intrahousehold
bargaining and food distribution revealed from those results are similar to the models presented here.
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Consistent with the descriptive analysis above, pro-male bias in intrahousehold allocation of
animal calories are evident within the preschoolers, adults, and elderly age-groups. For each of
these groups, a male's animal calorie share is signicantly higher than a female's both in OLS and
FE estimates.
Conversely, the calorie share from the cheapest source (i.e., cereal) is slightly lower for males
than females in these age-groups; this gender-dierence is signicant within the adult and elderly
groups. Adult and elderly males compared with adult and elderly females tend to have more calories
from the plant sources as well, which are less expensive than animal sources but more expensive
than cereal sources. The gender disparity for these age groups are signicant in both OLS and FE
estimates.
What role does intrahousehold bargaining play in food distribution? As the estimates and the
tests of the unitary model demonstrate, based on assets as the proxy for bargaining power, there
is evidence of signicant intrahousehold bargaining for food distribution between adult males and
females. A wife's assets positively aect the calorie allocation from animal and plant sources (with
the magnitude of the eect much larger for animal sources) for adult women (who are the most
disadvantaged in getting the allocation from animal sources) in OLS estimates. A wife's assets
negatively aect the allocation for adult men both in OLS and FE estimates (being absorbed in
household xed eects, the eect of a wife's bargaining power on adult women is unidentied in
HFE estimate). Quantitatively, doubling a wife's assets will reduce adult males' calorie share from
animal sources by 15% and that from plant sources by 8% in OLS estimate, while the reduction in
corresponding shares based on HFE estimates are 12.5% and 7.5%, respectively. On the other hand,
doubling a wife's assets will increase adult females' calorie share from animal and plant sources by
11.5% and 8%, respectively in OLS estimate. The magnitude of age-sex group coecients and
their interactions with assets measures are smaller in HFE than OLS estimates, possibly indicating
that OLS estimates might be biased upwards as far as these coecients are concerned due to the
unobserved household and marriage market selection eects (see Section 3.2). As the tests for
the unitary model show, these eects are signicantly dierent from the corresponding eects of a
husband's assets. A wife's assets also negatively aect the calorie share from plant sources for elderly
males and positively aect their cereal calories, and diers signicantly from the corresponding eect
of a husband's assets. Finally, I also nd intrahousehold bargaining over the allocation of plant
calories for pregnant women both in OLS and FE estimates, where a wife's assets positively, but
a husband's assets negatively, aect a pregnant woman's plant calories. Doubling a wife's assets
will increase plant calorie share for pregnant women by 18% in OLS estimate and 25.5% in FE
estimates. The eect of a wife's assets for the calorie allocation for lactating women, however,
appears to be negative (doubling her assets will reduce the plant calorie share by 9%), but only
signicantly dierent from the corresponding eect of a husband's assets in FE estimates.
Among other covariates, the health and energy intensity of primary occupation (caveats of which
are discussed in Section 3.2) are negatively associated with animal calorie share but positively
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with cereal calorie share implying that increased calorie required for higher energy expenditure are
primarily met from calorie-dense and comparatively cheaper cereal sources. At low levels of income,
animal and plant calorie shares increases with income, while the eect of income on cereal share
appears to be not signicant. Animal calorie share seems to be marginally higher in rounds 1 and
2 and lower in round 3 compared with round 4, while opposite pattern appears for plant and cereal
calorie shares. Household landholding has a small but signicant eect only on an individual's
animal calorie share. Doubling the landholding will increase the calorie share from animal group
by about 1%, while doubling household expenditure at the initial level of expenditure will increase
the share by more than 3% (results not shown).
Using log expenditure share for these three food groups as dependent variables (Table 3.5), I nd
that adult males have signicantly higher expenditure share for animal products and signicantly
lower expenditure share for cereals compared to adult females. Similar gender dierence is also
signicant within elderly group particularly for expenditure share for animal products. As the
tests for the unitary model show, intrahousehold bargaining on the allocation of animal and cereal
expenditure shares for the adult and elderly males are signicant. Doubling a wife's assets will lead
to a decrease in expenditure share for adult males by 17% in OLS and 10% in FE estimates, and
an increase in cereal expenditure share for cereals by about 11% in OLS and 8% in FE estimates.
Doubling a wife's assets will also lead to a reduction in elderly males' expenditure share for animal
products by 20% in OLS and 15% in FE estimates, and an increase in the expenditure share for
cereals by 8% in FE estimates. The dierence between OLS and HFE estimate of these bargaining
coecients might imply that OLS estimates are upward biased.
In terms of the costliness of diet, based on log of unit cost of calorie, signicant intrahousehold
bargaining is again observed for the adult group and for boys of age group 6-10 years. The unit
cost of calorie is signicantly higher for adult males than adult females (as the rst two columns
of Table 3.6 shows). While the unit cost for preschoolers and elderly groups is higher than that for
adult females (implying the disadvantaged position of adult females within the household), within
age-group gender disparity is not signicant for any other age-group. Doubling a head's assets will
increase the unit cost of calorie for adult males by 2% while doubling a wife's assets will reduce
this by 9% in OLS and 7% in HFE estimates. Conversely, doubling a head's assets do not have any
signicant impact on the unit cost of adult females while doubling a wife's assets will increase it by
8% in OLS estimate.
Assessing the relative cost of one's diet using the index ri (the last two columns of Table 3.6),
I nd that adult males have a higher index (by 0.07 points) than adult females. Preschoolers and
elderly age-groups also have signicantly higher index than adult females while adolescent groups
have lower value of the index than adult females. Within age-group gender dierence is signicant
for the adult group. An increase in a wife's assets increases adult women's index and decreases
adult males' index. The opposite eect of a husband's and a wife's assets is also seen for the index of
elderly males. On the other hand, while both husband's and wife's assets are negatively associated
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with elderly females' index, the eect of the later is almost twice as much as the eect of the
former. Intrahousehold bargaining is also signicant for boys of age group 6-10 years. An increase
in women's bargaining power tends to have a more equitable distribution of food expenditure within
the households as the index of the groups that are negatively aected by the increase in wife's assets
is higher than the index of adult women. Finally, intrahousehold bargaining based on ri index is
also evident for pregnant women, which is negatively aected by the increase in a head's assets.
3.4.1 Intrahousehold Bargaining and Food Distribution across Terciles
Analysing how intrahousehold bargaining and food distribution vary across dierent income
groups, I nd that within age-group gender dierence with males having higher animal calorie
share than females is signicant at tercile 1 for the adult group, at tercile 2 for preschoolers and
adolescent groups, and at tercile 3 for the elderly group (Table 3.7).
Signicant intrahousehold bargaining appears for the adult category at tercile 1, in which a
wife's assets are signicantly and positively associated with adult women's animal calorie share (in
OLS) and negatively associated with adult males' share (both in OLS and FE estimates).
Furthermore, at tercile 1 a wife's assets aect the allocation of animal calories positively for male
preschoolers, but negatively for female preschoolers. This reverses at tercile 2, and no evidence of
bargaining is found for the preschooler group at tercile 3. In addition, at tercile 1, a wife's assets
signicantly and negatively aect the allocation for male children and female adolescents, indicating
a reallocation of animal calories in favor of preschooler males and adult females at the expense of
preschooler females, adolescent females, male children, and adult males. These eects of a wife's
assets also reverse or disappear at higher income levels.
Women preferences for male children for schooling, is postulated in the literature as a motivation
for old-age support as women marry at younger age than their husbands and thus should live
longer than their husbands, ceteris paribus (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). The above pattern
of intrahousehold bargaining over food allocation adds a more nuanced view to this literature as
the male preference is not prominent across all of the age-groups or income groups.
In terms of food expenditure share of dierent food groups, I nd that adult males' food ex-
penditure share for animal sources are signicantly higher than adult females', while the former's
expenditure share of cereals are signicantly lower than the latter's at tercile 1 (Table 3.8). These
dierences are however no longer signicant at higher income levels. As far as other age-groups are
concerned, preschooler boys have a signicantly higher animal expenditure share than preschooler
girls at tercile 2, while adolescent males have a higher share than adolescent females at terciles 2
and 3.
Bargaining eect is signicant for the preschooler group. A wife prefers male to female preschool-
ers at tercile 1, but female to male preschoolers at higher income levels. Both at terciles 1 and 2, the
eect of a wife's assets is signicantly dierent from the eect of a head's assets for this age group.
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At tercile 1, doubling a wife's assets will increase the animal expenditure share for preschooler males
by 46%, but will not aect the expenditure share for preschooler females. Conversely at tercile 2
(relative to the corresponding age groups at tercile 1), doubling a wife's assets will reduce the ex-
penditure share for preschooler males by 76%, and increase that for preschooler females by 104%
in HFE estimates. At tercile 1, intrahousehold bargaining is also signicant for the adult group.
A wife's assets positively aect the animal expenditure share of adult females, but negatively that
of adult males. Doubling a wife's assets will increase the share for adult females by 26% in OLS
estimate while will reduce that for adult males by 36% in OLS and 27% in FE estimates10.
3.5 Conclusion
Past literature on intrahousehold inequality in food distribution focusing on total calorie intake
has claimed that the households are inequality averse, and apparent gender-disparity in calorie
allocation is due to the gender-disparity in energy-intensity of occupational activities. I empirically
demonstrate in this chapter that focusing on total calorie intake does not reveal the underlying
household behaviour for food distribution. Using a variety of measures for food distribution that
shift the focus from an individual's total calorie intake to the cost and composition of that intake, I
show that gender inequality of food distribution may persist resulting from intrahousehold bargain-
ing. In contrast to the previous literature in richer societies, I also nd that nonparametric food
expenditure Engle curve appears to be quadratic, a similar shape that is found in semiparametric
analysis in a poor country, Pakistan by Bhalotra and Atteld (1998). Moreover, in contrast with
the nding of previous literature in poor society that nonparametric calorie Engle curve is linear,
I nd that calorie Engle curve tends to be quadratic, implying that even in this poor society, per
capita calorie consumption increases at a decreasing rate with the increase in income and the calorie
demand tends to be saturated at the higher income level. On the other hand, for the most expensive
calorie sources, i.e, animal-group, at the very low level of income, the demand for animal calorie
tends to increase at an increasing rate with the increase in income, before it start to increase at a
decreasing rate and eventually attens out at an income level, which is higher than at which calorie
demand starts to saturate. These ndings based on simple nonparametric analysis, obviously are
not conclusive, but might provide motivation for further work on food demand in poor societies.
While adult women are one the most disadvantaged groups within the household in terms
of allocation from the most expensive food groups, their position improves relative to their male
counterparts when a wife has more bargaining power within the household. The nature of preference
and bargaining, however, vary across income levels. At the low income level, a wife prefers male
preschoolers to female preschoolers in terms of allocation from animal sources while she prefers
10A wife's preference for male to female preschooler and adult female to adult males at the low income level also
appears when I use log of unit cost of calorie and ri index as dependent variables (results not reported). However,
the bargaining eects are not signicant.
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female preschoolers to male preschoolers at the middle income level. As the general bargaining
framework used in this chapter does not explain why the eect of bargaining should vary across
income levels, this might lay out the ground for further work to test the robustness of this empirical
nding and its underlying theoretical explanations.
At their face value, the ndings, however, imply that from the policy point of view, it is not only
enough to understand to whom within the household the policy should be targeted to improve the
allocation for a particular age-gender group, but that one also needs to know the level of average
wellbeing of the household as the pattern of intrahousehold bargaining might vary at dierent levels
of income.
This phenomenon of intrahousehold bargaining on food distribution also has important nutri-
tional implications as animal, sh, dairy, and plant products are much richer sources of micronu-
trients than cereals. The bioavailability of micronutrients in animal products is much higher than
that in plant products. Animal, sh and dairy products also promote the bioavailability of micronu-
trients in non-staple plant foods and cereals. The ndings of this chapter are consistent with the
ndings of Chapter 2, which demonstrates evidence of intrahousehold bargaining on the allocation
of a range of critical nutrients.
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Table 3.1: Household Characteristics
Tercile 1 Tercile 2 Tercile 3
Round Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Mcapx 1 409 122 609 174 1001 644
2 342 102 522 150 959 620
3 422 121 628 172 1102 618
4 398 129 586 172 1118 964
Hhadeq 1 4.70 1.80 5.07 2.15 5.51 2.93
2 4.71 1.77 5.04 2.13 5.39 2.88
3 4.67 1.74 5.07 2.17 5.20 2.60
4 4.68 1.76 5.04 2.20 5.11 2.54
Food expen- 1 0.75 0.31 0.64 0.25 0.51 0.25
diture share 2 0.79 0.38 0.67 0.27 0.51 0.26
3 0.68 0.30 0.57 0.25 0.44 0.23
4 0.76 0.37 0.66 0.29 0.51 0.27
Taka to pur- 1 6.13 3.56 6.17 3.17 5.67 2.79
chase 100 calorie 2 5.58 2.69 5.50 2.61 5.66 2.68
from 3 7.16 3.56 6.41 2.81 6.24 3.12
Animal group 4 6.97 4.34 6.06 3.67 5.82 2.85
from 1 1.60 0.83 1.59 0.86 1.81 1.18
Plant group 2 1.72 0.92 1.74 0.83 1.84 1.23
3 1.33 0.90 1.27 0.58 1.33 0.56
4 1.42 1.01 1.60 1.10 1.77 1.50
from 1 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.04 0.30 0.05
Cereal group 2 0.27 0.04 0.27 0.04 0.28 0.04
3 0.31 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.32 0.06
4 0.27 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.28 0.05
Animal exp/ 1 0.19 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.27 0.16
total food exp 2 0.21 0.14 0.25 0.14 0.26 0.14
3 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.25 0.15
4 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.27 0.16
Cereal exp/ 1 0.50 0.15 0.43 0.13 0.39 0.14
total food exp 2 0.49 0.12 0.43 0.13 0.38 0.13
3 0.48 0.14 0.42 0.12 0.38 0.12
4 0.47 0.14 0.42 0.13 0.36 0.13
Calorie 1 1748 474 2019 588 2064 607
per capita 2 1735 580 1941 665 2086 767
3 1705 623 1854 548 1996 599
4 1913 617 2117 634 2195 707
Animal calorie/ 1 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
total calorie 2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
3 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
4 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03
Cereal calorie/ 1 0.86 0.07 0.82 0.08 0.81 0.09
total calorie 2 0.88 0.05 0.85 0.07 0.82 0.08
3 0.82 0.09 0.79 0.08 0.77 0.09
4 0.85 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.81 0.08
Head's assets 20994 70261 36965 216099 38815 117843
Wife's assets 1662 4769 2206 8697 3675 12554
Head's house 2024 5906 2603 7023 3281 8445
Wife's house 114 1209 271 2856 149 1802
Head's cattle 6148 28193 7391 30318 9974 32307
Wife's cattle 324 1603 678 5239 728 4275
Head's durable 1718 5482 2266 7371 6274 15231
Wife's durable 888 3864 880 2757 2188 6669
Head's food 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wife's food 296 446 320 489 634 1638
Head's land 11696 56443 25355 214103 19458 97077
Wife's land 303 2635 290 3842 287 5665
Head's education 1.99 3.08 3.26 3.94 5.28 4.64
Wife's education 0.82 1.87 1.74 2.71 2.66 3.31
Head's age 45 12 46 12 48 12
Wife's age 36 11 37 11 40 11
Hhland 0.78 1.02 1.52 1.77 2.51 2.68
Note: Mcapx, monthly per capita expenditure, exp, expenditure, Hhadeq, adult
equivalent household size, Hhland, household landholding (in acre)
Std, standard deviation.
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Table 3.2: Adult Equivalence Weights by Age and Sex
Ages (years)
From To Females Males
0 1 0.25 0.25
1 2 0.36 0.37
2 3 0.4 0.42
3 4 0.43 0.46
4 5 0.46 0.49
5 6 0.48 0.53
6 7 0.49 0.56
7 8 0.49 0.58
8 9 0.49 0.58
9 10 0.49 0.58
10 11 0.64 0.70
11 12 0.64 0.71
12 13 0.66 0.73
13 14 0.68 0.77
14 15 0.7 0.81
15 16 0.7 0.85
16 17 0.72 0.89
17 18 0.75 0.92
18 30 0.82 1.03
30 60 0.83 1.03
60 { 0.61 0.68
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Table 3.3: Food Distribution Measures by Age and Sex
N Calorie/Day Calorie Share Food Exp Food Exp. Sh Unit Cost ri
All Animal Plant Tk/day Animal Plant
m2-5 164 1026 5.48 16.71 6.91 25.97 32.84 0.12 1.15
f2-5 177 1033 4.26 17.87 6.78 22.99 35.36 0.11 1.11
m6-10 329 1627 3.00 14.80 9.85 21.97 32.9 0.15 1.03
f6-10 278 1534 2.99 15.23 9.28 21.3 34.1 0.15 1.05
m11-19 695 2483 2.76 14.10 14.27 22.45 31.79 0.2 0.98
f11-19 658 2061 2.59 14.52 11.80 21.51 32.83 0.18 0.97
m20-55 1176 3032 3.12 15.22 18.81 23.69 34.09 0.29 1.03
f20-55 1090 2259 2.52 14.65 13.18 20.55 34.8 0.22 0.98
m>55 244 2590 3.90 16.32 17.16 24.51 36.26 0.25 1.09
f>55 243 1919 3.07 15.05 12.04 21.85 36.51 0.21 1.04
Tercile 1
m2-5 68 942 3.78 15.48 5.49 22.57 30.97 0.11 1.14
f2-5 81 984 2.81 15.80 5.46 19.71 34.05 0.10 1.10
m6-10 141 1578 2.14 13.25 8.13 18.32 31.46 0.15 1.02
f6-10 125 1479 2.37 13.71 7.80 17.81 33.29 0.15 1.06
m11-19 204 2355 1.92 13.00 11.65 17.92 30.92 0.20 0.98
f11-19 236 1945 1.85 13.17 9.77 17.67 31.45 0.18 0.97
m20-55 342 2941 2.15 13.72 15.83 19.21 32.82 0.29 1.02
f20-55 349 2137 1.72 13.25 10.84 16.19 33.49 0.22 0.99
m>55 71 2488 2.20 15.28 13.53 17.32 36.4 0.23 1.08
f>55 72 1734 2.21 13.09 9.54 17.79 34.29 0.22 1.07
Tercile 2
m2-5 47 1049 6.01 16.36 7.19 26.96 32.70 0.12 1.15
f2-5 53 1051 3.86 17.09 7.17 22.06 35.68 0.10 1.1
m6-10 111 1630 3.05 14.95 10.26 22.83 33.14 0.15 1.02
f6-10 91 1536 2.84 14.7 9.11 21.76 33.28 0.14 1.02
m11-19 228 2469 2.76 13.77 14.3 23.24 31.47 0.20 0.99
f11-19 196 2089 2.55 14.89 11.95 21.79 33.05 0.17 0.97
m20-55 407 3055 3.06 14.87 18.85 23.79 34.21 0.29 1.03
f20-55 374 2282 2.45 14.37 13.18 20.69 34.87 0.22 0.98
m>55 84 2703 3.11 15.76 16.53 23.03 36.35 0.24 1.08
f>55 81 1953 2.72 14.7 11.65 20.95 36.80 0.19 1.04
Tercile 3
m2-5 38 1113 7.16 19.02 8.55 29.45 35.76 0.13 1.15
f2-5 40 1075 6.44 21.19 7.98 27.92 36.63 0.13 1.12
m6-10 75 1709 4.43 17.26 12.23 27.02 35.05 0.16 1.05
f6-10 67 1615 4.08 18.10 11.69 25.97 36.24 0.16 1.07
m11-19 259 2634 3.67 15.65 17.04 26.44 33.08 0.21 0.97
f11-19 234 2169 3.51 15.73 14.01 25.71 34.21 0.18 0.97
m20-55 467 3102 4.17 17.13 21.84 28.20 35.25 0.30 1.03
f20-55 373 2364 3.45 16.41 15.64 25.01 36.11 0.24 0.99
m>55 106 2555 5.63 17.46 19.95 30.25 36.09 0.28 1.10
f>55 99 2029 4.06 16.85 14.31 25.76 37.95 0.22 1.02
Note: Exp, expenditure, Tk, taka, the numbers with m and f represent age, m, male, f, female, m2-5, male of
2-5 years, f2-5, female of 2-5 years, and so on.
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Table 3.4: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Individual's Calorie Share from Food Groups
Log of Calorie Share From
Animal Group Cereal Group Plant Group
Vars OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
male, 2-5 years 0.345*** 0.180*** -0.067*** -0.042* 0.058 0.061
[0.082] [0.065] [0.026] [0.025] [0.065] [0.049]
female, 2-5 years 0.130 0.025 -0.051 -0.013 0.174*** 0.064
[0.083] [0.065] [0.037] [0.030] [0.062] [0.050]
male, 6-10 years 0.110** 0.040 -0.009 0.015 0.081** 0.033
[0.048] [0.031] [0.012] [0.010] [0.039] [0.027]
female, 6-10 years 0.092* 0.039 -0.013 0.006 0.050 -0.002
[0.054] [0.036] [0.018] [0.015] [0.037] [0.025]
male, 11-19 years 0.089*** 0.049** -0.005 0.009 0.023 -0.002
[0.032] [0.023] [0.007] [0.007] [0.023] [0.018]
female, 11-19 years 0.050 0.024 -0.005 0.015* 0.062*** 0.010
[0.031] [0.022] [0.007] [0.009] [0.023] [0.018]
male, 20-55 years 0.223*** 0.157*** -0.034*** -0.015** 0.112*** 0.068***
[0.033] [0.024] [0.007] [0.006] [0.025] [0.018]
male, > 55 years 0.246*** 0.208*** -0.058*** -0.030*** 0.202*** 0.147***
[0.053] [0.045] [0.012] [0.010] [0.036] [0.030]
female, > 55 years 0.112** 0.076* -0.013 0.000 0.023 0.027
[0.049] [0.041] [0.011] [0.008] [0.037] [0.030]
log head's asset 0.014 0.021 0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.002
 male 20-55 years [0.014] [0.014] [0.003] [0.002] [0.011] [0.008]
log head's asset 0.013 0.020 0.007 -0.004 -0.020 0.010
 male > 55 years [0.030] [0.028] [0.006] [0.005] [0.020] [0.016]
log head's asset -0.053 -0.022 0.009 -0.001 -0.017 -0.006
 female > 55 years [0.033] [0.030] [0.007] [0.006] [0.025] [0.022]
log wife's asset -0.150*** -0.125*** 0.026*** 0.022*** -0.078** -0.075**
 male 20-55 years [0.047] [0.047] [0.009] [0.007] [0.038] [0.029]
log wife's asset -0.135 -0.125 0.045*** 0.029** -0.132*** -0.151***
 male > 55 years [0.096] [0.087] [0.016] [0.012] [0.047] [0.040]
log wife's asset -0.079 -0.051 0.036 0.028 0.017 -0.059
 female > 55 years [0.148] [0.115] [0.031] [0.020] [0.089] [0.057]
log head's asset 0.021 -0.006* 0.031***
[0.015] [0.003] [0.012]
log wife's asset 0.115** -0.023** 0.077*
[0.052] [0.010] [0.042]
log head's asset -0.039 -0.040 0.002 0.006 -0.009 -0.001
 pregnant [0.058] [0.043] [0.011] [0.011] [0.040] [0.037]
log wife's asset 0.080 -0.079 -0.030 -0.011 0.184* 0.255**
 pregnant [0.183] [0.129] [0.024] [0.026] [0.096] [0.121]
log head's asset -0.001 0.033* -0.001 -0.007 0.004 0.007
 lactating [0.025] [0.020] [0.005] [0.005] [0.022] [0.018]
log wife's asset -0.073 -0.011 0.017 0.012 -0.041 -0.089**
 lactating [0.083] [0.070] [0.011] [0.013] [0.058] [0.044]
pregnant 0.025 0.042 -0.001 0.000 0.022 0.005
[0.087] [0.069] [0.014] [0.014] [0.060] [0.053]
lactating 0.033 -0.045 0.002 0.012 -0.032 -0.017
[0.039] [0.029] [0.007] [0.008] [0.029] [0.023]
log weight -0.024 -0.111*** 0.018 0.054*** 0.060 -0.047*
for height [0.057] [0.034] [0.012] [0.011] [0.037] [0.025]
primary occupation, -0.089*** -0.060*** 0.026*** 0.010** -0.092*** -0.033**
energy intensive [0.025] [0.017] [0.005] [0.004] [0.018] [0.013]
secondary occupation, -0.024 0.033** 0.005 -0.007** 0.012 0.030***
energy intensive [0.022] [0.014] [0.004] [0.003] [0.017] [0.011]
constant -33.280** 0.910*** 8.629*** 4.497*** -4.498 2.519***
[13.860] [0.098] [1.712] [0.023] [4.917] [0.081]
adj R2 0.153 0.021 0.108 0.024 0.180 0.004
observations 13906 14581 13906 14581 13906 14581
households 783 837 783 837 783 837
Eect of (relative to adult females) head's=wife's assets
male 20-55 years 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.02
female 20-55 years 0.08 0.11 0.28
male > 55 years 0.14 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00
female > 55 years 0.86 0.81 0.34 0.17 0.70 0.39
pregnant 0.52 0.77 0.20 0.53 0.05 0.04
lactating 0.40 0.55 0.14 0.15 0.45 0.04
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Additional controls and tests (not shown) are discussed in section 3.2.
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Table 3.5: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Individual's Expenditure Share on Dierent Food Groups
Log of Food Expenditure Share on
Animal Group Cereal Group Plant Group
Vars OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
male, 2-5 years 0.298** 0.119 -0.148*** -0.082** -0.144*** -0.092**
[0.116] [0.083] [0.052] [0.041] [0.051] [0.040]
female, 2-5 years 0.055 -0.041 -0.147** -0.045 0.006 -0.035
[0.114] [0.087] [0.062] [0.048] [0.055] [0.044]
male, 6-10 years 0.175** 0.080* -0.057* 0.011 -0.028 -0.038*
[0.073] [0.046] [0.032] [0.021] [0.032] [0.022]
female, 6-10 years 0.104 0.085 -0.032 0.017 -0.030 -0.060***
[0.083] [0.054] [0.033] [0.022] [0.031] [0.021]
male, 11-19 years 0.206*** 0.173*** -0.006 0.025* -0.082*** -0.086***
[0.051] [0.036] [0.018] [0.014] [0.020] [0.016]
female, 11-19 years 0.109** 0.084** -0.009 0.039** -0.034* -0.061***
[0.052] [0.034] [0.019] [0.016] [0.019] [0.015]
male, 20-55 years 0.304*** 0.241*** -0.121*** -0.069*** -0.006 0.004
[0.050] [0.034] [0.019] [0.015] [0.020] [0.016]
male, > 55 years 0.249*** 0.231*** -0.166*** -0.116*** 0.088*** 0.080***
[0.075] [0.056] [0.031] [0.025] [0.028] [0.025]
female, > 55 years 0.075 0.060 -0.082*** -0.082*** 0.080** 0.112***
[0.083] [0.066] [0.028] [0.022] [0.032] [0.029]
log head's asset 0.022 0.034 0.000 -0.000 -0.022** -0.025***
 male 20-55 years [0.023] [0.022] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.008]
log head's asset 0.018 0.025 0.000 -0.012 -0.023 -0.016
 male > 55 years [0.039] [0.034] [0.018] [0.013] [0.017] [0.014]
log head's asset -0.046 -0.025 0.021 0.019 -0.019 -0.012
 female > 55 years [0.051] [0.047] [0.020] [0.015] [0.017] [0.016]
log wife's asset -0.171*** -0.104** 0.106*** 0.082*** -0.026 -0.022
 male 20-55 years [0.061] [0.046] [0.030] [0.023] [0.032] [0.028]
log wife's asset -0.197** -0.151* 0.089 0.082* -0.065* -0.085**
 male > 55 years [0.083] [0.083] [0.058] [0.046] [0.036] [0.040]
log wife's asset -0.083 0.148 0.054 0.097* -0.043 -0.152**
 female > 55 years [0.229] [0.187] [0.076] [0.053] [0.097] [0.061]
log head's asset 0.018 -0.023** 0.036***
[0.024] [0.010] [0.009]
log wife's asset 0.120** -0.089*** 0.045
[0.060] [0.035] [0.045]
log head's asset -0.056 0.005 0.048* 0.057** -0.017 -0.039
 pregnant [0.094] [0.072] [0.026] [0.029] [0.028] [0.024]
log wife's asset -0.318 -0.126 -0.086 -0.037 0.300*** 0.251***
 pregnant [0.341] [0.173] [0.084] [0.085] [0.082] [0.082]
log head's asset 0.031 0.050 -0.006 -0.014 0.003 -0.015
 lactating [0.039] [0.032] [0.016] [0.012] [0.016] [0.015]
log wife's asset -0.090 0.021 0.057 0.021 -0.030 -0.058
 lactating [0.093] [0.076] [0.046] [0.036] [0.070] [0.054]
pregnant 0.168 0.034 -0.029 -0.037 -0.032 0.003
[0.144] [0.116] [0.047] [0.044] [0.050] [0.047]
lactating 0.024 -0.058 0.005 0.043** -0.068*** -0.005
[0.067] [0.050] [0.020] [0.017] [0.026] [0.021]
log weight 0.041 -0.049 -0.004 0.088*** 0.066** -0.016
for height [0.084] [0.050] [0.034] [0.021] [0.032] [0.022]
primary occupation, -0.056 -0.056** 0.077*** 0.039*** -0.029* -0.005
energy intensive [0.038] [0.024] [0.014] [0.011] [0.015] [0.011]
secondary occupation, -0.044 0.021 0.017 -0.026*** 0.015 0.012
energy intensive [0.033] [0.021] [0.013] [0.009] [0.013] [0.009]
constant 39.539*** 2.550*** -32.204*** 3.826*** 4.615 3.497***
[13.256] [0.163] [4.612] [0.059] [7.582] [0.065]
adj. R2 0.108 0.004 0.133 0.022 0.066 0.011
observations 13906 14581 13906 14581 13906 14581
households 783 837 783 837 783 837
Eect of (relative to adult females) head's=wife's assets
male 20-55 years 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.92
female 20-55 years 0.12 0.07 0.84
male > 55 years 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.30 0.10
female > 55 years 0.87 0.37 0.67 0.15 0.81 0.02
pregnant 0.45 0.47 0.11 0.28 0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Additional controls (not shown) are discussed in section 3.2.
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Table 3.6: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Costliness of Individual's Diet
Log Unit Cost of Calorie Log ri
Vars OLS FE OLS FE
male, 2-5 years 0.124*** 0.076*** 0.061* 0.060*
[0.039] [0.028] [0.031] [0.032]
female, 2-5 years 0.127*** 0.066** 0.078** 0.062*
[0.043] [0.030] [0.038] [0.036]
male, 6-10 years 0.044 0.011 0.004 -0.004
[0.027] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018]
female, 6-10 years 0.038 0.013 0.012 0.010
[0.026] [0.017] [0.031] [0.029]
male, 11-19 years 0.012 -0.011 -0.017* -0.023**
[0.016] [0.012] [0.010] [0.012]
female, 11-19 years 0.014 -0.024** -0.028*** -0.036***
[0.015] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012]
male, 20-55 years 0.110*** 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.067***
[0.016] [0.012] [0.010] [0.012]
male, > 55 years 0.142*** 0.106*** 0.099*** 0.102***
[0.026] [0.020] [0.019] [0.023]
female, > 55 years 0.096*** 0.101*** 0.080*** 0.102***
[0.023] [0.020] [0.023] [0.026]
log head's asset -0.030* -0.006 -0.009 -0.006
 male 6-10 years [0.016] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011]
log head's asset -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.006
 male 20-55 years [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006]
log head's asset -0.006 0.005 0.009 0.013
 male > 55 years [0.014] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013]
log head's asset -0.027 -0.028** -0.026** -0.033**
 female > 55 years [0.018] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014]
log wife's asset -0.103** -0.086*** -0.071*** -0.063**
 male 6-10 years [0.049] [0.033] [0.027] [0.029]
log wife's asset -0.089*** -0.068*** -0.060*** -0.065***
 male 20-55 years [0.027] [0.021] [0.014] [0.016]
log wife's asset -0.065 -0.054 -0.068** -0.066*
 male > 55 years [0.043] [0.037] [0.028] [0.034]
log wife's asset -0.067 -0.092** -0.132*** -0.146***
 female > 55 years [0.060] [0.042] [0.041] [0.046]
log head's asset 0.021*** 0.005
[0.008] [0.003]
log wife's asset 0.079*** 0.035***
[0.030] [0.010]
log head's asset -0.053** -0.068*** -0.044*** -0.050***
 pregnant [0.022] [0.023] [0.014] [0.018]
log wife's asset 0.061 0.030 0.073 0.028
 pregnant [0.090] [0.088] [0.046] [0.039]
pregnant 0.029 0.054 0.023 0.020
[0.040] [0.038] [0.025] [0.025]
lactating -0.002 -0.043*** -0.030*** -0.030**
[0.019] [0.014] [0.010] [0.013]
log weight 0.001 -0.048*** -0.073*** -0.092***
for height [0.028] [0.016] [0.014] [0.019]
primary occupation, -0.061*** -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.028***
energy intensive [0.012] [0.008] [0.006] [0.009]
secondary occupation, -0.014 0.020** 0.006 0.012
energy intensive [0.011] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008]
constant 21.492*** -5.206*** 7.410 0.852***
[4.304] [0.050] [4.760] [0.033]
adj R2 0.140 0.020 0.041 0.044
observations 13906 14581 13906 14581
households 783 837 783 837
Eect of (relative to adult females) head's=wife's assets
male 6-10 years 0.16 0.02 0.03 0.07
male 20-55 years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
female 20-55 years 0.06 0.01
male > 55 years 0.19 0.12 0.01 0.03
female > 55 years 0.52 0.14 0.01 0.01
pregnant 0.20 0.27 0.01 0.06
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Additional controls (not shown) are discussed in section 3.2.
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Table 3.7: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Individual's Calorie Share from Three
Food Groups across Terciles
Log of Calorie Share From
Animal Group Cereal Group Plant Group
Vars OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
male, 2-5 years 0.319*** 0.130 -0.072 -0.076 -0.006 0.144**
[0.116] [0.087] [0.059] [0.060] [0.095] [0.073]
female, 2-5 years 0.228** 0.080 -0.101** -0.068* 0.229** 0.152*
[0.102] [0.082] [0.042] [0.035] [0.096] [0.084]
male, 6-10 years 0.091 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.018 0.051
[0.061] [0.051] [0.016] [0.011] [0.056] [0.039]
female, 11-19 years 0.092* 0.021 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.015
[0.052] [0.037] [0.013] [0.013] [0.038] [0.033]
male, 20-55 years 0.231*** 0.102*** -0.026** -0.014* 0.107*** 0.081***
[0.040] [0.036] [0.011] [0.008] [0.035] [0.029]
t2 male, 2-5 years -0.060 0.037 0.035 0.067 0.031 -0.161
[0.155] [0.133] [0.067] [0.069] [0.131] [0.119]
t2 female, 2-5 years -0.327** -0.282** 0.002 0.022 -0.090 -0.109
[0.137] [0.126] [0.074] [0.062] [0.127] [0.114]
t2 male, 6-10 years -0.012 0.006 -0.018 0.004 0.054 -0.041
[0.076] [0.073] [0.016] [0.012] [0.067] [0.058]
t2 female, 11-19 years -0.115 -0.010 -0.014 0.001 0.051 0.001
[0.070] [0.059] [0.014] [0.012] [0.049] [0.050]
t2 male, 20-55 years -0.016 0.073 -0.009 0.005 -0.001 -0.030
[0.049] [0.047] [0.013] [0.009] [0.042] [0.041]
t3 male, 2-5 years 0.087 0.170 -0.012 0.021 0.107 -0.112
[0.175] [0.147] [0.070] [0.070] [0.153] [0.146]
t3 female, 2-5 years -0.075 0.148 0.108* 0.092* -0.076 -0.084
[0.189] [0.167] [0.058] [0.048] [0.123] [0.116]
t3 male, 6-10 years 0.017 0.130 -0.037* -0.011 0.117 -0.002
[0.096] [0.085] [0.023] [0.021] [0.075] [0.069]
t3 female, 11-19 years -0.083 -0.003 -0.018 -0.004 0.070 -0.024
[0.078] [0.072] [0.016] [0.013] [0.052] [0.050]
t3 male, 20-55 years -0.041 0.111** -0.010 -0.006 0.014 -0.012
[0.055] [0.055] [0.014] [0.010] [0.043] [0.045]
log head's asset -0.123** -0.046 0.019 0.022 0.061 0.000
 male 2-5 years [0.056] [0.052] [0.021] [0.021] [0.058] [0.050]
log head's asset -0.059 -0.046 0.035** 0.025* -0.048 -0.027
 female 2-5 years [0.063] [0.047] [0.015] [0.014] [0.050] [0.048]
log head's asset -0.031 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.007 -0.040
 male 6-10 years [0.037] [0.035] [0.008] [0.007] [0.040] [0.033]
log head's asset 0.003 0.017 0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.007
 female 11-19 years [0.027] [0.023] [0.004] [0.004] [0.020] [0.021]
log head's asset 0.005 0.040* 0.002 -0.000 -0.009 0.001
 male 20-55 years [0.022] [0.021] [0.005] [0.004] [0.020] [0.016]
log wife's asset 0.315* 0.359** -0.001 0.044 0.061 -0.253
 male 2-5 years [0.172] [0.153] [0.048] [0.054] [0.139] [0.177]
log wife's asset -0.415** -0.341** 0.048 0.062 -0.071 -0.281*
 female 2-5 years [0.183] [0.168] [0.056] [0.053] [0.153] [0.156]
log wife's asset -0.343*** -0.221** 0.015 0.006 -0.077 -0.074
 male 6-10 years [0.094] [0.090] [0.021] [0.019] [0.107] [0.104]
log wife's asset -0.193** -0.171** 0.004 0.012 -0.059 -0.014
 female 11-19 years [0.097] [0.081] [0.015] [0.019] [0.098] [0.091]
log wife's asset -0.231*** -0.168** 0.012 0.013 -0.057 -0.068
 male 20-55 years [0.084] [0.081] [0.013] [0.016] [0.062] [0.077]
log head's asset -0.001 0.001 0.008
[0.022] [0.004] [0.018]
log wife's asset 0.213** -0.005 -0.004
[0.087] [0.015] [0.078]
t2: log head's asset 0.187 0.117 -0.037 -0.046 -0.024 0.041
 male 2-5 years [0.122] [0.114] [0.027] [0.029] [0.074] [0.069]
t2: log wife's asset -0.530** -0.481** 0.005 -0.052 0.000 0.335
 male 2-5 years [0.239] [0.229] [0.069] [0.068] [0.252] [0.237]
t2: log head's asset 0.073 0.037 -0.043* -0.044** 0.093 0.086
 female 2-5 years [0.115] [0.107] [0.023] [0.021] [0.090] [0.096]
t2: log wife's asset 0.918*** 0.799*** -0.008 -0.015 -0.063 -0.043
 female 2-5 years [0.312] [0.299] [0.075] [0.071] [0.178] [0.213]
t2: log head's asset 0.081 0.081 -0.008 -0.021** 0.008 0.051
 male 6-10 years [0.054] [0.055] [0.011] [0.010] [0.049] [0.043]
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Table 3.7: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Individual's Calorie Share from Three
Food Groups across Terciles
Animal Group Cereal Group Plant Group
Vars OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
t2: log wife's asset 0.370** 0.263* -0.033 -0.003 -0.011 -0.054
 male 6-10 years [0.178] [0.159] [0.040] [0.038] [0.139] [0.130]
t2: log head's asset 0.057 0.043 -0.002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.007
 female 11-19 years [0.041] [0.040] [0.007] [0.006] [0.030] [0.032]
t2: log wife's asset 0.220 0.179 0.003 -0.017 0.016 0.018
 female 11-19 years [0.144] [0.128] [0.021] [0.025] [0.108] [0.118]
t2: log head's asset 0.013 -0.015 -0.002 -0.005 0.009 0.011
 male 20-55 years [0.031] [0.032] [0.006] [0.006] [0.027] [0.025]
t2: log wife's asset 0.162 0.096 0.008 -0.001 -0.052 -0.011
 male 20-55 years [0.112] [0.100] [0.016] [0.019] [0.081] [0.101]
t2: log head's asset 0.008 0.043 -0.006 -0.004 0.024 0.032
[0.028] [0.033] [0.006] [0.006] [0.026] [0.033]
t2: log wife's asset -0.127 0.011 -0.019 -0.014 0.136* 0.069
[0.114] [0.104] [0.018] [0.023] [0.078] [0.093]
t3: log head's asset 0.057 0.004 -0.001 -0.025 -0.130 -0.035
 male 2-5 years [0.095] [0.088] [0.036] [0.037] [0.081] [0.070]
t3: log wife's asset 0.090 0.170 -0.000 -0.027 -0.144 0.044
 male 2-5 years [0.387] [0.382] [0.080] [0.084] [0.239] [0.197]
t3: log head's asset -0.001 0.060 -0.083 -0.083* 0.068 0.100
 female 2-5 years [0.158] [0.143] [0.054] [0.048] [0.070] [0.069]
t3: log wife's asset 0.523* 0.309 -0.124* -0.126* 0.209 0.372*
 female 2-5 years [0.293] [0.280] [0.073] [0.075] [0.183] [0.198]
t3: log head's asset -0.051 -0.083 0.007 -0.019 -0.020 0.060
 male 6-10 years [0.061] [0.058] [0.017] [0.014] [0.058] [0.049]
t3: log wife's asset 0.387 0.304 0.006 0.026 -0.027 -0.119
 male 6-10 years [0.261] [0.247] [0.059] [0.063] [0.231] [0.256]
t3: log head's asset -0.031 -0.065* 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.004
 female 11-19 years [0.040] [0.037] [0.008] [0.007] [0.030] [0.029]
t3: log wife's asset 0.123 0.157 0.020 0.011 -0.112 -0.114
 female 11-19 years [0.154] [0.127] [0.029] [0.029] [0.170] [0.166]
t3: log head's asset 0.020 -0.037 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.013
 male 20-55 years [0.029] [0.030] [0.007] [0.006] [0.024] [0.022]
t3: log wife's asset 0.077 0.001 0.023 0.022 -0.030 -0.015
 male 20-55 years [0.133] [0.134] [0.019] [0.021] [0.073] [0.094]
t3: log head's asset 0.049 0.139*** -0.014* -0.006 0.037 0.024
[0.033] [0.038] [0.008] [0.008] [0.029] [0.037]
t3: log wife's asset -0.172 -0.078 -0.020 -0.024 0.085 0.079
[0.123] [0.122] [0.023] [0.027] [0.094] [0.126]
tercile2 0.058 0.013 -0.022
[0.054] [0.013] [0.043]
tercile3 0.119* 0.007 0.002
[0.071] [0.017] [0.050]
adj. R2 0.161 0.032 0.117 0.031 0.185 0.009
Eect of (relative to adult females) head's=wife's assets
male 2-5 years 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.63 1.00 0.17
t2: male 2-5 years 0.01 0.02 0.53 0.93 0.93 0.23
t3: male 2-5 years 0.94 0.68 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.72
female 2-5 years 0.07 0.09 0.80 0.47 0.89 0.11
t2: female 2-5 years 0.01 0.01 0.64 0.68 0.42 0.57
t3: female 2-5 years 0.11 0.42 0.62 0.61 0.45 0.17
male 6-10 years 0.00 0.02 0.57 0.84 0.45 0.75
t2: male 6-10 years 0.11 0.27 0.56 0.65 0.89 0.43
t3: male 6-10 years 0.11 0.14 0.99 0.47 0.98 0.47
female 11-19 years 0.05 0.02 0.87 0.57 0.61 0.94
t2: female 11-19 years 0.26 0.29 0.82 0.65 0.80 0.83
t3: female 11-19 years 0.33 0.09 0.51 0.64 0.52 0.48
male 20-55 years 0.01 0.01 0.43 0.42 0.46 0.40
t2: male 20-55 years 0.20 0.29 0.51 0.84 0.49 0.83
t3: male 20-55 years 0.67 0.79 0.22 0.35 0.71 0.98
female 20-55 years 0.01 0.71 0.88
t2: female 20-55 years 0.25 0.78 0.46 0.69 0.18 0.72
t3: female 20-55 years 0.08 0.11 0.82 0.53 0.62 0.68
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Tests for equality of coecients for a bargaining measure on a given age-group of terciles 2 and 3
are relative to the bargaining eect on the corresponding age-group at tercile 1; t2=tercile2
and t3=tercile 3. Additional controls (not shown) are described in section 3.2. Observations
and households are same as Table 3.6. Constant term is not reported.
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Table 3.8: Intrahousehold Bargaining and Individual's Food Expenditure Share on
Three Food Groups across Terciles
Log of Food Expenditure Share on
Animal Group Cereal Group Plant Group
Vars OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
male, 2-5 years 0.348* 0.099 -0.150* -0.110 -0.152** -0.007
[0.180] [0.118] [0.083] [0.069] [0.074] [0.059]
female, 2-5 years 0.097 -0.105 -0.211*** -0.107* 0.005 -0.013
[0.184] [0.146] [0.075] [0.060] [0.080] [0.067]
male, 6-10 years 0.177* 0.006 0.011 0.047* -0.072* -0.033
[0.104] [0.079] [0.036] [0.027] [0.043] [0.032]
male, 11-19 years 0.169** 0.073 0.010 0.050** -0.084** -0.076**
[0.082] [0.068] [0.026] [0.022] [0.034] [0.031]
female, 11-19 years 0.228** 0.113* -0.009 0.051** -0.065* -0.079***
[0.097] [0.068] [0.030] [0.024] [0.034] [0.026]
male, 20-55 years 0.344*** 0.168*** -0.120*** -0.037* -0.011 0.009
[0.071] [0.059] [0.024] [0.021] [0.028] [0.025]
t2 male, 2-5 years -0.174 0.001 0.092 0.070 -0.062 -0.199**
[0.231] [0.190] [0.103] [0.091] [0.108] [0.097]
t2 female, 2-5 years -0.363 -0.252 0.045 0.064 0.038 0.026
[0.254] [0.227] [0.109] [0.091] [0.119] [0.108]
t2 male, 6-10 years -0.072 0.048 -0.055 -0.056 0.042 -0.021
[0.127] [0.122] [0.046] [0.040] [0.057] [0.050]
t2 male, 11-19 years 0.030 0.161 -0.006 -0.050* -0.001 -0.012
[0.099] [0.101] [0.034] [0.029] [0.042] [0.042]
t2 female, 11-19 years -0.242* -0.033 0.046 -0.003 0.036 0.019
[0.127] [0.110] [0.037] [0.032] [0.045] [0.041]
t2 male, 20-55 years -0.070 0.130 0.013 -0.047* 0.002 -0.015
[0.084] [0.083] [0.028] [0.026] [0.033] [0.034]
t3 male, 2-5 years -0.126 0.000 -0.014 -0.002 0.110 -0.039
[0.249] [0.185] [0.114] [0.096] [0.133] [0.121]
t3 female, 2-5 years 0.048 0.414* 0.176 0.083 -0.050 -0.091
[0.264] [0.231] [0.111] [0.090] [0.115] [0.108]
t3 male, 6-10 years 0.016 0.219* -0.133* -0.085 0.112* 0.012
[0.138] [0.127] [0.071] [0.058] [0.061] [0.054]
t3 male, 11-19 years 0.071 0.117 -0.016 -0.011 0.009 -0.018
[0.117] [0.118] [0.041] [0.036] [0.048] [0.047]
t3 female, 11-19 years -0.195 -0.098 0.004 -0.032 0.066 0.055
[0.128] [0.110] [0.046] [0.040] [0.046] [0.039]
t3 male, 20-55 years -0.089 0.120 0.006 -0.053* 0.024 -0.004
[0.093] [0.091] [0.034] [0.031] [0.036] [0.036]
log head's asset -0.201* -0.052 0.056 0.046 0.034 -0.018
 male 2-5 years [0.108] [0.091] [0.036] [0.032] [0.058] [0.052]
log head's asset 0.098 0.032 0.063* 0.046 0.006 0.019
 female 2-5 years [0.103] [0.083] [0.035] [0.029] [0.048] [0.040]
log head's asset -0.028 0.041 0.006 0.011 0.035 -0.025
 male 6-10 years [0.064] [0.059] [0.025] [0.023] [0.033] [0.031]
log head's asset -0.039 -0.014 0.004 0.005 0.014 0.001
 female 11-19 years [0.050] [0.040] [0.016] [0.012] [0.019] [0.016]
log head's asset -0.009 0.043 0.008 -0.008 0.002 -0.006
 male 20-55 years [0.037] [0.034] [0.017] [0.015] [0.018] [0.015]
log wife's asset 0.366 0.456** -0.034 0.016 -0.044 -0.174*
 male 2-5 years [0.264] [0.202] [0.091] [0.100] [0.135] [0.104]
log wife's asset -0.803** -0.513 0.195** 0.209*** -0.015 -0.136
 female 2-5 years [0.348] [0.339] [0.090] [0.074] [0.118] [0.100]
log wife's asset -0.423*** -0.207 0.106* 0.047 -0.076 -0.046
 male 6-10 years [0.152] [0.131] [0.054] [0.052] [0.076] [0.072]
log wife's asset -0.198 -0.201* 0.053 0.042 -0.098 -0.068
 female 11-19 years [0.161] [0.112] [0.047] [0.050] [0.070] [0.055]
log wife's asset -0.358** -0.269*** 0.113*** 0.060 -0.060 -0.025
 male 20-55 years [0.150] [0.102] [0.041] [0.044] [0.052] [0.050]
log head's asset 0.017 -0.001 0.010
[0.044] [0.013] [0.017]
log wife's asset 0.258* -0.044 0.043
[0.139] [0.043] [0.048]
t2: log head's asset 0.201 0.025 -0.115** -0.079 -0.044 -0.000
 male 2-5 years [0.161] [0.151] [0.056] [0.051] [0.084] [0.076]
t2: log wife's asset -0.808** -0.728*** 0.076 0.010 0.123 0.231
 male 2-5 years [0.347] [0.278] [0.149] [0.144] [0.205] [0.144]
t2: log head's asset -0.080 -0.162 -0.087 -0.089* -0.014 0.006
 female 2-5 years [0.180] [0.174] [0.055] [0.049] [0.084] [0.082]
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t2: log wife's asset 1.338*** 1.049** -0.187 -0.160 -0.082 -0.138
 female 2-5 years [0.420] [0.422] [0.128] [0.112] [0.138] [0.143]
t2: log head's asset 0.114 0.032 -0.014 -0.031 -0.068 -0.012
 male 6-10 years [0.087] [0.084] [0.038] [0.031] [0.044] [0.042]
t2: log wife's asset 0.476* 0.259 -0.071 0.034 -0.038 -0.084
 male 6-10 years [0.287] [0.243] [0.104] [0.090] [0.107] [0.085]
t2: log head's asset 0.138* 0.094 -0.024 -0.021 -0.067** -0.058**
 female 11-19 years [0.072] [0.063] [0.024] [0.021] [0.027] [0.027]
t2: log wife's asset 0.145 0.169 -0.078 -0.041 0.107 0.063
 female 11-19 years [0.234] [0.199] [0.079] [0.081] [0.093] [0.075]
t2: log head's asset 0.028 -0.035 -0.014 0.005 -0.025 -0.013
 male 20-55 years [0.058] [0.057] [0.020] [0.018] [0.023] [0.021]
t2: log wife's asset 0.286 0.256 -0.021 0.030 0.010 -0.015
 male 20-55 years [0.220] [0.167] [0.059] [0.061] [0.062] [0.062]
t2: log head's asset -0.013 0.093 -0.021 -0.028* 0.031 0.012
[0.060] [0.064] [0.017] [0.016] [0.020] [0.024]
t2: log wife's asset -0.192 0.063 -0.064 -0.135** 0.060 0.058
[0.206] [0.164] [0.062] [0.063] [0.063] [0.052]
t3: log head's asset 0.229* 0.034 -0.014 -0.028 -0.088 -0.018
 male 2-5 years [0.126] [0.110] [0.061] [0.057] [0.065] [0.057]
t3: log wife's asset 0.030 0.239 0.061 0.045 -0.257 -0.348
 male 2-5 years [0.379] [0.311] [0.166] [0.153] [0.250] [0.217]
t3: log head's asset -0.343* -0.225 -0.087 -0.095 -0.039 -0.022
 female 2-5 years [0.180] [0.176] [0.091] [0.080] [0.081] [0.072]
t3: log wife's asset 0.603 0.165 -0.291* -0.290* 0.163 0.258**
 female 2-5 years [0.400] [0.388] [0.159] [0.171] [0.142] [0.125]
t3: log head's asset -0.083 -0.181** 0.080* 0.022 -0.047 0.022
 male 6-10 years [0.082] [0.082] [0.047] [0.039] [0.047] [0.043]
t3: log wife's asset 0.651** 0.443 0.026 0.043 -0.105 -0.172
 male 6-10 years [0.312] [0.310] [0.151] [0.122] [0.169] [0.153]
t3: log head's asset 0.005 -0.029 0.011 0.013 -0.036 -0.017
 female 11-19 years [0.065] [0.057] [0.025] [0.019] [0.029] [0.026]
t3: log wife's asset 0.418** 0.433** 0.009 0.046 -0.054 -0.098
 female 11-19 years [0.207] [0.185] [0.092] [0.072] [0.119] [0.101]
t3: log head's asset 0.065 0.011 -0.010 0.017 -0.043* -0.041*
 male 20-55 years [0.048] [0.050] [0.021] [0.020] [0.023] [0.021]
t3: log wife's asset 0.231 0.147 0.006 0.049 0.047 0.016
 male 20-55 years [0.169] [0.147] [0.063] [0.059] [0.074] [0.082]
t3: log head's asset 0.012 0.186*** -0.040** -0.056*** 0.043* -0.003
[0.054] [0.069] [0.020] [0.019] [0.023] [0.027]
t3: log wife's asset -0.207 0.080 -0.033 -0.089 -0.022 0.006
[0.152] [0.176] [0.077] [0.067] [0.075] [0.073]
tercile2 0.160 -0.027 -0.005
[0.097] [0.029] [0.033]
tercile3 0.176 -0.058 0.013
[0.115] [0.040] [0.039]
adj. R2 0.110 0.012 0.146 0.032 0.069 0.013
Eect of (relative to adult females) head's=wife's assets
male 2-5 years 0.04 0.02 0.30 0.76 0.62 0.20
t2: male 2-5 years 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.56 0.47 0.17
t3: male 2-5 years 0.62 0.55 0.68 0.67 0.52 0.15
female 2-5 years 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.87 0.13
t2: female 2-5 years 0.00 0.01 0.49 0.56 0.68 0.40
t3: female 2-5 years 0.03 0.35 0.25 0.30 0.20 0.04
male 6-10 years 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.51 0.17 0.79
t2: male 6-10 years 0.23 0.38 0.61 0.49 0.79 0.43
t3: male 6-10 years 0.02 0.06 0.74 0.87 0.74 0.22
female 11-19 years 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.46 0.12 0.23
t2: female 11-19 years 0.97 0.71 0.51 0.81 0.07 0.12
t3: female 11-19 years 0.05 0.02 0.98 0.65 0.88 0.43
male 20-55 years 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.26 0.72
t2: male 20-55 years 0.26 0.10 0.91 0.71 0.60 0.98
t3: male 20-55 years 0.35 0.38 0.81 0.62 0.25 0.51
female 20-55 years 0.10 0.32 0.52
t2: female 20-55 years 0.41 0.87 0.50 0.12 0.67 0.44
t3: female 20-55 years 0.18 0.60 0.93 0.65 0.40 0.91
Same end of table note as Table 3.7.
CHAPTER IV
Cultural Norms and Son-Preference in Intrahousehold Food
Distribution - A Case Study of Two Asian Agrarian
Economies
Abstract: Based on cost and content of individual calorie intake, I nd evidence of son-preference
in food distribution in rural Bangladesh and not in the rural Philippines, which is consistent with the
contrasting cultural norms about females in these two agrarian economies. In Bangladesh, consistent with
purdah culture, few female participate in the labour market and gender dierence in wage rate is prominent,
while transfer at marriage from a bride's family exceeds that from a groom's family. There, village wage
rate of adult female positively and that of adult male negatively aect a girl's allocation from animal food
group, while village average value of transfers from grooms' families in recent marriages positively aect a
girl's allocation. Gender disparity seems not due to scarcity. Higher birth ordered children fare worse than
lower birth ordered in both countries, but a higher birth ordered girl does worse than a higher birth ordered
boy in Bangladesh but not in the Philippines. A village access to television in Bangladesh positively aects
girls' allocation from animal group.
4.1 Introduction
Understanding how cultural norms can inuence intrahousehold food distribution has critical
policy implications in light of the severity of micronutrient malnutrition around the world. How-
ever, despite considerable advancement in intrahousehold resource allocation literature, still there
is limited progress in understanding intrahousehold food distribution issues let alone the role of
culture in food distribution. In general, existing empirical work in economics does not adequately
capture the specic cultural contexts in which individuals within the households make decisions
(Quisumbing, 2003; Fernandez, 2008), while the lack of individual dietary intake data in typical
household surveys constrain the analysis of intrahousehold food distribution.
To the best of my knowledge, there have been only a few studies, such as Quisumbing and
Maluccio (2003), that attempt to replicate a common intrahousehold allocation framework across
dierent cultural contexts, and nd pro-male bias in education spending in Bangladesh - a patriar-
chal society in which husbands control most of the household resources, but not in West Sumatra,
Indonesia, which is a matrilineal and matrilocal society1. The contrast between these two Asian
Islamic societies illustrates the diculty in predicting the direction of sex preference without con-
sidering the underlying culture and customs.
1See also Quisumbing (2003) and the references therein.
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Intrahousehold allocations can be inuenced by norms dictating dierential roles, acceptable
behaviors, rights, privileges, and life options for women and men (Agarwal, 1997; Kabeer, 1999).
The bargaining power and threat points of women vis-a-vis men could be inuenced by cultural
factors, such as the purdah (veil) culture, which limits womens ability to obtain and possess control
over resources and their mobility. In such context, even if women have education, it may not serve
them in the labor market as women have few opportunities to work outside home (Hallman, 2003).
While the test of unitary model is at the center of empirical intrahousehold literature, the
absence of dierent cultural contexts in this analysis limits our understanding on how the eects
of bargaining power of a husband vis-a-vis his wife vary in dierent cultural contexts. In societies,
where cultural norms dictate male-preference, targeting policy toward women may not necessarily
reduce gender inequality.
Women's son-preference may have a sound economic basis but that basis could be inuenced
by cultural norms. If a cultural context, such as purdah system, limits women's participation in
outside economic activities and thus makes males the main bread-earners, then in the absence of
public provision for old age support, women may invest in the human capital of sons even more than
their husbands as women are younger at marriage and expect to live longer than their husbands,
ceteris paribus2. The gender discrimination in South Asia (SA), in contrast to Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) where daughters are slightly more nutritionally favored than sons, is arguably due to the
dowry culture in SA that requires families to pay bridegrooms to marry their daughters vis-a-vis
the custom of bridegrooms to pay a bride price in SSA (Quisumbing, 2003).
The cultural norms of a patriarchal society combined with economic necessity of manual labour
in an agrarian economy may imply that sons are prized (Chung and Das Gupta, 2007), while the
tradition of dowry payments could put families with daughters in a disadvantaged position. Some
religions and customs also put a premium on sons as in Hindu tradition a son light a man's funeral
pyre. Lineage is primarily traced through the male in many societies, and families may depend on
males for physical protection (Oldenburg, 1992).
In this context, this chapter attempts to make a number of contributions to the literature.
First, focusing on food distribution among children in two poor agrarian societies, I demonstrate
the evidence of son-preference in Bangladesh but not in the Philippines, which is consistent with
the contrasting cultural norms about gender in these societies. Bangladesh is a patrilineal and
patriarchal society with strong male dominance while the Philippines is a bilineal society with
non gender-discriminatory social norms. The son-preference, arguably, is not likely to be driven
by | the current nutrition-health-labour market linkage | a key economic explanation in the
literature for observed sex-disparity in food distribution in an agrarian economy. As data shows, in
Bangladesh, where son-preference is prominent, children do not participate in the labour market.
In the Philippines, where they do, there is no such son-preference. If the disparity is driven by
2The age at marriage of women can also be inuenced by the cultural norms related to womens labor market
participation vis-a-vis household activities. Smith et al. (2003) nd women marry at younger ages in South Asia and
at older ages in Latin America.
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labour market participation, one would expect disparity among older than younger children. Son-
preference, however, is persistent at all ages in Bangladesh, but at no age in the Philippines3.
While sex-disparity among children could be inuenced by future sex-disparity in labour market
participation rates, Behrman (1988b) does not nd any such link in rural India4. Consistent with
the purdah culture in Bangladesh, I nd that few women participate at the labour market. Although
both societies are agrarian, adult males' labour market participation is 7 times that of adult females
in Bangladesh, while it is only double of that of adult females in the Philippines. Mean village wage
rate of adult male is twice as much as that of adult female in Bangladesh, while consistent with
egalitarian norms in the Filipino society, no such sex-disparity in wage rate is observed there.
Using village mean wage rate of adult males and females as proxy for future earning potential of
boy and girl in a society - an approach similar to Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982)5, I nd that village
female wage rate positively and male wage rate negatively aect a girl's allocation from animal
food group (which is the most expensive and also nutritionally rich) in Bangladesh, but not in the
Philippines6. Thus my second contribution is the demonstration of the link between intrahousehold
food allocation and expected labour market returns in Bangladesh, while the previous literature
found no such link in South Asia. The lack of such link in the Philippines could be due to no
sex-disparity in adult wage to begin with and no bar on labour market participation of females due
to the country's egalitarian social norms.
Third, based on the same Rosenzweig-Schultz type assumption, I also explore if and how chil-
dren's food allocation in Bangladesh7 is aected by the practice of dowry versus bride-price in a
village and nd that the higher are the transfers from grooms' families at the recent marriages in
a village, the higher is a girl's allocation of animal foods, while the higher are the transfers from
brides' families, the lower (although not statistically signicant) is a girl's allocation. While some
previous studies (cited below) analyse the link between dowry and intrahousehold allocation, I add
3The inuential work of Pitt et al. (1990) (henceforth PRH) in rural Bangladesh illustrates that gender disparity
in food distribution is prominent among adults but absent among children (less than 12 years), which they argue,
is due to adult males' engagement in more energy-intensive labour market activities in which health inuences
productivity, while adult females (for whom there is no market returns for health due to social norm driven sex-
segregated occupational pattern) are conned to low energy-intensive household activities. Hence, PRH argue that
the nutrition-health-labour market linkage is not relevant for children, and thus no sex-disparity in food distribution
is observed among them.
4Using the same data, PRH nd gender inequality in calorie consumption for the age group  13, and argue that
this further strengthens their claim as a large proportion of children  13 years do not participate in the labour
market.
5They view that in a stable slowly developing society parents reasonably expect that conditions which they face
as adults will also condition in a similar way the behaviour of their ospring. Thus they assume expectations of
future sex-specic earning opportunities of children are formed on the basis of contemporaneous sex-specic patterns
of adult earnings.
6As Folbre (1984) commented on Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982), it is however dicult to determine whether this
link depicts the relationship between intrahousehold allocation and sex-disparity in expected labour market returns
or evidence of intrahousehold bargaining on current allocation in which women who have greater incomes have greater
inuence in intrahousehold allocations that leads to greater investments in daughters.
7Similar data is unavailable in the Philippines survey.
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to this literature by exploring households' responses to their future transfers at marriages of their
daughters and current food allocation to these girls. These second and third ndings, potentially
indicate that son-preference in Bangladesh (and its absence in the Philippines) is a household's
economic response to pre-existing cultural norms in this society, i.e., purdah culture and customs
of dowry vis-a-vis bride price.
As opposed to the ndings of many previous studies, my fourth contribution is that not only I
show the evidence of gender-inequality in food distribution, but also demonstrate that inequality
is not necessarily due to scarcity8. Son-preference is more prominent in non-poor or higher income
households than poor or lower income households in Bangladesh, while not in either category of
households in the Filipino sample (which appears to be poorer than Bangladeshi one). As the
empirical analysis suggests below, dowry payment might rise with household wealth. This might
be a potential explanation of son-preference in non-poor households in Bangladesh.
Fifth, while I do not have any direct way to measure the eect of cultural norms in intrahousehold
food distribution in these two societies, for Bangladesh, using community information of the survey,
I use whether a village has access to television (tv) as a proxy for more liberal cultural norms towards
gender. Jensen and Oster (2009) nd that introduction of cable tv is associated with signicant
decreases in domestic violence toward women and son-preference in India and cites a number of
studies that found television can inuence a wide range of attitudes and behaviour. Television can
expose remote rural villages to modern lifestyles. Many popular tv dramas and soap operas in
Bangladesh feature urban (and even international settings) in which women have education, work
outside home, live independently and marry later; all of which dier in salient ways from those
practiced in the rural areas. I nd a village access to tv signicantly improves girls' food allocation
in Bangladesh. While the previous literature is mixed on the eect of birth order (Das Gupta, 1987;
Bhalotra and Atteld, 1998), I nd that higher birth ordered children fare worse than lower birth
ordered in both countries, but a higher birth ordered girl does worse than a higher birth ordered
boy in Bangladesh but not in the Philippines.
Sixth, I attempt to contribute to the measurement of intrahousehold food distribution. While
PRH and many previous studies (for a survey, see Behrman (1990), among others) focus on indi-
vidual calorie intake as the metric for intrahousehold food distribution, I focus not just on the total
calorie intake but on its cost and composition, which have important nutritional implications.
Finally, I also attempt to improve upon the empirical strategy. Barcellos et al. (2010) argue
that ndings of the previous work are biased due to their assumption that boys and girls live in
8Using adult-good method, (Deaton, 1989) nds no evidence of boy-girl discrimination. Using household food
expenditure data from rural Pakistan, Bhalotra and Atteld (1998) nd no evidence of sex-disparity in children's
food allocation. While some studies argue that boys receive more nutrition (Chen et al., 1981; Das Gupta, 1987),
more healthcare (Basu, 1993; Ganatra and Hirve, 1994) and are more likely to be vaccinated (Borooah, 2004) than
girls, others nd no dierence in anthropometric measures (Marcoux, 2002). While some studies nd that households
discriminate between boys and girls in bad times (Behrman, 1988a; Rose, 2000), Duo (2005) concludes that even
in the countries where the preference for boys is strongest, it is hard to nd evidence that girls receive less care than
boys under normal circumstances.
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families with similar characteristics (observables and unobservables), which is incorrect if families
have a preference for sons and follow a male-biased stopping rule of childbearing. To overcome this
problem, they restrict the sample to families (with the age of children 0-12 months or a bit older)
identical in observables and nd son-preference in terms of time allocation, breastfeeding, vaccina-
tions, and vitamin supplementation. While novel, this strategy suers from the bias resulting from
unobservable household characteristics, and also does not enable them to analyze discrimination
within older children. I thus employ household xed eect (henceforth, FE) methods to control for
unobserved household xed eects in analysing intrahousehold food distribution.
The chapter, nonetheless, has several limitations. First, available survey information does not
enable me to directly measure the eect of cultural norm on sex-disparity in food distribution.
Apart from cultural norms, the underlying dierences in food distribution in two societies could be
governed by economic factors unobserved in the data. Second, I use individual food intake data
based on 24-hour recall methodology. Such data, arguably, provides a better measure for calorie
demand as opposed to household food expenditure surveys (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1987; Bouis
and Haddad, 1992; Bouis et al., 1992). Nonetheless, the recall data could be prone to reporting bias
in favor of respondents appropriate norms rather than actual allocations. While theoretically the
bias could go either way, if people tend not to publicly admit their obvious discriminations (Levitt
and Dubner, 2005), then in a discriminatory environment against girls, the recall data is likely to
understate actual boy-girl discrimination of food-intake. Third, it is also not obvious whether the
observed sex-dierence in food allocation in the sample households is over or under representation
of true inequality. On the one hand, there could be sample selection bias resulting from past dis-
crimination against girls through sex-selective abortion and higher female infant mortality resulting
from household's neglect of critical care or food allocation to the female infants (Das Gupta, 1987).
In that case, the observed boy-girl dierence in the data is likely to be the lower bound of true
inequality as the girls appeared in the sample are the preferred ones. On the other hand, as mortal-
ity rate tends to drop after age 5 and also reected in household's reported mortality incidence in
Bangladesh data (see Table 4.1), the girls observed in the sample could be the ones who have better
health endowments (as they have survived)9. So it is unclear if the observed allocations are over or
under-estimation of true sex-disparity as it will depend on whether the households compensate or
reinforce endowments of the surviving children within and between gender.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 highlights cultural norms of the two
countries. Section 4.3 provides descriptive analysis of the survey data. Section 4.4 provides the
empirical analysis, and Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Cultural Norms
This section contrasts the cultural norms of Bangladesh and the Philippines.
9Similar sex-disaggregated mortality data is unavailable in the Philippines survey.
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4.2.1 Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a patriarchal society with high level of gender discrimination. More than 2.7
million Bangladeshi women are missing, indicating son-preference led sex-selective abortions, and
neglect and abandonment of girls in early childhood (OECD, 2009). Based on the son-preference
sub-index of the OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), Bangladesh holds 101th
position (with the index value of 0.5) out of 122 countries while China holds the last position10.
Morris (1997) views that the combination of religion, history and culture in Bangladesh poses
too formidable a barrier to overcome for women, who are dependent on men throughout their lives,
from their fathers through to husbands, brothers or sons. They do not have their own identities,
and rarely viewed as individuals outside of the world of men. From the time of birth, as Morris
notes, a Muslim woman's place in Bangladeshi society is largely pre-determined. While a son is
welcomed into the world with the cry of "Allah Akbar" (God is Great), a female child receives
only the whisper of the Qurannic prayer. Soon after the birth of a girl, her relatives begin the
negotiations for her marriage. A key feature of this marriage is the dowry payment, that occurs
over the course of several years and is a signicant nancial burden for most families. An inability
to pay dowry severely aects a young bride's treatment in her husband's family home, which is
consistent with Rao (1997), who nds that lower dowries increase wife-beating.
Amin and Cain (1997) documents dowry ination in Bangladesh over the past decades. As
Ambrus et al. (2010) illustrate, dowry system rst emerged in the 1950s and has now almost fully
replaced the traditional system of bride prices, making Bangladesh the only Muslim country in
which bride price is rarely observed and dowry is almost universally practiced. While muslim
marriages involve negotiation of a mehr (traditional Islamic brideprice, ideally to be paid at the
time of marriage) as a part of the marriage contract, the key characteristic of mehr in Bangladesh
is that, unlike in other Islamic countries, it is almost universally and automatically specied to be
paid only in the case of husband-initiated divorce, much like a standard prenuptial agreement.
Womens access to education and employment in rural Bangladesh are also constrained by the
purdah (veil) custom, which impedes womens freedom and mobility (Begum, 1998; Rozario, 1998;
Gruenbaum, 1991; Hoodfar, 1991; Papanek, 1982) and enable men to dominate their women by
exercising control over property, income and their labor (Rahman, 1994; Zaman, 1995). Bakr
(1994) nds that the practice of purdah, which is socially and culturally determined, has been used
deliberately as an instrument to enable men to dominate the family structure and divide labor by
gender, leaving women extremely dependent upon their husbands. Hashemi et al. (1996) argue
that as a result of purdah, Bangladeshi women are traditionally isolated at home with little social
contact outside of their own kin groups. Amin (1997) nds that the practice of female seclusion,
inuences and conditions womens decisions regarding roles they assume, and remains a dominant
10This indicator is inspired by Sen (1990). The SIGI countries are coded by Klasen based on Klasen and Wink
(2003) on the scale of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1, with 0 indicating that missing women is not a problem and 1 indicating
a severe incidence of excess female mortality. See Economist (2010) for a recent survey of the missing women issue
in developing countries.
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inuence in womens lives, showing little evidence of responsiveness to poverty.
In this socio-cultural context, it is unsurprising that women appear to be a "residual category"
in intrahousehold food distribution, eating after men and children, and making to do with what
is left (Kabeer, 1998). This practice is believed to ensure the longevity and good fortune of male
guardians, and thus girls are taught by their mothers to get used to such deprivation (Naved, 2000).
4.2.2 The Philippines
Mendez and Jocano (1974), Medina (1995), and Miralao (1997), among others, provide detailed
accounts of the traditional regime of the Filipino family. The pre-colonial social structure of the
Philippines gave equal importance to maternal and paternal lineage, which gave Filipino women
enormous power within a clan. Women were entitled to property, engaged in trade, could exercise
their divorce right, and could become village chiefs in the absence of a male heir. Although the male-
centered colonization processes aected some signicant changes in the traditional gender regime,
Filipino women, in comparison with their Euro-American and Southeast Asian counterparts, have
always enjoyed a greater share of legal equality with men, and have held a relatively high social
status that can be traced to the pre-colonial era. The laws in the Philippines reect egalitarian
rather than patriarchal politics. It is illegal to publicly denigrate women. Women have the same
legal rights to parental authority, and can inherit, sell, and own property as men (Agbayani-Siewerat,
2004; OECD, 2009).
The tradition of marriage and courtship depicts the importance of bride and her family in the
society. A man is expected to court a woman to win her heart. Parents prefer their daughter to be
courted in their home, so they have a chance to know the man. Sometimes, the courtship lasts for
several years during which the man is measured on his ability to respect the womans family and
servitude. Often, the woman is courted by several men, and will choose the best from among her
suitors.
Traditionally, dowry was a part of the Filipino marriage, but in contrast to Bangladesh, it is
the payment from groom to bride and her family (similar to bride-price in Sub-Saharan Africa).
Before marriage, the groom gave a dowry (bigay-kaya) to the bride's family, consisted of gold, land,
money, slaves, or anything of value11.
In Filipino folklore, both the husband and wife come from a single piece of bamboo, which
contributes to the egalitarian concept to the role of husband and wife in the society. Conversely in
Bangladesh, grounded in Islamic tradition, the belief is that the woman is made out of a chest bone
11Some other forms of dowry included: (i)Panghimuyat - a sum of money given to the bride's mother as the
compensation for the sleepless nights she endured while rearing the girl; (ii) Bigay-susu - another sum given to the
mother or wet nurse who gave milk to the bride during her infancy; (iii) Himaraw - a sum of money given to the
parents of the bride to reimburse them for the cost of bringing her up. The giving of the ring, although inuenced
by the western culture, is actually a scaled-down version of the tradition of groom's oering of dowry to his wife
and her family. Aside from the dowry, the groom had to serve the bride's parents for free for chopping wood,
fetching water, and other manual work. See http://philippinealmanac.com/philippine-history/marriage-customs-of-
the-ancient-lipinos/.
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of the man, and so she is inherently weaker and dependent on the man. A father in the Filipino
tradition is a bread-winner while the mother is the Reyna ng Tahanan (Queen of the Home). She
controls the nances, acts as religious mentor, disciplines the children, and may also arrange the
marriages of sons and daughters to improve the familys dynastic connections. Overall, she holds
the key to household development (Flavier, 1970). Since she controls the household nance, her
parental family rather than her husbands family has a better chance of receiving nancial help.
In this cultural setting, society values ospring regardless of sex. Female children are as valuable
as male ones as it is recognized that women are as important as men. Parents provide equal
opportunities to their children regardless of sex. In contrast to Bangladesh, linguistic analysis of
Filipino kin terminology has a striking lack of gender dierentiation (Stoodley, 1957). For example,
the Tagalog language has a general term for child (anak), but no specic word for either daughter or
son. Similarly, the ethnographic studies document no evidence of son preference in food distribution
(Palabrica-Costello, 1994). Fertility studies show that Filipinos are just as likely to desire (if not
slightly more) a daughter as a son (Wong and Ng, 1985). Almond et al. (2009) nd that while for all
other Asian immigrants to Canada, sex ratios are normal at rst parity and rise with parity if there
were no previous sons, for the Filipino immigrants, the sex-ratio is at biological norm for all parities
including for the third child preceded by two girls indicating no son preference at all. According
to SIGI index of OECD, the Philippines is one of the top-ranked countries (ranked 7th out of 102
non-OECD countries while Bangladesh ranked 90), reecting a high degree of gender equality. In
terms of son-preference index, the Philippines value is 0 indicating no problem of missing women
(OECD, 2009).
4.3 Data and Descriptives
4.3.1 Bangladesh
For Bangladesh, I use the same IFPRI survey data described in Chapters 2 and 3. As Chapter
2 describes (see Table 1 of Chapter 2), there is limited variation of household size and composition
across rounds (as should be expected as the survey was conducted in four rounds within a period
of one year with roughly a four-month gap between the rounds), but per capita expenditure varies
signicantly between the rounds. Similarly, Chapter 3 shows that food budget share and budget
share for dierent food groups signicantly vary between the rounds, particularly for low and middle
income households (see Table 1 of Chapter 3).
Table 4.1 presents some descriptives averaging over four rounds. I divide the households into
poor and non-poor category based on the absolute poverty line (i.e., per capita calorie consumption
of 2122 kcal per day). As this case study involves data from two dierent countries at dierent
time periods, use of APL is convenient as it does not require conversion of nominal income to real
income using purchasing power parity to analyze the behavior of poor and non-poor groups in these
two dierent samples. Based on APL, majority of the households in any given round are poor. At
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the same time, majority of the households tend to move in and out of poverty in dierent rounds
as about 35% households remain poor in all four rounds. About 7% of the households are landless
based on the landholding data collected in round 1.
As already discussed in Chapter 2, PRH's claim of children's non-participation at the labour
market tends to hold in IFPRI survey (see Table 2 of Chapter 2). Detailed work activities of children
are absent in the survey. Based on recorded occupation of 1203 children (of which 630 are boys),
2 boys are involved in farming, 1 in service, 2 as labour and another 2 as servants, while 1 girl in
household work, 3 as servants, and 1 as labour. The rest are recorded as children or students under
occupational category. Survey data on wage rate of dierent individuals and activities also do not
indicate any wage labour of children, and even for adult category, there is few female participation
in wage labour (see Table 4.2, which averaged wage rate of all activities in four rounds by sex and
age). Adult males' participations in wage labour are more than 7 times higher than that of adult
females, while the mean wage rate of adult males is almost double of that of adult females. The
mean village wage rate12 of adult males are also twice as much as that of adult females (see Table
4.1).
The marriage module of the survey records transfers (at 1996 prices) at marriage from a wife's
family to her husband's family, husband, or to her and her husband (henceforth, loosely termed as
dowry) and the transfer from her husband's family to her family, her, or to her and her husband
(loosely termed as mehr, i.e., bride-price). For the empirical analysis in the following section, I
construct village-level average of total transfer from a wife's and a husband's family based on the
marriages that occurred between 1990 and 1995, which, consistent with the phenomenon of dowry
price ination, shows that on average transfer from a wife's family (dowry) is about 3.5 times higher
than the transfer from a husband's family (mehr)13.
Table 4.3 presents a simple regression analysis of the association between a husband's and
wife's own and family characteristics and transfer at marriage from their families (rst 2 columns
report OLS results and last two seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) results). A wife's parents'
landholding increases both the dowry and mehr, although the magnitude of the eect of the former is
larger than the latter implying a net outow (the overall mean value of dowry of all marriages in the
survey is 9,544 taka while the corresponding mean value of mehr is 6,496 taka, both in 1996 prices)
from a wife's family, which increases with the landholding of her parents. For a 10% increase in wife's
parents' landholding would increase the transfer from her family by 16% while from her groom's
family by 15% in SUR estimate. Education of a wife's father is also positively associated with both
dowry and mehr. A wife's education increases mehr, while a husband's education increases dowry,
and the magnitude of these opposite eects are almost similar for an additional year of schooling
of a wife vis-a-vis her husband. Finally, the coecient of length of marriage is consistent with the
12Mean wage rate is the averaged over all activities of adult males and females in four rounds in a given village,
and nominal wage rate is deated by village rice price averaged over four rounds to obtain a proxy for real wage rate.
13Data enables me to construct the village-level average for 33 out of 47 villages based on the marriages occurred
in the specied period.
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ndings in the literature about dowry price ination and replacement of bride price with dowry in
recent periods. The higher the length of a marriage (i.e., the earlier is the year of marriage), the
lower (higher) is the value of transfer from a wife's (groom's) family. An additional year of length
of marriage decreases dowry by 3% and increase mehr by 5% in SUR estimate.
The literature suggests that girls tend to live in bigger families with higher number of siblings
than boys (Morduch and Stern, 1997). Based on the number of co-residing living siblings for a boy
vis-a-vis a girl, both the mean and 75th percentile of female siblings of a boy and a girl appear to
be higher in poor households than non-poor households. The mean of total number of siblings are
higher in poor than non-poor households. The mean and 25th percentile of male siblings of a girl
is also higher in poor than non-poor households, indicating that girls tend to live in bigger families
in poor households. However, this pattern could be due to use of per capita calorie based poverty
line. By construction, per capita calorie intake would be lower in households with higher number
of children as a child would consume less calories than an adult. Moreover, if a girl's required
calorie amount is less than a boy as the WHO requirement gures suggest, and accordingly if a
girl consumes less calorie than a boy, then APL based poor households could end up having more
children than adults and more girls than boys.
Regarding a village's access to television, it appears that 4 out of 47 villages do not have any
access to television, which contain about 13% and 7% of total survey observations for female and
male, respectively.
Both monthly per capita expenditure and per capita calorie consumption are higher in non-
poor than poor households, while the composition of food expenditure and calorie consumption
from the three broadly dened food-groups: animal, sh, and dairy (henceforth, animal), cereals,
and plant and others, are roughly similar between the two groups. Moreover, food expenditure
share is also substantially higher for non-poor households than poor households, primarily due
to higher amounts of calorie consumption of the latter, indicating high income elasticity for food
consumption, particularly at relatively low levels of income. As reected in the price to purchase
same amount of calories from dierent food groups, the animal group is the most expensive.
Children ( 10 years) on average have about 500 calories more in non-poor households than
in poor households (see Table 4.4). The total calorie intake of boys is about 8% higher than girls
in non-poor households, while the corresponding dierence is 4% in poor households. However,
the boy-girl dierence in total calorie intake does not necessarily imply discrimination as the mean
requirement of total calorie intake of girls for this age group is about 214 calories less than that of
the boys, while the requirements for all other critical macro and micronutrients are almost same
for boys and girls14.
14See World Food Programme (2000) for requirements for micronutrients for males and females of dierent age
groups of developing countries. As described in Chapter 2, the calorie requirement gures for children are from World
Health Organization (1985), which are based on the United States National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)
referenced children sample. Some studies argue that the calorie requirement gures are themselves gender-biased as
the standards based on energy use for various activity levels systematically may understate the actual energy use of
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PRH view that calorie is the sucient statistic for all other nutrients, while evidence suggests
critical micronutrient malnutrition among individuals who are at or above their calorie adequacy
ratio (Bouis et al., 1992) as predominant sources of calories, although cheap, are not always good
sources of a variety of critical micronutrients (IFRPI-BIDS-INFS, 1998). Moreover, for critical
nutrients like protein and iron, not only the quantity matters, the sources matter too. Protein from
animal and dairy sources as opposed to cheaper cereal sources are of high quality and digestibility,
while iron from the former sources, known as haem-iron, have high bioavailability (World Health
Organization, 1985). Furthermore, as Chapter 3 demonstrates, focusing on calorie intake may
understate intrahousehold inequality as two individuals might consume the same amount of calories
but one's intake, as opposed to the other's, may be composed of a larger share of food items,
which are more expensive and/or more nutritious. This type of discrimination, as reected in the
ethnographic studies, is not revealed if the focus is only on total calorie intake.
Given that the animal group is the most expensive food group and at the same time rich in
various nutrients, such as protein and iron, and also promotes bioavailability of micronutrients in
non-staple plant foods and cereals, I focus on individuals' calorie and food expenditure share of
animal group in analyzing intrahousehold food distribution. The boy-girl disparity based on animal-
group shares in calorie and food expenditure is prominent in non-poor than in poor households.
The calorie share from animal group is virtually same between boys and girls in poor households
while boys' share is 22% higher than girls' share in non-poor households. The same pattern applies
regarding boys' vs girls' intakes of animal calories as a share of total household calories from animal
sources, and boys' and girls' food expenditure shares on animal products in poor and non-poor
households15. None of these dierences are likely to be driven by the age-composition of the
children as the mean age of children is around 6 years for both types of households.
Upper panel of Figure 4.1 presents nonparametric (using locally weighted regression method,
lowess at bandwidth 0.8) Engel curve for boys and girls for total calorie, calorie from animal group,
and calorie from cereal group, while the lower panel portrays their calorie adequacy ratio16, and
calorie share from animal and cereal groups. As opposed to the linear calorie Engel curve in the
literature (Deaton and Subramanian, 1996), these Engel curves are broadly quadratic implying the
increase in total calorie and animal and cereal calorie before their declines with the increase income.
In line with the analysis in Chapter 3, intake of cereal calorie tends to atten at a relatively low
level of income compared to the income level at which animal calorie intake tends to decline. While
boys' total calorie intakes surpass girls' intakes with the increase in income, girls' calorie adequacy
ratio appear to be higher than that of the boys at all income level. Conversely, as income level
increases, boys' total animal calorie intakes and animal calorie as a share of total calorie intake both
tend to surpass those of girls roughly at around monthly per capita expenditure of 350 taka (which
women (Chen et al., 1981; Sen, 1984)
15Total household animal calorie and expenditure on animal food group are the sum of animal calorie intake and
expenditure on animal food group of all individuals within the household and not just those of the children.
16Calorie adequacy ratio is described in details in Chapter 2 (see Section 5.1 and Appendix of Chapter 2). It is an
individual's calorie intake as a share of his/her calorie requirement.
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is about 150 taka less than the national rural lower poverty line in 1995-96). This is consistent with
the above descriptive analysis that boy-girl dierence in animal calorie share is higher in non-poor
households than in poor households. Finally, as expected, cereal share in total calorie tends to
decline with the increase in income. Nonparametric Engel curves of total expenditure and animal
and cereal expenditure as a share of total expenditure broadly mirror the ndings based on total
calorie and calorie share Engel curves (not shown).
4.3.2 The Philippines
The Philippines data comes from the IFPRI study, the Philippines Cash Cropping Project. The
objective of the study was to understand the eects of cash cropping on human nutrition. Four
survey rounds were administered to 448 households in 29 villages over a sixteen-month period in
1984-85 in the predominantly rural southern providence of Bukidnon. The households, compris-
ing 2,880 individuals, were surveyed to assess the eects of agricultural commercialization on land
tenure, household resource allocation and nutrition. Similar to the Bangladesh survey17, the sur-
vey in the Philippines also collected a wide array of individual and household level information
including demography, schooling, farm and non-farm labour, food and non-food expenditure, and
most importantly for my analysis, the individual food intake information based on 24-hour recall
methodology.
Table 4.5 presents some descriptives averaging over four rounds. Based on APL, the Filipino
sample seems to have a larger proportion of poor households than the Bangladeshi sample, perhaps
because the survey area was a relatively poorer province and the sampling criteria was that only
households with at least one child less than ve years old and farming less than 15 hectares of land
were eligible for the survey. More than half of the sample households are landless compared to 7% of
household in Bangladesh sample. About 5% households owned a television set, the eect of which
on food allocation as a proxy for modern and liberal norms about gender is explored in empirical
analysis. Even in this disproportionately large share of poor households, similar to the Bangladesh
case, a signicant share of the households tended to move in and out of poverty in dierent survey
rounds. While more than 97% of the households seemed to be poor at least in one round, 71% of
the households were poor in all four survey rounds. Consistent with the poverty level, more than
70% of the household expenditure were spent on food.
Average household size is about 1 person lower in non-poor households than in poor households,
while share of boys compared to that of girls are higher in non-poor than poor households. While
on average male siblings tend to be roughly similar between poor and non-poor households, female
siblings are less in non-poor than poor households, resulting in total siblings of a child higher in poor
than non-poor households. This pattern is similar to Bangladesh sample, although the magnitude
is much higher in the Filipino sample. However, as mentioned before, this pattern could be due to
the per capita calorie based poverty line used in both samples.
17The survey in the rural Philippines was used as a valuable input in designing the subsequent Bangladesh Survey.
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While the magnitude diers, there are also some broad similarities between Filipino and Bangladeshi
samples in terms of calorie consumption and composition of food expenditure. In the Philippines
data, on average the per capita calorie consumption of the non-poor household is about 1000 calorie
higher than that of the poor households. However, the calorie and expenditure composition for the
broadly dened three food groups, i.e., animal, plants and others, and cereals, are roughly similar
between the poor and non-poor households. Similar to Bangladesh, animal products are the most
expensive sources of calories in the Philippines, and the households spend about 30% of their food
budget to obtain about 6% of their calories from this expensive food group. A key dierence with
Bangladesh, however, is that the plant and other sources contribute larger than cereal sources in
calorie and expenditure compositions. This is due to Filipino households' reliance on roots and
tubers, cassava, and corn as some cheaper sources of calories.
However, noticeable dierence is observed between Bangladesh and the Philippines in terms of
gender disparity in wage labour and wage rate. Adult males' labour market participation is not
7 times higher (as in Bangladesh) but about twice as much as the participation of adult females
in the Philippines. Unlike Bangladesh, adult males' wage rate is almost the same as that of adult
females. Similar pattern also emerge for village-level mean wage rates of adult males and females,
which are not signicantly dierent from each other (see Table 4.5).
Regarding children's food distribution (Table 4.4), boys' calorie intakes are about 3-4% higher
than that of the girls, which could be due to the dierences in the calorie requirements for boys vis-
a-vis girls. What is dierent from Bangladesh is the phenomenon of no signicant gender disparity
in either poor or non-poor Filipino households in either the calorie share or the expenditure share
of animal products. Girls' calorie share from animal sources are about 9% higher than boys' share
in the non-poor households, while the expenditure share from the animal products are roughly the
same between boys and girls in the non-poor households.
Figure 4.2 presents the calorie Engel curves for the Philippines. Similar to Bangladesh, with
the increase in income, calorie from animal group increases while that from cereal group declines.
Total calorie intake tends to increase with income and at log per capita expenditure value of 3,
girls' calorie adequacy ratio surpasses that of the boys. Unlike Bangladesh, there is much less
sex-disparity in animal calorie consumption. If anything, girls' animal calorie (and animal calorie
share) Engel curve tends to be on or slightly over the boys' curve. As the APL measure suggests
that the Filipino sample is relatively poorer than the Bangladeshi sample, unlike Bangladesh, the
decline in calorie intake for children with the increase in income is not prominent in the Filipino
Calorie Engel curve. Engel curves based on expenditure measures portray the similar story from
the expenditure side (not presented).
4.4 Empirical Analysis
I rst estimate the following basic empirical model, separately for Bangladesh and the Philip-
pines:
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where, y is a measure of intrahousehold food distribution of an individual i of household j in
site s at time t, and the set of household characteristics (Xhjst)) include per capita expenditure and
its square, per capita landholding, and household size, all in logs, share of boys, girls, adolescents
males and females, and adult males, survey rounds (Rt), and sites (Sl) (for Bangladesh) dummies.
The sign and size of coecient 3 of girl dummy variable (=1 if the child is a girl) is of key interest.
OLS estimate of equation 4.1 has econometric concerns as households with boys vis-a-vis girls
could dier in terms of observables and unobservable characteristics. A household's unobserved
fertility preference can aect both the household size and sex-composition of the children and
sex-preference in food allocation. Marriage market selection eect (Foster, 1998) can also be at
play, whereby, each spouse's sex-preference for a child could be correlated with the other spouse's
characteristics (such as education and assets) through marriage, which in turn could be correlated
with sex-composition of children and their food allocation. Also, if girls are born in bigger families,
then they may have (lower) higher food allocation if bigger families have greater (dis)economies
of scale (Deaton and Paxson, 1998). If the scale (dis)economies are not suciently captured by
the household size and composition, then OLS estimates may carry a bias. To the extent, these
unobserved household and spouses' characteristics and unmeasured scale eect are time invariant,
they could be controlled in household xed eect (FE) estimate. As the survey was conducted in
four rounds in both countries, exploiting within household variation in food distribution measures
between boys and girls in dierent rounds and variation in time-varying household characteristics
across rounds (such as their poverty status and monthly per capita expenditure), I also estimate
equation 4.1 using household FE. However, as already indicated in the previous chapters, there is
limited variation in household size and composition, and per capita landholding in Bangladesh as
landholding information is collected in the rst round only, which could potentially lead to imprecise
estimation of the eects of these variables. The HFE estimates will also be based on a restricted
sample of households that have at least a boy and girl under consideration. The noise to signal
ratio is also likely to increase due to dierencing.
Using both OLS and FE, I also estimate a number of variants of equation 4.1 to explore dierent
hypotheses. First, to explore whether a village's access to tv is conducive for less sex-disparity in
food allocation in Bangladesh, I augment the basic specication by controlling for a dummy = 1,
if the village has access to tv (and 0 otherwise) and its interaction with the girl dummy. Similar
village level data on tv access is not available in the Philippines survey, but whether household has a
tv or not is. So, for the Philippines, I use a dummy (=1) if the household has a tv and interact that
with the girl dummy. However, having a tv within the household may not suciently capture the
eect of social norm of the community and its eect at the household level as a household within a
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community can be largely inuenced by communal norms. In Bangladesh, it is quite common that
villagers (men) watch tv (even if they do not own it) in small tea-stalls or at the market places,
while female neighbours gather in a neighbour's house who has a tv to watch popular tv dramas
and serials. Thus, a tv may aect the norms of a community, even if not many individuals in that
community necessarily own a tv but are able to watch it. A village's access to tv, as the results in
the following sub-section summarises, seem to positively aect a girl's food allocation from animal
group in Bangladesh, but a household's tv in the Philippines does not have any signicant eect
on girl's allocation. So, in other variants of equation 4.1, I control for the tv eect in Bangladesh
but not in the Philippines.
Related to the discussion on child mortality at dierent ages (see Section 4.1) and it's drop after
age 5, it is useful to investigate at which age sex-disparity in food distribution becomes apparent.
Instead of just the intercept eect of sex-dierence in basic specication, in a variant, I also interact
age with girl dummy.
To explore the link between future labour market returns and current food distribution among
children, in the spirit of Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982), in one specication, I control for mean
real village wage rate of adult males and females and interact these wage rates with girl dummy.
For Bangladesh, related to dowry vs mehr practices, to explore if a household's allocation for a girl
(vis-a-vis a boy) could be inuenced by the expected payments that the household vis-a-vis the
groom's family is likely to make at that girl's wedding, in another specication, I use village mean
payments from grooms' families and brides' families at the marriages (and their interaction with
girl dummy) that occurred between 1990-95 and formed some of the survey households.
To explore if households prefer rst born to those of higher birth orders, in another specication,
I control for a child's birth order and interact this with girl dummy to see whether the allocation
is worse for higher birth order children, particularly if they are girls. Further to the indication of
more disparity in non-poor households than poor households in Bangladesh in descriptive analysis,
in another specication, I use an APL dummy (=1 if the household is poor), and its interaction with
girl dummy. APL is a time-varying household characteristic as households tend to move in and out
of poverty in dierent rounds. To explore if son-preference varies with land ownership, in another
variant, instead of controlling for per capita landholding, I use a dummy equals 1 if the household
is landless and interact the landless dummy with girl dummy. Households may discriminate against
girls in bad times but not in good times, as suggested by previous studies. To explore the eect of
seasonality on gender discrimination, in another specication I interact round dummies with girl
dummy to see if a girl's allocation is particularly worse in any particular round. Finally, in one
variant, I also interact girl dummy with log household size and log per capita expenditure to explore
how a girl vis-a-vis a boy fares in bigger vs smaller households and as household income increases,
ceteris paribus. The estimates of these models for Bangladesh and the Philippines are summarised
below.
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4.4.1 Bangladesh
Table 4.6 presents OLS and FE estimates of the equation 4.1 for calorie and animal calorie
shares. In line with the summary statistics and nonparametric gures, a girl's total calorie intake
appears to be lower than a that of a boy (about 5% in OLS and 4% in FE estimate), while a girl's
calorie adequacy ratio appears to be higher than that of a boy because of lower requirement gures
for girls compared to boys for a given age.
Son-preference becomes evident in the allocation of animal calories. A girl's animal calorie
share is about 11% lower than that of a boy (column 6), while her animal calorie as a share of
total animal calorie of the household is 12% lower than the corresponding share of a boy in FE
estimate (column 8). FE estimates are both higher in magnitudes and signicance level, potentially
indicating downward bias of OLS results resulting from unobserved household xed eects discussed
above. Household size, holding composition xed, is a proxy for scale economies. No consistent
pattern of scale economies appears from changing sign and signicance of the coecient of household
size for total calorie and animal calorie measures. Limited variation in household size across rounds
also makes it dicult to obtain precision of scale eect in FE estimate. In terms of seasonality,
calorie intake seems to be lower in round 1 and 3, while animal calorie share in total calorie seems
to be higher in round 1 and 2 compared to round 4, indicating seasonality can vary dierently
for dierent food items. At low level of income, while a child's calorie adequacy ratio increases
with the household income, her animal calorie as a share of total household animal calorie declines
substantially perhaps due to disproportionately larger increase in animal calorie consumption of
adolescents and adults. This is consistent with the per capita animal calorie Engel curve depicted
in Chapter 3 (see Figure 2 of Chapter 3).
Table 4.7 summarises key parameters of interests from dierent variants of equation 4.1 for
total calorie and animal calorie based food distribution measures. In model 1, I augment the basic
specication by adding a village access to tv dummy and its interaction with girl. While a girl's
animal calorie share in her total calorie and in households total animal calorie appear to be 36%
and 27% lower than the corresponding shares of a boy (column 6 and 8), if a village has access to
tv, then these shares of a girl increases by 28% and 16%, respectively compared to a girl in a village
which does not have an access to tv. Both girl and girl  tv coecients are jointly signicant for
all the dependent variables in model 118.
In model 2, instead of age square in equation 4.1, I interact girl dummy with age to see at which
age sex-disparity becomes prominent. The intercept eect remains substantial for animal calorie
shares (column 5-8). For each incremental age, the female's allocation vis-a-vis a male's increases
only marginally, resulting sex-dierence to be persistent at each age of the child. For following
variants, I thus return to age and its square specication.
Model 3 explores the link between children's food distribution and expected labour market
18p-values of the joint signicance of the parameters of interest in all these variants are not reported but available
upon request
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returns and nds a strong positive (negative) link between a girl's animal calorie allocation and
mean village wage rate of adult women (men) in addition to a strong positive eect of tv on a
girl's allocation. Doubling female wage rate would increase a girl's animal calorie share in her total
calorie by 40%, while doubling male wage would reduce it by 30%. The coecients of girl and girl
 log female wage (Lfwage) and girl and girl  log male wage (Lmwage) are jointly signicant in
FE estimates for animal calorie share in total calorie and in household's total animal calories and so
are the girl and girl  tv coecients. Model 4 further includes mean village transfer from a bride's
family (dowry) and groom's family (mehr) and their interaction with girl dummy. A girl's animal
calorie allocation seems to be negatively associated with dowry and positively with mehr, and the
coecient of mehr is signicant at 10%, providing at least weak indication for the link between
these practices and intrahousehold allocation. Model 5 demonstrates that children of higher birth
order, particularly if they are girls seem to be in a disadvantaged position compared to the ones
who were born ahead of them in the allocation of animal calories (both as a share of individual
total calorie and as a share of total household animal calorie). The coecient of girl and girl 
birth order are jointly signicant in FE estimate for these calorie shares (column 6 and 8).
In contrast to the previous literature, the gender disparity seems not to be driven by scarcity
as poverty does not appear to be a key determinant of disparity in model 6. While a girl's animal
calorie share in her total calorie intake is about 41% lower than a boy (column 6) and a girl's animal
calorie share in households total animal calorie is 31% lower than a boy (column 8) in non-poor
households, no such disparity appears in poor households. In terms of these animal calorie shares,
a girl's position is worse than a boy's in households with landholdings. While compared to a girl in
households with landholding, a girl in landless households is worse-o (model 7), it is not possible
to identify in FE estimate whether boy-girl discrimination is worse in landless than in households
with land. Consistent with the ndings related to absolute poverty level, model 8 demonstrates that
a girl's animal calorie shares are worse in higher income households than lower income households
and in bigger households than in smaller ones. Girls doing worse in higher income or non-poor
households than in poor households are consistent with some previous literature. Almond et al.
(2009) note that sex-ratio is higher in the richer states of India, such as Punjab, while Sen and
Sengupta (1983) nd higher gender disparity in anthropometry measures in richer households than
in poorer ones. As the results in Table 4.3 tends to indicate, dowry payment may rise (more
than mehr) with daughter's parents wealth, which in turn may lead to stronger son-preference in
non-poor households19.
Finally, to explore whether households discriminate against girls in bad times but not in good
times, as the previous literature suggests, I interact girl dummy with survey round dummies. As
19Son-preference in non-poor households is also consistent with the long-standing hypothesis of evolutionary bi-
ology, namely the Trivers-Willard (TW) hypothesis (Trivers and Willard, 1973), which predicts that high-status
individuals favor boys and low-status individuals favor girls. Almond and Edlund (2007) provide evidence of TW
hypothesis in terms of childrens sex-ratio from US natality data, while Hopcroft (2007) provides evidence in terms
of childs education in the US.
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mentioned in Chapter 2, round 2 contains the major agricultural lean season, while round 3 contains
the minor one. But I do not nd any signicant evidence of seasonality either on a girl's or on
a boy's animal calorie shares. Neither a girl's (boy's) animal calorie as a share of her (his) total
calorie nor as a share of total household's animal calorie dier signicantly across survey rounds
(results unreported).
Sex disparity based on expenditure measures (summarised in Table 4.8) broadly resemble to
those based on calorie measures. Model 1 reports the result of girl dummy from the estimation of
basic specication (equation 4.1). Consistent with total calorie intake, a girl's total food expenditure
is 5% lower than a boy in OLS and 3.5% in FE estimate. A girl's animal food expenditure share in
total food expenditure is 6% lower than that of a boy in FE, while her animal food expenditure as
a share of total household animal food expenditure is 7% lower than a boy.
Eect of a village access to tv (model 2) have substantial positive impact on these expenditure
shares of a girl. A girl's animal food expenditure share in her total food expenditure is 27% higher
and her animal food expenditure share in total household animal food expenditure is 18% higher
in a village which has access to tv compared to the one which does not (column 6 and 8). The
girl dummy and its interaction with tv dummy are jointly signicant in FE estimate for all the
dependent variables. Instead of age square, when girl dummy is interacted with age (model 3), I
nd substantial intercept eect of girl dummy for animal expenditure shares (col 6 and 8) and only
marginal increment of these shares for a girl with the increase of her age, implying persistence of
sex-disparity at all ages of children for animal group expenditure shares. For the remaining variants,
I revert to age and age square specication.
Doubling village female wage rate would increase a girl's animal expenditure share in her total
food expenditure by 24% (model 4 column 6) and her animal food expenditure share in total
household animal food expenditure share by 22%, while doubling village male wage would reduce
the later share by 22%. The eect of mean village dowry on a girl's animal expenditure shares
has expected negative signs but is not statistically signicant, while mean village mehr positively
aect these shares and signicant at 10% level for a girl's animal expenditure share in her total
food expenditure (model 5 column 6 and 8). Girls of higher birth order also have less expenditure
allocation for animal group and both girl and birth order interaction are jointly signicant for these
expenditure shares in FE estimate (model 6 column 6 and 8).
Gender disparity in animal expenditure shares are also prominent in non-poor than poor house-
holds (model 7 column 6 and 8). A girl's animal expenditure share in her total food expenditure
is 30% lower and her animal expenditure as a share of total household animal food expenditure is
23% lower than the corresponding shares of a boy in households with landholding, while these share
do not vary signicantly between a girl in landholding household and a girl in landless household
(model 8 column 6 and 8). Model 9 suggests that a girl is worse-o in bigger households than
smaller households in terms of expenditures shares on animal food. Doubling the household size
would reduce her animal expenditure share in total food expenditure by 20% (column 6) while her
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share in total household animal expenditure by 27% (column 8). Finally, no signicant eect of
seasonality is observed on a girl's animal food expenditure shares (results not reported).
4.4.2 The Philippines
Table 4.9 presents the results of the estimates of basic specication (equation 4.1) for calorie
based measures for the Philippines. Similar to Bangladesh, a girl's total calorie intake is about
3% lower than that of a boy, while her calorie adequacy ratio is about 7% higher than a boy in
FE estimate. OLS estimates are also similar in magnitudes. In contrast to Bangladesh, however,
there does not appear any signicant boy-girl dierence in animal calorie shares (column 6 and 8).
Household size and boys' share do not vary across rounds and thus are dropped in FE estimate.
Table 4.10 summarises variants of equation 4.1 for calorie and animal calorie shares. A house-
hold's tv ownership does not signicantly aect a girl's animal calorie allocation (model 1), so in
subsequent variants I do not control for tv. Interacting girl dummy with age (model 2) does not
indicate that gender inequality in animal calorie allocation, which is absent to begin with, appears
to be signicant at higher or lower ages. Model 3 onwards I revert to age and age square speci-
cation. There does not appear any signicant eect of village male or female wage rate on a girl's
animal calorie allocation (model 3, column 6 and 8). Girl dummy and its interaction with either
male or female wage are not jointly signicant. While a child of higher birth order seems to be
worse-o than those of lower birth order for the child's share in household's total animal calorie,
the eect does not vary signicantly between a higher birth ordered girl vs a boy (model 4, column
8). In terms of animal calorie shares, gender disparity is not signicant either in poor or non-poor
households (model 5), or in landless or not landless households (model 6). Neither does it appear
that a girl is worse-o in bigger vs smaller household or in higher income vs lower income house-
holds in terms of her animal calorie shares (model 7). In terms of seasonality (model 8), compared
to round 4, a boy's animal calorie share in his total calorie is only signicantly dierent in round
1 (16% less), while a girl's corresponding share does not vary signicantly in rounds 1 to 3 from
that in round 4. A boy's animal calorie as a share of total household animal calorie is signicantly
dierent in round 1 (13.5% lower) and 2 (8% lower) from that in round 4, while the corresponding
share of a girl is 9% higher than that of a boy in round 1, 15% in round 2, and 10% in round 3,
all statistically signicant. In round 4, however, a girl share is 20% less than that of a boy (boys'
coecients are unreported).
Table 4.11 summarises the results of dierent variants of the basic specication for total food
expenditure and animal food expenditure shares which broadly resemble to the above results based
on total calorie and animal calorie share measures. The rst model reports girl dummy coecient
of the estimate of equation 4.1, which shows no signicant sex disparity in FE estimates for any of
the outcome variables. A household's tv ownership does not aect a girl's food expenditure based
measures in FE estimate (model 2) and thus is not controlled for in remaining models. When instead
of age square, I interact girl dummy with age, neither of them individually or jointly signicant for
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animal expenditure shares (model 3), and thus I revert to age and age square specication for the
remaining models. There does not appear any signicant relationship between either adult male or
female village real wage rate and a girl's animal expenditure shares (model 4). While a higher birth
ordered child appears to get less in terms of total food expenditure, share of household's total food
expenditure and share of total household expenditure on animal food compared to a lower birth
ordered child, this birth order eect does not vary between gender (model 5). Gender inequality in
animal expenditure shares is not prominent either in poor or in non-poor household (model 6), or
in landless or non-landless households (model 7). It does not appear either that a girl is better or
worse-o in larger vs smaller households or in higher income vs lower income households in terms
of animal expenditure shares (model 8).
Finally, in terms of seasonality (a boy's coecients are not shown to conserve space), compared
to round 4, a boy's animal expenditure share in total food expenditure is 23.5% lower in round 1
and 19% lower in round 2, while a girl's share is 5% higher than a boy's share in round 1 and 13%
higher in round 2. The corresponding shares in round 3 are not signicantly dierent from round
4. A boy's animal food expenditure as a share of total household animal food expenditure is 15%
lower in round 1 and 8% lower in round 2 compared to that in round 4, while his share in round 3
is not signicantly dierent from round 4. Conversely, the corresponding girl's share is 12% lower
than a boy's share in round 4, but 11% higher in round 1, 14% higher in round 2, and 13% higher
in round 3.
4.5 Conclusion
Despite substantial progress in intrahousehold resource allocation literature, the eect of socio-
cultural context on such allocation has remained less explored in empirical work. While existing
literature focuses on a wide range of individual outcomes, the analysis of intrahousehold food
distribution based on actual food intake data is also limited. Focusing on total calorie intake,
previous literature has suggested that in an agrarian economy food intake aects the productivity
of manual labor, and the gender disparity in food distribution is due to the gender disparity in
energy-intensity of occupations, whereby men as opposed to women are engaged in more energy-
intensive labour market activities and such sex-segregation of occupational activities are driven by
cultural norms. Hence, the inequality is observed among adults but not among children and there
is no evidence between the intrahousehold allocation among children and expected labour market
participation. Some literature further suggests that the boy-girl discrimination could be driven by
scarcity of households resources as such inequality is observed in bad times but not under normal
circumstances.
In this context, I attempt to contribute to the literature by demonstrating that intrahousehold
inequality in food distribution tends to exist among children in Bangladesh but not necessarily
apparent if the focus is on total calorie intake but not on the cost and composition of calories. The
latter also have critical nutritional implications as the most expensive sources of calories, i.e., the
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animal food group, are also nutritionally rich. Total calorie, a key focus of past literature, might
not be a good metric for analysing intrahousehold food distribution as calorie adequacy can coexist
with micronutrient deciency. Given the wide range of food sources to meet one's calorie need, two
people can consume the same amount of calories but the cost and content of that intake can vary
substantially. Thus, focusing on calorie intake may understate intrahousehold inequality in food
distribution as well.
To further explore the role of cultural norms in son-preference in food distribution, I analyse
the case of two agrarian economies | Bangladesh and the Philippines | in which manual labor is
a key feature. The traditional role of gender in economic activities is similar in these two societies -
men the bread winners and primarily engaged in manual labor intensive agricultural activities, and
women the home makers engaged primarily in household activities. However, the two societies dier
strikingly regarding their attitude towards women, which in turn has been inuenced by deep-rooted
and long-standing cultural values. In the patriarchal society in Bangladesh, women appear to be
a "residual' category whose position is inuenced by "purdah", and who are a potential source of
drainage of household resources in their paternal family through "dowry payments". On the other
hand, women are the "queen of the home" for whom the men have to engage in "courtship" and
traditionally have had to pay bride-price and provide manual labor to serve brides' parental family
in the egalitarian society of the Philippines. Consistent with the contrasting cultural norms in
these two societies, using a variety of measures focusing on allocation from animal food group, I
nd strong evidence of son-preference in Bangladesh, but not in the Philippines.
Consistent with the previous literature, this inequality does not appear to be due to gender
inequality in labour market activities, as children in Bangladesh do not appear to participate in
the labour market although sex-disparity in food distribution is prominent there. Moreover, if
inequality is due to labour market activities, then it should be more prominent among older than
younger children, while it appears to be persistent across all ages in Bangladesh, but at no age in the
Philippines. The inequality does not appear to be driven by scarcity either as it is more prominent
in non-poor or higher income households than poor or lower income households in Bangladesh, and
not evident in either category of households in the Philippines.
While both Philippines and Bangladesh are agrarian economies, consistent with the literature
on purdah culture in Bangladesh, I nd limited participation of adult women in the labour market.
While adult males' labour market participation is double of that of adult females in the Philippines,
it is seven-folds of that of adult females in Bangladesh. Adult males' wage rate is double of that of
adult females in Bangladesh, while consistent with the egalitarian values no such wage dierence is
apparent in the Philippines. Adult female wage rate tends to positively while adult male wage rate
negatively aect a girl's allocation from animal food group in Bangladesh. Such eects, however,
are not observed in the Philippines.
Dowry system is argued to contribute to gender disparity in South Asia. As the literature
suggests, Bangladesh is the only Muslim country in which bride price is rarely observed and dowry
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is almost universally practiced. Consistent with that, I nd that on average transfers from a bride's
family exceeds the transfer from a groom's family at marriage and the former seems to be higher
while the later lower the more recent the marriage is. Exploring how households response to their
future transfers at marriages of their daughters and current food allocation to these girls, I nd that
the higher are the transfers from grooms' families at the recent marriages (either to bride, groom and
bride, or bride's family) in a village, the higher is a girl's allocation of animal foods, while the higher
are the transfers from brides' families (either to bride, groom and bride, or groom's family), the
lower (although not statistically signicant) is a girl's allocation. These ndings possibly indicate
while son-preference in Bangladesh (and its absence in the Philippines) might have a sound economic
basis, but this basis is shaped by pre-existing cultural norms in these societies (e.g., purdah culture
and customs of dowry vis-a-vis bride price). Son-preference in non-poor households in Bangladesh
but not in the Philippines might also be related with phenomenon that transfers from a bride's
family tends to increase with bride's parents wealth (proxied by bride's parents landholding). While
transfers from a groom's family also tend to increase with bride's families wealth, consistent with
dowry price ination and replacement of bride price with dowry, as the descriptive analysis shows,
the eect of bride's parents wealth on the transfer from bride's family is higher than that on the
transfer from groom's family. Finally, consistent with the literature that tv can play an important
role in promoting modern norms related to gender in villages, I nd that a village's access to tv in
Bangladesh positively aect a girl's allocation from animal food group.
A serious limitation of my analysis, however, is the inability to directly measure the strength
of cultural norms across households and its impact on intrahousehold food distribution. Apart
from cultural norms, the underlying dierences in food distribution in two societies could also be
governed by economic factors unobserved in the data.
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Figure 4.1: Bangladesh: Calorie Share Engel Curves, Lowess Fit, Bandwidth=0.8
Note: ltotcal, ln calorie intake; lanimcal, ln animal-calorie intake; lcerlcal, ln cereal calorie intake; lcal, calorie adequacy
ratio; lansh, ln (animal-calorie/total calorie); lcerlsh, ln(cereal calorie/total calorie)
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Figure 4.2: Philippines: Calorie Share Engel Curves, Lowess Fit, Bandwidth=0.8
Note: ltotcal, ln calorie intake; lanimcal, ln animal-calorie intake; lcerlcal, ln cereal calorie intake; lcal, calorie adequacy
ratio; lansh, ln (animal-calorie/total calorie); lcerlsh, ln(cereal calorie/total calorie)
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Table 4.2: Wage Rates of Males and Females in Bangladeshi and Filipino Sample
N Age P-value Real Wage Rate
Mean Std Mean Std P-value
Bangladesh
Children ( 10 years)
Boy 0
Girl 0
Adolescent (<10<18)
Male 75 15.12 1.92 0.70 0.51 0.21 0.27
Female 7 14.79 2.07 0.41 0.20
Adult ( 18)
Male 458 36.59 12.85 1.00 0.66 0.23 0.00
Female 65 36.59 11.85 0.38 0.21
The Philippines
Children ( 10 years)
Boy 11 8.95 0.68 0.24 1.93 0.77 0.15
Girl 9 8.47 1.01 2.42 0.65
Adolescent (<10<18)
Male 119 14.56 2.12 0.03 2.94 1.33 0.03
Female 84 13.92 2.00 2.56 1.12
Adult ( 18)
Male 358 33.36 8.78 0.00 3.76 1.41 0.27
Female 168 31.16 7.42 3.54 2.20
Real wage rate is nominal wage rate (Taka/hour in Bangladesh and Pesos/day
in the Philippines) deated by mean village rice price
Table 4.3: Transfers at Marriage from Wife's and Husband's Family in Bangladesh
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Ldwry Lmehr Ldwry Lmehr
OLS OLS SUR SUR
Lwpland 0.147*** 0.124*** 0.163*** 0.151***
(0.053) (0.042) (0.053) (0.044)
Lhpland 0.051 0.120*** 0.040 0.099**
(0.048) (0.039) (0.047) (0.039)
lenmarr -0.028*** 0.049*** -0.029*** 0.048***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
huseduc 0.075*** -0.026 0.078*** -0.029
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
wifeduc 0.006 0.077*** -0.002 0.075***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028)
feducfw 0.036* 0.039* 0.038* 0.043*
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023)
feducmw -0.047 0.041 -0.050 0.043
(0.032) (0.036) (0.031) (0.036)
feducfh 0.043* 0.014 0.035 0.018
(0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
feducmh -0.005 0.005 0.002 0.001
(0.049) (0.064) (0.048) (0.064)
Constant 7.608*** 5.471*** 7.614*** 5.449***
(0.251) (0.215) (0.252) (0.229)
Observations 348 363 342 342
adj R2 0.194 0.350
Heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors clustered at household level
are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; dwry, wife's family transfer,
mehr, husband's family transfer; wpland, wife's parents land; hpland, husband's parents
land; lenmarr, length of marriage, huseduc, husband's education, wifeduc, wife's education;
huseduc, husband's education; feducfw, wife's father education; feducmw, wife's mother's education;
feducfh, husband's father education, feducmh, husband's mother education; L, natural log.
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Table 4.6: Intrahousehold Food Distribution in Bangladesh: OLS and FE Estimates
Variables log total calorie log calorieintake
calorierequirement
log animalcalorie
totalcalorie
log animalcalorie
householdanimalcalorie
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
age 0.264*** 0.283*** 0.153*** 0.172*** -0.290*** -0.251*** 0.073* 0.085
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.060) (0.061) (0.044) (0.053)
age2 -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 0.018*** 0.015*** -0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
female -0.053*** -0.040** 0.054*** 0.066*** -0.034 -0.107** -0.079** -0.123***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.054) (0.050) (0.038) (0.044)
Lmcapx 0.416 0.467 0.431 0.494* 2.291** 0.542 -0.884 -2.106***
(0.286) (0.295) (0.285) (0.293) (0.908) (1.203) (0.545) (0.658)
Lmcapx2 -0.025 -0.030 -0.027 -0.033 -0.133* -0.028 0.062 0.147***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.069) (0.089) (0.042) (0.049)
Llandpc 0.026 -0.839*** 0.026 -0.869*** 0.277*** 0.803 0.046 -0.139
(0.034) (0.324) (0.034) (0.320) (0.106) (1.378) (0.059) (0.821)
Lhhsz 0.084** -0.376 0.083** -0.392* 0.123 1.032 -0.862*** -0.370
(0.033) (0.230) (0.032) (0.227) (0.094) (1.077) (0.053) (0.643)
shm0-10 0.220 0.013 0.216 -0.002 -0.437 0.974 0.070 2.052
(0.146) (0.438) (0.146) (0.433) (0.470) (1.619) (0.280) (1.347)
shf0-10 0.281** 0.508 0.276** 0.528 -0.715 -0.556 -0.071 1.404
(0.134) (0.402) (0.133) (0.398) (0.463) (2.339) (0.269) (1.166)
shm11-17 0.308** 0.238 0.298** 0.229 -0.421 -1.165 -0.029 0.755
(0.126) (0.418) (0.126) (0.414) (0.481) (1.853) (0.278) (1.265)
shf11-17 0.069 0.021 0.063 0.005 -0.300 -0.371 0.014 0.009
(0.131) (0.381) (0.130) (0.378) (0.450) (1.656) (0.262) (1.061)
shm18+ -0.208 -0.455 -0.215 -0.457 0.643 2.149 -0.042 0.327
(0.169) (0.511) (0.168) (0.504) (0.525) (2.040) (0.326) (1.495)
round1 -0.036* -0.041* -0.042** -0.047** 0.128 0.164* 0.017 0.042
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.087) (0.092) (0.048) (0.052)
round2 0.002 -0.004 -0.000 -0.007 0.256*** 0.209** 0.031 0.024
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.081) (0.085) (0.044) (0.046)
round3 -0.102*** -0.113*** -0.104*** -0.115*** -0.118 -0.078 -0.019 0.005
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.088) (0.091) (0.047) (0.048)
site1 -0.028 -0.028 -0.355*** 0.036
(0.025) (0.025) (0.084) (0.047)
site2 -0.034 -0.035 0.101 0.099**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.082) (0.043)
Constant 4.290*** 5.543*** -2.782*** -1.521 -12.273*** -8.162* 2.105 4.909*
(0.933) (1.196) (0.931) (1.189) (3.032) (4.877) (1.765) (2.597)
Observations 3,349 3,349 3,349 3,349 3,005 3,005 3,005 3,005
Adj. R2 0.331 0.272 0.143 0.111 0.114 0.026 0.163 0.030
Households 627 627 627 627 618 618 618 618
Heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors allowing for within household correlation are in brackets;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Mcapx, monthly per capita expenditure, landpc, land per capita,
sh, share, m, male, f, female and associated numbers indicate age group, i.e., shm0-10, share of males
of age0-10 in the household; hhsz, household size; L, natural log.
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Table 4.7: Intrahousehold Food Distribution in Bangladesh-Alternative Models
Model Variables log total calorie log calorieintake
calorierequirement
log animalcalorie
totalcalorie
log animalcalorie
householdanimalcalorie
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 girl -0.107* -0.087 0.002 0.015 0.215 -0.364* -0.034 -0.271**
(0.057) (0.066) (0.057) (0.067) (0.181) (0.189) (0.097) (0.124)
tv 0.003 0.002 0.269 0.049
(0.052) (0.052) (0.170) (0.096)
tv  0.060 0.052 0.058 0.056 -0.271 0.282 -0.050 0.163
girl (0.057) (0.069) (0.057) (0.069) (0.187) (0.196) (0.102) (0.135)
2 girl -0.031 -0.062 0.025 -0.015 -0.224 -0.457* -0.233 -0.267
(0.083) (0.098) (0.081) (0.094) (0.242) (0.235) (0.142) (0.166)
tv 0.014 0.008 0.247 0.049
(0.053) (0.053) (0.174) (0.096)
tv  0.039 0.004 0.046 0.022 -0.220 0.340* -0.041 0.149
girl (0.059) (0.076) (0.058) (0.074) (0.188) (0.195) (0.101) (0.133)
age 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.058*** 0.050*** -0.102*** -0.066*** 0.041*** 0.049***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013)
age  -0.010 0.001 -0.003 0.008 0.062*** 0.009 0.029** 0.001
girl (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016)
3 girl -0.173** -0.104 -0.062 0.003 0.312 -0.149 -0.024 -0.237
(0.076) (0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.246) (0.223) (0.136) (0.196)
tv 0.005 0.004 0.273 0.023
(0.053) (0.053) (0.176) (0.098)
tv  0.048 0.047 0.047 0.052 -0.237 0.436** -0.010 0.244*
girl (0.059) (0.073) (0.060) (0.074) (0.198) (0.204) (0.106) (0.139)
Lfwage -0.004 -0.002 -0.040 -0.148**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.135) (0.075)
Lfwage -0.029 -0.015 -0.026 -0.012 0.098 0.399*** 0.133 0.231
 girl (0.043) (0.048) (0.043) (0.048) (0.135) (0.154) (0.088) (0.165)
Lmwage 0.091 0.089 -0.374 0.024
(0.088) (0.087) (0.283) (0.167)
Lmwage -0.089 -0.008 -0.090 -0.003 0.020 -0.297 -0.250 -0.376**
 girl (0.085) (0.076) (0.085) (0.076) (0.292) (0.207) (0.155) (0.169)
4 girl -0.229 -0.184 -0.120 -0.082 0.447 -0.461 -0.277 -0.738
(0.228) (0.233) (0.226) (0.231) (0.646) (0.574) (0.386) (0.482)
tv 0.015 0.013 0.334* 0.039
(0.054) (0.054) (0.181) (0.099)
tv  0.028 0.041 0.027 0.044 -0.319 0.433** -0.040 0.256*
girl (0.061) (0.075) (0.061) (0.076) (0.205) (0.205) (0.109) (0.142)
Lfwage 0.009 0.010 0.014 -0.160*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.151) (0.086)
Lfwage -0.062 0.003 -0.059 0.002 0.069 0.398** 0.135 0.298
 girl (0.053) (0.064) (0.052) (0.063) (0.154) (0.179) (0.110) (0.202)
Lmwage 0.080 0.077 -0.346 -0.069
(0.080) (0.079) (0.318) (0.188)
Lmwage -0.016 -0.042 -0.015 -0.030 0.056 0.007 -0.105 -0.247
 girl (0.091) (0.085) (0.091) (0.084) (0.356) (0.263) (0.189) (0.207)
Lvdowry 0.003 0.004 0.125** -0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.056) (0.032)
Lvdowry -0.011 0.006 -0.011 0.005 -0.054 -0.087 -0.032 -0.029
 girl (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) (0.059) (0.063) (0.035) (0.059)
Lvmehr 0.011 0.010 -0.127* -0.079**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.077) (0.039)
Lvmehr 0.020 0.004 0.020 0.006 0.050 0.161* 0.082 0.118
 girl (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.086) (0.085) (0.052) (0.088)
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Table 4.7: Intrahousehold Food Distribution in Bangladesh-Alternative Models
Model Variables log total calorie log calorieintake
calorierequirement
log animalcalorie
totalcalorie
log animalcalorie
householdanimalcalorie
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5 girl -0.141** -0.091 -0.030 0.021 0.318 -0.309 -0.155 -0.308**
(0.067) (0.082) (0.067) (0.082) (0.231) (0.224) (0.110) (0.145)
tv -0.003 -0.005 0.339* 0.051
(0.055) (0.055) (0.179) (0.089)
tv  0.029 0.059 0.028 0.065 -0.318 0.376* -0.053 0.274*
girl (0.060) (0.079) (0.060) (0.079) (0.203) (0.221) (0.105) (0.143)
border 0.001 -0.022 0.000 -0.019 -0.036 -0.102 -0.050*** -0.123*
(0.012) (0.039) (0.012) (0.039) (0.037) (0.085) (0.018) (0.067)
border 0.017 -0.003 0.016 -0.007 -0.018 -0.042 0.040** -0.013
 girl (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.041) (0.029) (0.020) (0.024)
6 girl -0.182*** -0.090 -0.071 0.012 0.211 -0.408* -0.065 -0.311**
(0.058) (0.069) (0.058) (0.070) (0.202) (0.211) (0.106) (0.137)
tv -0.014 -0.016 0.281* 0.055
(0.050) (0.050) (0.167) (0.094)
tv  0.093* 0.060 0.091* 0.063 -0.295 0.276 -0.063 0.161
girl (0.055) (0.070) (0.055) (0.071) (0.187) (0.195) (0.101) (0.135)
APL -0.345*** -0.317*** -0.344*** -0.316*** 0.223** 0.124 0.117** 0.051
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.089) (0.111) (0.051) (0.070)
APL 0.055* -0.005 0.053* -0.005 0.041 0.068 0.063 0.056
girl (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.112) (0.121) (0.064) (0.081)
7 girl -0.102* -0.092 0.007 0.011 0.223 -0.337* -0.025 -0.247*
(0.058) (0.067) (0.058) (0.067) (0.181) (0.196) (0.097) (0.128)
tv 0.006 0.004 0.277* 0.053
(0.052) (0.052) (0.167) (0.095)
tv  0.056 0.053 0.054 0.057 -0.288 0.271 -0.056 0.152
girl (0.058) (0.069) (0.058) (0.070) (0.186) (0.201) (0.101) (0.138)
landless -0.005 -0.005 -0.201 0.037
(0.046) (0.046) (0.166) (0.098)
landless -0.044 0.060 -0.046 0.059 0.097 -0.278 -0.065 -0.223
girl (0.061) (0.087) (0.060) (0.086) (0.192) (0.201) (0.133) (0.192)
8 girl -0.084 -0.226 0.035 -0.115 1.119* 0.969 0.270 0.450
(0.235) (0.250) (0.235) (0.251) (0.636) (0.698) (0.447) (0.522)
tv 0.008 0.006 0.264 0.053
(0.052) (0.052) (0.170) (0.096)
tv  0.051 0.050 0.049 0.054 -0.264 0.336* -0.057 0.209
girl (0.057) (0.069) (0.057) (0.069) (0.186) (0.193) (0.103) (0.135)
Lmcapx -0.031 0.020 -0.033 0.018 -0.160* -0.129 -0.078 -0.031
girl (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.094) (0.104) (0.062) (0.068)
Lhhsz 0.095** 0.010 0.096** 0.011 0.047 -0.303** 0.101 -0.298*
girl (0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.050) (0.146) (0.149) (0.108) (0.159)
Lmcapx 0.436 0.455 0.453 0.483* 2.419*** 0.605 -0.833 -2.117***
(0.287) (0.287) (0.286) (0.286) (0.918) (1.218) (0.544) (0.657)
Lmcapx2 -0.026 -0.030 -0.027 -0.032 -0.137** -0.028 0.060 0.149***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.069) (0.090) (0.042) (0.050)
Lhhsz 0.041 -0.379 0.040 -0.395* 0.092 1.076 -0.908*** -0.313
(0.038) (0.231) (0.038) (0.229) (0.109) (1.073) (0.070) (0.634)
Heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors allowing for within household correlation are in brackets;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Mcapx, monthly per capita expenditure, fwage, mean female village wage
mwage, mean male village wage, vdowry, mean (1990-95) village transfer at marriage from wife's family, vmehr,
mean(1990-95) village transfer at marriage from husband's family, border, child's birth order, APL, absolute
poverty line; hhsz, household size; L, natural log. Additional covariates are from the basic specication, see Table 4.6.
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Table 4.8: Intrahousehold Food Expenditure Distribution in Bangladesh-Basic
and Alternative Models
Model Variables log (totexp) log( totexp
hhtotexp
) log (animexp
totexp
) log ( animexp
hhanimexp
)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 girl -0.051** -0.035* -0.051*** -0.032 0.001 -0.064* -0.055* -0.074*
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.041) (0.036) (0.032) (0.038)
2 girl -0.037 -0.108** -0.095** -0.078* 0.165 -0.313* -0.031 -0.240**
(0.058) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046) (0.154) (0.162) (0.095) (0.122)
tv 0.084 -0.023 0.156 0.053
(0.053) (0.045) (0.142) (0.092)
tv  -0.015 0.081 0.049 0.051 -0.179 0.273 -0.026 0.182
girl (0.060) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.158) (0.166) (0.100) (0.130)
3 girl 0.002 -0.025 -0.046 0.000 -0.105 -0.455** -0.181 -0.273*
(0.085) (0.081) (0.074) (0.080) (0.194) (0.192) (0.127) (0.155)
tv 0.093* -0.015 0.143 0.056
(0.053) (0.046) (0.144) (0.092)
tv  -0.032 0.040 0.032 0.007 -0.148 0.306* -0.023 0.154
girl (0.061) (0.056) (0.051) (0.056) (0.159) (0.162) (0.099) (0.129)
age 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.090*** 0.093*** -0.047*** -0.033*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012)
age  -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 0.038** 0.019 0.022* 0.008
girl (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015)
4 girl -0.096 -0.029 -0.097 -0.025 0.163 -0.115 -0.017 -0.149
(0.084) (0.069) (0.070) (0.073) (0.192) (0.171) (0.124) (0.172)
tv 0.092* -0.026 0.155 0.028
(0.054) (0.046) (0.144) (0.093)
tv  -0.031 0.118** 0.046 0.072 -0.187 0.372** 0.009 0.263*
girl (0.062) (0.057) (0.051) (0.055) (0.166) (0.173) (0.103) (0.135)
Lfwage -0.010 -0.017 -0.003 -0.132**
(0.047) (0.038) (0.102) (0.065)
Lfwage -0.049 0.103** -0.009 0.058 -0.029 0.242** 0.114 0.217
 girl (0.051) (0.052) (0.044) (0.059) (0.102) (0.099) (0.079) (0.147)
Lmwage -0.042 0.016 0.024 0.042
(0.098) (0.073) (0.262) (0.131)
Lmwage -0.031 -0.030 0.015 0.002 0.055 -0.027 -0.202 -0.221*
 girl (0.098) (0.074) (0.082) (0.070) (0.225) (0.149) (0.125) (0.124)
5 girl -0.043 -0.233 -0.088 -0.128 0.133 -0.270 -0.257 -0.482
(0.273) (0.242) (0.222) (0.230) (0.465) (0.391) (0.340) (0.385)
tv 0.098* -0.015 0.179 0.041
(0.055) (0.047) (0.145) (0.092)
tv  -0.030 0.112* 0.043 0.077 -0.269 0.354** -0.019 0.266*
girl (0.064) (0.060) (0.053) (0.059) (0.170) (0.176) (0.104) (0.136)
Lfwage -0.005 -0.042 0.018 -0.154**
(0.053) (0.041) (0.109) (0.072)
Lfwage -0.044 0.148** 0.020 0.107 -0.080 0.221* 0.121 0.297*
 girl (0.060) (0.065) (0.054) (0.074) (0.110) (0.116) (0.099) (0.180)
Lmwage -0.090 -0.112 0.224 -0.071
(0.101) (0.083) (0.276) (0.152)
Lmwage -0.017 -0.055 0.064 -0.015 0.099 0.230 -0.071 -0.107
 girl (0.110) (0.084) (0.095) (0.085) (0.267) (0.208) (0.158) (0.171)
Lvdowry 0.006 0.016 0.086* -0.005
(0.021) (0.016) (0.045) (0.028)
Lvdowry -0.015 0.017 -0.018 0.007 -0.027 -0.058 -0.031 -0.030
 girl (0.022) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.044) (0.046) (0.032) (0.051)
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Table 4.8: Intrahousehold Food Expenditure Distribution in Bangladesh-Basic
and Alternative Models
Model Variables log (totexp) log( totexp
hhtotexp
) log (animexp
totexp
) log ( animexp
hhanimexp
)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lvmehr -0.004 -0.039* -0.061 -0.075**
(0.028) (0.021) (0.057) (0.034)
Lvmehr 0.010 0.013 0.026 0.011 0.038 0.101* 0.077* 0.098
 girl (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.063) (0.060) (0.047) (0.078)
6 girl -0.062 -0.125** -0.142** -0.114** 0.233 -0.185 -0.137 -0.233
(0.066) (0.059) (0.056) (0.055) (0.196) (0.199) (0.109) (0.143)
tv 0.080 -0.033 0.220 0.061
(0.055) (0.047) (0.150) (0.093)
tv  -0.049 0.101* 0.038 0.081 -0.215 0.327* -0.024 0.282**
girl (0.062) (0.055) (0.049) (0.050) (0.173) (0.192) (0.105) (0.143)
border -0.029** -0.028 -0.024** -0.028 -0.022 -0.018 -0.041** -0.078
(0.013) (0.044) (0.012) (0.041) (0.023) (0.074) (0.016) (0.059)
border 0.019 0.001 0.019* 0.004 -0.015 -0.057** 0.034** -0.025
 girl (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.034) (0.024) (0.017) (0.020)
7 girl -0.115* -0.130** -0.122** -0.083 0.155 -0.370** -0.064 -0.283**
(0.061) (0.055) (0.051) (0.050) (0.176) (0.182) (0.103) (0.130)
tv 0.070 -0.019 0.165 0.059
(0.051) (0.044) (0.139) (0.089)
tv  0.010 0.087* 0.038 0.049 -0.196 0.269 -0.040 0.179
girl (0.058) (0.052) (0.048) (0.051) (0.157) (0.165) (0.098) (0.130)
APL -0.271*** -0.255*** 0.087*** 0.064*** 0.166** 0.103 0.121*** 0.062
(0.031) (0.035) (0.022) (0.024) (0.068) (0.092) (0.043) (0.057)
APL 0.071* 0.022 0.051* 0.008 0.041 0.083 0.067 0.062
girl (0.039) (0.038) (0.030) (0.030) (0.089) (0.101) (0.058) (0.069)
8 girl -0.025 -0.105** -0.091* -0.080* 0.160 -0.298* -0.032 -0.226*
(0.059) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.154) (0.165) (0.095) (0.126)
tv 0.088* -0.022 0.156 0.052
(0.053) (0.045) (0.140) (0.091)
tv  -0.024 0.080 0.048 0.051 -0.181 0.265 -0.025 0.175
girl (0.060) (0.052) (0.049) (0.050) (0.159) (0.168) (0.099) (0.132)
landless -0.004 0.017 -0.117 0.028
(0.048) (0.047) (0.149) (0.088)
landless -0.088 -0.024 -0.051 0.026 0.112 -0.123 0.012 -0.112
girl (0.071) (0.088) (0.065) (0.083) (0.160) (0.172) (0.112) (0.158)
9 girl 0.263 0.187 0.100 0.153 0.494 0.033 -0.083 -0.123
(0.288) (0.275) (0.219) (0.231) (0.479) (0.543) (0.406) (0.471)
tv 0.082 -0.024 0.155 0.059
(0.052) (0.045) (0.142) (0.092)
tv  -0.013 0.091* 0.049 0.061 -0.178 0.302* -0.035 0.216*
girl (0.060) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.159) (0.164) (0.101) (0.129)
Lmcapx -0.055 -0.028 -0.042 -0.015 -0.062 0.002 -0.013 0.059
girl (0.043) (0.042) (0.031) (0.033) (0.073) (0.085) (0.057) (0.061)
Lhhsz 0.022 -0.069 0.036 -0.077 0.032 -0.202** 0.075 -0.268*
girl (0.052) (0.053) (0.048) (0.061) (0.113) (0.094) (0.093) (0.142)
Lmcapx 1.147*** 0.785* -0.749*** -0.980*** 2.049*** 1.232 -0.547 -1.530***
(0.407) (0.424) (0.253) (0.286) (0.775) (1.015) (0.498) (0.576)
Lmcapx2 -0.064** -0.049 0.055*** 0.066*** -0.129** -0.082 0.037 0.102**
(0.031) (0.032) (0.020) (0.022) (0.058) (0.074) (0.039) (0.044)
Lhhsz 0.018 -0.376 -0.927*** -1.203*** -0.009 0.014 -0.941*** -0.669
(0.045) (0.392) (0.036) (0.318) (0.078) (0.873) (0.059) (0.615)
Heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors allowing for within household correlation are in brackets;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1; totexp, individual's total food expenditure; hhtotexp, household's total food expenditure, animexp, individual's animal
food expenditure; hhanimexp, total household animal food expenditure. For covariates' descriptions, see Table 4.7 notes.
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Table 4.9: Intrahousehold Food Distribution in the Philippines: OLS and FE Estimates
Variables log total calorie log calorieintake
calorierequirement
log animalcalorie
totalcalorie
log animalcalorie
householdanimalcalorie
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
age 0.174*** 0.184*** 0.001 0.017 -0.189*** -0.131*** 0.026 0.037
(0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.041) (0.033) (0.025) (0.029)
age2 -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.001 0.000 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
female -0.037** -0.034** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.053 0.010 -0.005 -0.014
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.038) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
Lmcapx 0.216 0.372 0.280 0.354 0.492 -0.487 -0.484** -0.418
(0.218) (0.245) (0.221) (0.246) (0.561) (0.669) (0.223) (0.267)
Lmcapx2 -0.009 -0.034 -0.019 -0.033 0.008 0.088 0.059** 0.050
(0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.032) (0.072) (0.086) (0.029) (0.034)
Llandpc 0.027 0.161 0.032 0.186 0.107 -0.487 0.059 0.604**
(0.058) (0.184) (0.058) (0.192) (0.142) (1.000) (0.061) (0.254)
Lhhsz 0.052 0.055 0.051 -0.773***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.129) (0.064)
shm0-10 0.114 0.094 -0.404 -0.638**
(0.220) (0.221) (0.590) (0.264)
shf0-10 0.042 -0.429 0.009 -0.864 -0.249 2.242 -0.469* 0.298
(0.213) (0.891) (0.214) (0.949) (0.603) (2.515) (0.271) (0.877)
shm11-17 -0.250 -0.120 -0.271 0.002 -0.562 -1.543 -1.147*** 0.056
(0.240) (0.484) (0.241) (0.502) (0.635) (1.411) (0.283) (0.406)
shf11-17 -0.377* -0.856 -0.429* -1.176 -0.677 2.227 -0.772*** 0.664
(0.218) (0.766) (0.223) (0.822) (0.598) (2.126) (0.284) (0.557)
shm18+ 0.370 -0.817 0.350 -0.601 -0.737 -4.602** -0.382 -1.403*
(0.268) (1.007) (0.271) (1.002) (0.733) (1.896) (0.313) (0.850)
round1 0.016 0.024 0.028 0.042 -0.122 -0.138 -0.107*** -0.095***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.084) (0.085) (0.032) (0.036)
round2 -0.026 -0.022 -0.029 -0.020 -0.040 -0.087 -0.022 -0.009
(0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.077) (0.081) (0.028) (0.031)
round3 -0.097*** -0.095*** -0.099*** -0.095*** 0.064 0.075 0.020 0.021
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.078) (0.079) (0.025) (0.025)
Constant 5.606*** 5.795*** -1.332*** -0.960 -4.135*** -1.659 0.807* -1.423**
(0.467) (0.612) (0.475) (0.621) (1.271) (1.654) (0.475) (0.630)
Observations 3,826 3,826 3,715 3,715 3,548 3,548 3,548 3,548
adj R2 0.180 0.171 0.062 0.037 0.089 0.016 0.258 0.044
Households 426 426 424 424 423 423 423 423
Heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors allowing for within household correlation are in brackets;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Mcapx, monthly per capita expenditure, landpc, land per capita,
sh, share, m, male, f, female and associated numbers indicate age group, i.e., shm0-10, share of males
of age0-10 in the household; hhsz, household size; L, natural log.
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Table 4.10: Intrahousehold Food Distribution in the Philippines: Alternative Models
Model Variables log total calorie log calorieintakecalorierequirement log
animalcalorie
totalcalorie log
animalcalorie
householdanimalcalorie
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 girl -0.039** -0.037*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.003 0.001 -0.007 -0.011
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.021)
tv 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.018 0.148
(0.067) (0.067) (0.025) (0.091)
tv  0.009 0.046 -0.000 0.018 -0.006 -0.007 0.009 -0.060
girl (0.068) (0.034) (0.071) (0.035) (0.018) (0.008) (0.095) (0.043)
2 girl -0.067 -0.038 -0.045 -0.034 0.054 0.071 -0.033 0.047
(0.050) (0.046) (0.049) (0.041) (0.109) (0.075) (0.059) (0.066)
age 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.002 0.010** -0.039*** -0.029*** 0.029*** 0.045***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
age  0.006 0.001 0.019** 0.017*** -0.001 -0.011 0.005 -0.010
girl (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.018) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
3 girl 0.096 0.105 0.225 0.183* 0.178 0.141 0.089 0.118
(0.150) (0.104) (0.152) (0.101) (0.340) (0.184) (0.190) (0.175)
Lfwage -0.013 -0.024 -0.092 -0.067
(0.048) (0.048) (0.117) (0.055)
Lfwage 0.052 0.019 0.058 0.050 -0.296** -0.053 0.072 -0.036
 girl (0.051) (0.038) (0.050) (0.037) (0.129) (0.067) (0.069) (0.068)
Lmwage -0.060 -0.039 0.106 0.089
(0.100) (0.100) (0.237) (0.116)
Lmwage -0.152 -0.123 -0.178 -0.133* 0.185 -0.047 -0.133 -0.064
 girl (0.117) (0.082) (0.119) (0.078) (0.259) (0.146) (0.147) (0.136)
4 girl -0.044 -0.007 0.082** 0.116*** -0.027 -0.004 0.022 0.011
(0.037) (0.029) (0.038) (0.027) (0.085) (0.048) (0.043) (0.048)
border -0.024** -0.046** -0.024** -0.046** -0.040 -0.015 -0.071*** -0.065**
(0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.019) (0.030) (0.031) (0.012) (0.032)
border 0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.011* 0.020 0.002 -0.006 -0.006
 girl (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
5 girl 0.006 -0.033 0.103* 0.058 0.004 -0.002 0.056 0.042
(0.052) (0.049) (0.053) (0.051) (0.009) (0.007) (0.059) (0.059)
APL -0.479*** -0.458*** -0.479*** -0.464*** 0.014** 0.010 0.143*** 0.013
(0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.042) (0.007) (0.007) (0.049) (0.049)
APL -0.047 -0.002 -0.042 0.011 -0.002 0.003 -0.066 -0.061
girl (0.053) (0.051) (0.054) (0.053) (0.009) (0.008) (0.061) (0.060)
6 girl -0.021 -0.014 0.083*** 0.091*** 0.003 -0.001 0.018 -0.014
(0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.018) (0.004) (0.002) (0.032) (0.029)
landless -0.003 -0.071 -0.012 -0.070 -0.004 0.015 0.003 0.027
(0.034) (0.081) (0.034) (0.082) (0.005) (0.021) (0.037) (0.103)
landless -0.031 -0.038 -0.031 -0.040 -0.002 0.003 -0.045 -0.001
girl (0.036) (0.027) (0.036) (0.025) (0.005) (0.003) (0.043) (0.040)
7 girl -0.257 -0.179 -0.068 -0.021 0.006 0.379 0.008 0.131
(0.176) (0.138) (0.183) (0.132) (0.432) (0.262) (0.213) (0.180)
Lmcapx 0.048* 0.033 0.037 0.015 -0.047 -0.044 0.004 0.017
girl (0.029) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.075) (0.055) (0.040) (0.034)
Lhhsz 0.022 0.014 0.000 0.018 0.104 -0.102 -0.013 -0.099
girl (0.061) (0.049) (0.063) (0.048) (0.136) (0.073) (0.070) (0.068)
Lmcapx 0.189 0.357 0.255 0.347 0.523 -0.470 -0.487** -0.425
(0.219) (0.244) (0.223) (0.245) (0.565) (0.669) (0.222) (0.269)
Lmcapx2 -0.009 -0.034 -0.018 -0.033 0.007 0.088 0.059** 0.050
(0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.072) (0.086) (0.029) (0.034)
Lhhsz 0.042 0.054 0.004 -0.767***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.139) (0.068)
8 girl -0.063** -0.061** 0.044 0.048* -0.022 -0.050 -0.087*** -0.100***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.067) (0.066) (0.030) (0.029)
round 1 0.008 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.064 0.055 0.080* 0.087**
 girl (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.102) (0.099) (0.044) (0.043)
round 2 0.033 0.038 0.027 0.032 0.162 0.136 0.155*** 0.151***
 girl (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.099) (0.098) (0.043) (0.042)
round 3 0.064 0.068 0.054 0.056 0.073 0.051 0.095** 0.102***
 girl (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.103) (0.103) (0.038) (0.037)
Heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors allowing for within household correlation are in brackets;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1; For covariates' abbreviations see Table 4.7 notes. Covariates from basic specication (Table 4.9) are controlled for.
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Table 4.11: Intrahousehold Food Expenditure Distribution in the Philippines: Basic and Alternative
Models
Model Variables log (totexp) log( totexphhtotexp ) log (
animexp
totexp ) log (
animexp
hhanimexp )
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 girl -0.019 -0.024 -0.032* -0.027 0.011 -0.014 -0.011 -0.023
(0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.032) (0.016) (0.022) (0.019)
2 girl -0.028 -0.024 -0.039** -0.027 -0.002 -0.003 -0.018 -0.022
(0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.006) (0.003) (0.023) (0.020)
tv 0.063 0.096 0.017 0.063
(0.131) (0.078) (0.032) (0.134)
tv  0.223** 0.006 0.150 0.006 0.023 -0.001 0.153 -0.027
girl (0.106) (0.045) (0.103) (0.045) (0.028) (0.011) (0.157) (0.056)
3 girl -0.037 0.010 -0.101* 0.018 0.041 -0.004 -0.029 0.025
(0.064) (0.057) (0.054) (0.057) (0.088) (0.049) (0.059) (0.061)
age 0.055*** 0.069*** 0.051*** 0.069*** -0.015 -0.018*** 0.031*** 0.046***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
age  0.004 -0.005 0.013 -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 0.003 -0.008
girl (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
4 girl 0.171 0.261* -0.005 0.150 0.255 0.023 0.162 0.102
(0.234) (0.145) (0.149) (0.137) (0.279) (0.134) (0.194) (0.171)
Lfwage -0.064 -0.039 -0.012 -0.059
(0.063) (0.046) (0.096) (0.057)
Lfwage -0.010 -0.011 0.056 -0.008 -0.310*** -0.019 0.059 -0.043
 girl (0.073) (0.052) (0.056) (0.052) (0.112) (0.051) (0.069) (0.068)
Lmwage 0.128 0.093 0.242 0.168
(0.128) (0.095) (0.197) (0.136)
Lmwage -0.134 -0.203* -0.072 -0.124 0.105 -0.010 -0.181 -0.051
 girl (0.162) (0.108) (0.118) (0.109) (0.222) (0.105) (0.156) (0.133)
5 girl -0.063 -0.026 -0.016 -0.023 -0.089 -0.008 0.008 0.000
(0.045) (0.037) (0.032) (0.037) (0.078) (0.033) (0.043) (0.045)
border -0.054*** -0.063*** -0.082*** -0.057** -0.018 0.006 -0.070*** -0.064**
(0.014) (0.024) (0.009) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.013) (0.031)
border 0.012 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.026 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005
 girl (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
6 girl 0.071 0.023 -0.037 -0.026 0.003 -0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.090) (0.079) (0.054) (0.051) (0.020) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007)
APL -0.431*** -0.432*** 0.109** 0.006 0.042** 0.029 0.022*** 0.006
(0.057) (0.060) (0.047) (0.051) (0.018) (0.019) (0.005) (0.005)
APL -0.098 -0.050 0.006 -0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.012 -0.012
girl (0.093) (0.084) (0.055) (0.053) (0.020) (0.019) (0.007) (0.008)
7 girl 0.023 -0.009 -0.016 -0.017 0.006 -0.004 0.005 -0.020
(0.034) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.009) (0.004) (0.033) (0.029)
landless -0.060 0.064 -0.009 0.048 0.001 0.083*** -0.020 -0.019
(0.038) (0.145) (0.033) (0.090) (0.012) (0.027) (0.041) (0.114)
landless -0.082* -0.027 -0.031 -0.018 -0.014 0.004 -0.033 -0.006
girl (0.045) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.012) (0.006) (0.044) (0.039)
8 girl -0.498** -0.300* -0.231 -0.235 -0.022 0.216 -0.042 -0.027
(0.245) (0.180) (0.184) (0.171) (0.355) (0.200) (0.209) (0.171)
Lmcapx 0.077* 0.056* 0.022 0.046* -0.052 -0.031 0.005 0.030
girl (0.040) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.058) (0.044) (0.039) (0.032)
Lhhsz 0.098 0.037 0.058 0.021 0.107 -0.057 0.005 -0.051
girl (0.082) (0.056) (0.061) (0.055) (0.120) (0.050) (0.070) (0.062)
Lmcapx 0.686** 0.619* -0.354 -0.294 0.838* 0.060 -0.484** -0.519*
(0.300) (0.342) (0.225) (0.218) (0.443) (0.548) (0.211) (0.269)
Lmcapx2 -0.027 -0.054 0.047 0.032 -0.063 0.014 0.059** 0.062*
(0.039) (0.045) (0.029) (0.027) (0.055) (0.069) (0.027) (0.034)
Lhhsz 0.035 -0.680*** 0.026 -0.781***
(0.075) (0.062) (0.113) (0.078)
9 girl -0.072* -0.072* -0.078*** -0.073*** -0.057 -0.073 -0.105*** -0.120***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.025) (0.025) (0.053) (0.054) (0.030) (0.030)
round 1 0.061 0.049 0.066* 0.062* 0.051 0.051 0.103** 0.111***
 girl (0.058) (0.060) (0.035) (0.035) (0.090) (0.086) (0.043) (0.042)
round 2 0.055 0.053 0.053 0.058* 0.147* 0.126* 0.145*** 0.142***
 girl (0.048) (0.048) (0.033) (0.032) (0.077) (0.075) (0.042) (0.041)
round 3 0.095* 0.091* 0.058** 0.061** 0.075 0.058 0.123*** 0.131***
 girl (0.052) (0.051) (0.028) (0.028) (0.086) (0.086) (0.039) (0.039)
Heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors allowing for within household correlation are in brackets;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1; See Table 4.8 notes for covariates' abbreviations. Covariates from basic specication (Table 4.9) are controlled for.
CHAPTER V
How Responsive are Nutrient Intakes to Implicit Nutrient
Prices? A Hedonic Demand Analysis
Abstract: Using a characteristic demand framework and exploiting spatial and time variation in
household unit values of food items as proxy for village food prices, I estimate implicit nutrient prices
and analyse responsiveness of individual nutrient intakes to implicit nutrient prices in rural Bangladesh
controlling for unobserved individual xed eects. I nd individual intakes of calories, macronutrients, and a
set of micronutrients are inelastic to implicit calorie prices while the own and cross implicit price elasticities
for a range of critical micronutrients are highly elastic to implicit micronutrient prices. Comparing the
nutrient intake behaviour of poor and non-poor, I nd that calorie intake is highly inelastic for both groups
while micronutrient intakes are not, and that both macro and micronutrient intakes of poor compared with
non-poor are more responsive to implicit macro and micronutrient prices. These ndings suggest that the
conventional way of addressing people's hunger and nutrition needs by subsidising one or two key staples
should be revisited.
5.1 Introduction
Understanding how responsive is nutrient intakes to nutrient prices is critical for at least four
reasons. First, a proper understanding is critical to design and implement eective government
policies to prevent hunger and malnutrition. In many poor countries like Bangladesh, poverty often
rears its ugliest face in terms of hunger and malnutrition. Consequently, a substantial amount of
resources are devoted to food subsidy and nutritional intervention programmes, which are a major
part of the government's anti-poverty programmes. To assess the need, eciency, and eectiveness
of these programmes, it is important to understand the demand for various nutrients.
Second, understanding how nutrient intakes vary with changes in nutrient prices is critical to
ght against micronutrient malnutrition. Micronutrient malnutrition is one of the most serious
public health problems in developing countries. More than two billion people in the developing
world currently suer from micronutrient malnutrition in one form or another(ACC/SCN, 2003).
Third, knowing how people value dierent attributes of foods is essential to determine agricul-
tural marketing potential of foods produced through new technologies. A number of agricultural
technologies, such as high-yielding varieties (HYV) and bio-fortication of foods, are being applied
in developing countries. If these technologies, such as bio-fortication of a particular food, say,
wheat, results more nutrients, but somehow distorts its colour or taste, and if people value the
color and taste of a food more than its nutritional value, then these technologies would not be able
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to reach the goal of reducing malnutrition.
Finally, understanding nutrient intake behaviours is important from the perspective of economic
development. There is now widespread evidence that better nutrition improves cognitive skills,
reduces monetary and opportunity costs associated with illness, and improves labour productivity
(for a survey of this literature, see Behrman et al., 2004).
The prevailing policy conclusion from existing food demand literature in poor countries is that
the nutritional status of the poor may be quite vulnerable to upward uctuations of food prices,
and that a strategy of low food prices should benet the poor. Employing the standard demand
analysis framework, these studies in poor countries found higher price-responsiveness of low income
households1.
However, a problem with these studies and their policy conclusions is that they shed no light
on (i) preference for nutritive contents vis-a-vis non-nutritive attributes of foods, and (ii) the ex-
tent to which food prices reect the nutritive characteristics of foods vis-a-vis their non-nutritive
attributes. Therefore, it is not obvious from these studies why an individual's nutritional status
might deteriorate due to an increase in certain food prices as, theoretically, the eect could go either
way.
A food item has various characteristics - nutritive (i.e., protein, fat, carbohydrate, vitamins,
and minerals) and non-nutritive (i.e., aroma, taste, texture, and class appeal. These characteristics
inuence people's demand for food. An individual may consume a particular food item for its
nutrient contents and/or for its non-nutritive features. There is indirect evidence that non-nutritive
attributes of foods can dominate nutritional consideration even for the poor and malnourished
people (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1989, 1990; Pitt, 1983).
Thus, inferring nutrient intake behaviour based on the conventional demand framework, as ap-
plied in past food demand studies, could be misleading. People can be benetted nutritionally by
an increase in the price of certain foods if they substitute higher-priced foods with those that are
cheaper but more nutritious despite being inferior in various non-nutritive features. Conversely, if
people substitute higher-priced foods with cheaper foods of less nutritive values, then their nutri-
tional status will deteriorate2.
Hence, for the policy to ght malnutrition, it is critical to understand to what extent individ-
uals (of dierent characteristics) value nutrients vis-a-vis nonnutritive features of dierent foods.
Otherwise, it would be dicult to determine what types of foods to subsidise, and whether or not
a price subsidy would be more eective than direct nutritional interventions.
In this paper, I attempt to bridge the gap between two broad streams of literature on food
demand. Based on the conventional demand framework, one stream analyses the nutrient respon-
siveness of dierent income groups to the changes in food prices. On the other hand, based on
the characteristics demand framework, the other stream attempts to estimate the implicit prices of
1(For a summary of this literature, see Behrman and Deolalikar, 1988; Behrman, 1995; Bouis, 1996).
2For a detailed discussion on the possible eects of food price changes on nutrition (see Behrman et al., 1988;
Bouis, 1996).
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characteristics of a given food or food-group.
Using a characteristics demand framework (Gorman, 1980; Lancaster, 1966, 1971; Ladd and
Suvannunt, 1976)) and utilising the spatial (Deaton, 1988) and time variation of food prices in rural
Bangladesh, I estimate the implicit prices of key nutrients in dierent locations in rural Bangladesh
for dierent time periods. Using these implicit nutrient prices (as opposed to a few food prices
typically used in the literature) in the nutrient demand function, I estimate the nutrient price
responsiveness of nutrient intakes of individuals. This procedure enables me to measure peoples'
demand for the nutrients embodied in the foods by eliminating their demand for the non-nutritive
attributes of foods. I nd that calorie intake is highly inelastic to implicit calorie price, while
micronutrient intakes are highly elastic to implicit micronutrient prices. Moreover, for a range of
nutrients, poor's intakes are more responsive than non-poor's.
This chapter thus has obvious policy implications. If food demand is guided by nutrient contents
of foods, then subsidising nutritious foods will be an eective way to improve the nutritional status
of people (especially of the poor). Similarly, if people tend to consume more nutritious foods with
an increase in income, then policies to promote economic growth and income earning opportunities
for the poor will have a benecial eect in improving their nutritional status. On the other hand,
if to a large extent food demand is guided by various nonnutritive attributes, then by subsidising
nutritious foods with unattractive non-nutritive features, a food policy or a growth promoting policy
is unlikely to achieve desired results. More direct nutritional interventions would be required in
this circumstance. Finally, if the nutrient intakes of individuals of certain characteristics (such as
women or female children) within the households are more responsive to implicit nutrient prices, the
price subsidy of nutritious foods can also be an eective way to tackle the malnutrition problems
of specic population groups.
Furthermore, analysing nutrient intakes based on individual food intake, not on household food
expenditure, I also attempt to contribute to the broader literature on food demand analysis. While
the nutritional intakes of individuals and their determinants are the ultimate interest of government
policy, most of the earlier demand studies use household food expenditure data in the absence of
individual food intake data. However, inferences based on food expenditure data may not necessarily
be a good proxy for the predictions based on actual food intake within the household. A number of
studies (for a discussion of this literature, see Bouis and Haddad, 1992) demonstrate that the income
elasticity of calorie consumption tends to be overestimated using the household food expenditure
data as opposed to food intake data. This may lead to erroneous policy conclusion that growth-
promoting policies will automatically address malnutrition in developing countries3.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a brief review of related
literature. Section 5.3 lay out the theoretical framework for the empirical analysis. Section 6.2
describes the data and provides descriptive analysis. Section 6.2.2 provides empirical analysis of
the demand for nutrients in rural Bangladesh. Section 5.6 concludes the paper.
3For a debate on this topic, see Behrman and Deolalikar (1987); Deaton and Subramanian (1996)
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5.2 Related Literature
This section briey summarizes two streams of the literature on food demand analysis. Based
on the conventional demand framework, one stream analyses the price responsiveness of nutrient
intakes of dierent income groups in developing countries. Based on the characteristics demand
framework, the other stream estimates the implicit prices of dierent nutritive and nonnutritive
characteristics of a given food item or food group.
Theoretically, it can be argued that dierent income groups (i.e., poor and non-poor) can have
dierent price and income elasticities. As is well-known, the price elasticities can be decomposed
by the Slutsky equation:
(5.1) eij = sij   Eiaj
where eij , often referred to as the Cournot elasticity, is the overall demand elasticity for good i
when price of good j changes; sij , the Slutsky elasticity, is the pure substitution elasticity for good
i when the price of good j changes; Ei, the Engel elasticity, is the income elasticity for good i; aj
is the amount spent on good j as a percentage of total expenditure. When i = j, the own price
components are given and when i 6= j, the cross-price components are given. So, eij can vary with
income, if sij , Ei, and/or aj vary with income.
Based on the conventional demand framework, Pinstrup-Andersen et al. (1976) is one of the
rst studies that provided empirical evidence that low income groups are more price-responsive
than high income groups4. Their objective was to analyze the nutritional distribution of dierent
income groups due to an increase in various commodity supplies. They argued that nutritional
distribution should be considered when establishing commodity priorities in agricultural research
and policy because increasing the supply of some foods may actually exacerbate malnourishment
as people substitute luxury goods for more nutritious commodities.
Pinstrup-Andersen et al. (1976) used data from a household survey of 230 families in Cali,
Colombia. The survey contained information on the quantities consumed and prices paid for 22 dif-
ferent foods, household size, and income. Althought the families were reinterviewed eighteen months
later, the attrition rate was 30%. In the absence of an extensive and accurate time series data, they
adopted Frisch's technique (Frisch, 1959) for estimating a complete set of own and cross-price elas-
ticities when income elasticities, budget proportions, and money exibility are known. The st two
can be calculated from cross-sectional data, and the money exibility can be indirectly determined
when the own-price elasticities of a few goods are known. However, their entire methodology, rests
on the critical assumption of want independence among goods under consideration5.
4For a detailed discussion of this study and a number of other studies spawned by this study, see Watereld (1985)
5Good i is want independent of all other goods, if the marginal utility of good i depends only on the quan-
tity of good i and not on any other quantity. This assumption implies direct additivity of the utility function:
U(q1; q2; :::; qn) = u1(q1) + u2(q2) + :::+ un(qn).
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Brandt and Goodwin (1980) criticised Pinstrup-Andersen et al. (1976) arguing that the use of the
Frisch methodology was inappropriate. They showed that if the goods are actually 'want dependent',
then the own-price elasticities will be in error by the sum of the non-zero cross-commodity 'want
elasticities.' Calculating price elasticities by both the Frisch method and a time-series method using
an extensive Canadian database, they found that the Frisch value to be consistently over-estimated,
typically by a factor of two6.
Using a comprehensive household survey, the 1976 Indonesian Socio-Economic Survey, Timmer
and Alderman (1979) found that the poor are more sensitive to price changes than the rich. The
survey covered 54,000 households - 18,000 surveyed in each trimester of 1976. Data were collected for
over 100 food commodities, but the authors were concentrated only on rice, fresh cassava, and corn
- the three major foodstus accounting for more than two-thirds of average energy intake7. Data
were reported for 12 income classes and 24 provinces, separately for urban and rural consumers,
and for three dierent time periods.
Timmer and Alderman (1979) found that both the budget proportion and income elasticity,
that is aj and Ei in equation 5.1, declined with increased income. Elasticities estimated by Timmer
and Alderman (1979) were signicantly higher in absolute magnitude than typically reported in
the literature. One explanation is that these elasticities, being estimated from cross-sectional data,
represent long-term responses to changes in incomes and prices. Long-term parameters are always
larger than short-term parameters because consumers' tastes and preferences take time to adjust
to changing incomes and prices. Due to these high elasticities, they claimed that directing income
to the poor will be an ecient way to improve their calorie intake.
Timmer (1981) showed that the pure substitution elasticity (i.e., sij in equation 5.1) also varies
by income class. This implies the need to understand how price changes aect nutritional level of
the poor. As Timmer argued, the price eects may be much more important to the nutritional
status of the poor than the income eects. If the poor are already at the nutritional margin of
survival, then even modestly higher food prices may have a profound welfare eect.
Pitt (1983) also found that the poor respond dierently than the rich to changes in prices and
income. He used a large panel data of 5750 rural households in Bangladesh interviewed in four
successive quarters. As the data were available at the household level rather than at the regional
level, he was able to perform his estimations at the household level.
Pitt's study diers from the previous studies as he estimated both the commodity price elas-
ticity matrix and a nutrient-food price elasticity matrix. He observes that the largest substitution
cross-price elasticity is for wheat demand with respect to rice price; if rice price goes up, consumers
heavily substitute wheat for rice. Moreover, wheat has a uniformly negative row of nutrient elas-
6Pinstrup-Andersen (1980) replied to the critique stating that their primary purpose of the study was not to
estimate price elasticities but to develop nutritional impact of the supply expansions. Due to the urgency of the
problem, they settled for directions and orders of magnitude, even though greater precision could not be obtained.
7Energy and calorie, or more preciously, kilo calorie (a measure of energy) are used interchangeably throughout
the thesis.
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ticities for low-income households, implying that subsidizing wheat will increase the intake of all
nutrients. Pulses { an important and inexpensive source of protein that has been considered for
price subsidies by the government { on the other hand, have a mostly positive row of nutrient
elasticities. This implies that subsidising pulses will actually reduce the nutrient intake of the low-
income households. In contrast to Timmer and Alderman (1979), Pitt argues that income transfers
may not be as eective as the programmes that encourage consumption of more nutritious foods
to increase nutrition, because even poorly nourished households can improve their nutrition simply
by altering their diet. Taste appears plays an important role in a household's dietary intake.
The phenomenon that the poor are more price-responsive than rich is also evident in Alderman
(1986); Behrman and Deolalikar (1989, 1990), among others. Alderman reviews the empirical
estimates of food price and income elasticities disaggregated by income groups. He nds that with
a few exceptions, these elasticities decline in absolute value with the increase in income. This is
consistent across a wide range of countries, for cross-section data sets collected at various frequencies
and time intervals, and employing several estimation techniques.
Similarly, using national-level information on food expenditures and prices for a number of
countries over time, Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) nds that food indierence curve becomes
more sharply curved as food expenditure increases. This in turn implies that the price response is
higher at lower incomes.
Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) estimate the nutrient responses of individuals of dierent age
and sex within the household to changes in four basic food prices (gram, sorghum, milk, and rice)
in rural South Indian villages. This study improves upon the previous studies as it is based on
individual food intake data as opposed to household food expenditure data. It also controls for
unobserved xed eects that may contaminate the estimation.
One of the key ndings of this study is that individual nutrient intakes respond strongly to these
four food prices. While the price of sorghum (the basic staple food in these villages), generally has
negative eects in nutrient intakes, other food prices, particularly of milk and rice, often have
strong positive impacts on nutrient consumption. They also nd that the nutritional burden due
to increased food prices that typically occur in the lean agricultural season (or in a drought year)
falls disproportionately on female members within the household. However, by the same token,
they enjoy the nutritional bonus from falling food prices (in the post-harvest seasons or in a year
of favorable monsoons).
The positive nutrient elasticity to a set of food prices are also evident in a number of other
studies, such as in Pitt and Rosenzweig (1985), which conjecture the inuence of taste, aroma,
status, etc. in food demand for the poor. They also argue that other than the basic staple,
subsidising foods that tend to have positive price response to nutrients will adversely aect the
nutrition status of the poor.
However, none of these studies provide any useful insights in the fundamental policy question
of how people value dierent characteristics|{nutritive and non-nutritive|{ embodied in foods.
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Moreover, there is a possibility that the results of these studies may be contaminated without
controlling for a number of other correlated food prices. Thus, the policy conclusions emerging
from these studies that only focus on a few food prices may be erroneous.
Prato and Bagali (1976) criticise the conventional food demand studies because of the absence
of a behavioral framework and empirical analysis of the nature and importance of nutritional and
nonnutritional factors that aect food demand. Using the US food consumption survey data from
a number of regions and of dierent income classes for 42 food items of the meat, poultry, and sh
category, they found the existence of nutritional ineciencies in consumer food choices. Nutritional
ineciency was dened as the situation when nutrients were not obtained from the minimum-
cost foods. They also nd that this nutritional ineciency tends to increase with residual food
expenditure (dened as total food expenditure minus the minimum-cost food expenditure).
Nutritional ineciency can arise because of demand for non-nutrient attributes of foods, such
as, taste, aroma, texture, etc. People may spend more to obtain the same or perhaps lower amount
of nutrients from foods that are otherwise rich in terms of non-nutritive attributes. As already
discussed above, a number of studies (using traditional demand framework) indirectly infer the
importance of non-nutritive attributes in the demand for food by the poor.
The absence of a characteristics demand framework in food demand studies in developing coun-
tries is somewhat ironic as this framework has its roots in agriculture. Waugh (1928) empirically
analyses the relationship between the physical characteristics (i.e., size, shape, color, maturity,
uniformity, etc.) of vegetables and their market prices to determine consumer valuations of these
characteristics. He observes that such information would be useful for asparagus producers. As
Waugh notes, the prices of agricultural products, like any other commodity, vary in two distinct
ways - time variation (day-to-day or seasonal) and the variation at any particular time due to
dierences in characteristics. He studied the relationship between the physical characteristics of
vegetables and their prices at any particular time. Waugh (1929) further argues that there is a dis-
tinct tendency for market prices of many commodities to vary with certain physical characteristics,
and this relationship can be fairly accurately determined through statistical analysis.
As is well-known, the commodity characteristics based demand framework was subsequently
laid out by Gorman (1980); Lancaster (1966, 1971). While in the traditional demand framework
the goods are the objects of the utility function, in the characteristic demand framework, it is
the characteristics of goods from which the utility is derived. A good can possess more than
one characteristic, and many characteristics can be shared by more than one good. Goods in
combination may possess characteristics dierent from those pertaining to the goods separately.
Consumption is viewed as an activity in which goods, singly or in combination, are inputs and
in which the output is a collection of characteristics. Utility or preference orderings are assumed
to rank collections of characteristics and only to rank collections of goods indirectly through the
characteristics that they possess8. Maximisation of this utility function subject to usual budget
8Various ingredients of characteristics demand framework are also evident in Strotz (1957, 1959); Gorman (1959);
Stigler (1945); Thrall et al. (1954); Morishima (1959); Quandt (1956); Becker (1965).
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constraint thus yields the implicit prices of characteristics, which in turn is the basis of the hedonic
price function9.
Lancaster's characteristics demand framework, has been criticised for the assumption of linear
consumption technology by Lucas (1975) and for the assumption of nonnegative marginal utilities
of all characteristics (by (Hendler, 1975)). Both Lucas and Hendler also criticise the assumption
that utility depends only upon total quantities of characteristics and not upon their distribution
among commodities.
Ladd and Suvannunt (1976) further develop a consumer goods characteristics model, which is
not prone to these criticisms10. They test two hypotheses: (i) the retail price of a product is a
weighted linear combination of product's characteristics, each weight being a marginal implicit price
of a characteristic; and (ii) consumer demand for a product is a function of income, product prices,
and product's characteristics. They found that the statistical results were consistent with both of
their hypotheses.
Using a hedonic price approach (based in the characteristics demand framework), a number of
studies estimate implicit values of nutrient and non-nutrient characteristics of a particular food item,
such as, milk, breakfast cereals, cowpea, wine, etc. For instance, Langyintuo et al. (2004) estimated
the implicit price for various nonnutritive characteristics of cowpeas, which is an important food
legume throughout West and Central Africa. Five samples were purchased once per month from
seven markets in Ghana and Cameroon between 1997 and 2000. In the market, price and vendor
characteristics were noted. In the laboratory, size of grains, color, texture, and damage levels were
recorded. Using a hedonic price regression model, they nd that quality characteristics are very
important in West African food markets. Even low income consumers are willing to pay a premium
for products that match their preferences.
Household survey data on prices and quantities consumed are often weighted averages of a
number of market goods. Information may be available on how much a household spends on
cereals, but not necessarily on specic brands and types of cereals. Lenz et al. (1994) developed an
aggregate commodity framework to address this issue of aggregate commodity groups in analyzing
valuation of dierent characteristics embodied in milk. In this two-stage framework, the household
in the rst stage chooses the "average" price, the "average" nutrient content, and the quantity of
the aggregate commodity which will maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint. In
the second stage, the household decides which market goods, and the quantity of each good that
9Hedonic price regressions have been extensively used to measure consumers' valuations for various characteristics
of durable goods, such as automobiles (Giliches, 1961), computers (see, among others Berndt and Griliches, 1990),
as well as air quality and environmental amenities, (for a survey, see Cropper and Oates, 1992). The underlying
objective of all these studies to regress commodity prices of a given commodity on various commodity characteristics
to estimate the buyer's marginal willingness to pay for each attribute are much in the same spirit of Waugh's
interpretation of his asparagus regressions. As the topic of my analysis is food demand, I focus here only on the
hedonic price studies of nondurable agricultural goods.
10This model is essentially a consumer goods counterpart to the model developed by Ladd and Martin (1976) to
study prices and demand for input characteristics.
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will meet the requirements of the rst stage. Researchers focus on the rst stage when estimating
the hedonic price function, since the "average" information on price, nutrient, and nonnutrient
food characteristics is adequate to estimate implicit values of characteristics. In this framework,
consumer choices for average price and nutrient content should be restricted to a convex feasible
set dened by the prices and nutrient contents of the individual market goods.
Lenz et al. (1991) use this framework to estimate the implicit values of protein, fat, and calcium
from dairy product retail prices. In their model, the marginal implicit values of these nutrients are
a function of household characteristics, i.e., households of dierent characteristics value dierent
nutrients dierently. Empirically, they nd that these implicit values dier depending on house-
hold characteristics such as age, occupation of the household head, education of the meal planner,
nutritional status of the household, and region and zone of domicile.
Shi and Price (1998) extend the framework of Lenz et al. (1994) by explicitly modeling the
nonnutrient food characteristics as a function of household characteristics. They estimate the
implicit values of nutrient and nonnutrient characteristics of breakfast cereals and the eects of
sociodemographic variables on these values. They used the 1987-88 household portion of the US
Department of Agriculture's nationwide food consumption survey data11.
Using the same notion that dierent households value the nutrient contents of food items dif-
ferently, Cook and Eastwood (1992) incorporate the issue of "subsistence" into the characteristics
demand framework. The interpretation of subsistence, as given originally by Samuelson (7 48),
is that a consumer needs minimum amount of goods, so utility is derived from the consumption
of goods over and above these subsistence levels. Similarly, in the Cook-Eastwood framework,
consumers need minimum amount of nutrients to survive, let alone to have healthier lives. These
subsistence levels are primarily attained through regular consumption of food. Utility arises from
the consumption of nutrients in excess of subsistence levels. Thus, Cook and Eastwood (1992) write
the utility function in terms of nutrients consumed above the subsistence level. This approach yields
hedonic price equations that can be consistent with declining marginal utilities of nutrients. Using
this framework, they estimate the hedonic price function and nutrient demands for three groups of
households: below the subsistence levels of all nutrients, below the subsistence level of at least one
nutrient but not all nutrients, and above the subsistence levels of all nutrients.
As the hedonic price theory does not provide any guidance on the functional form of the hedo-
nic price function, Stanley and Tschirhart (1991) estimate the hedonic model using the Box-Cox
transformation technique. However, Cassel and Mendelsohn (1985) list several reasons why it may
be inappropriate to use the Box-Cox technique: (i) this functional form does not necessarily yield
more accurate estimates of implicit prices of product characteristics, (ii) the nonlinear transforma-
tion leads to complex estimates of slopes and elasticities and makes it dicult to interpret results,
and (iii) the Box-Cox form usually leads to an increase in the number of parameters in the model,
and hence the eciency of the parameter estimates is reduced.
11Implicit values of characteristics of breakfast cereals was also estimated by Morgan (1987); Stanley and Tschirhart
(1991), among others.
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As Nerlove (1995) points out, while the hedonic price function provides implicit prices for prod-
uct characteristics, almost all these hedonic price analyses purport to view these implicit prices of
characteristics as consumers' valuation of these characteristics (i.e., the characteristics price ratio is
viewed to reect consumers' marginal rates of substitution among attributes). However, as Rosen
(1974) points out, it is problematic to regard implicit prices of characteristics as an indicator only
of consumers' valuation without considering the supply side. To the extent product characteristics
aect marginal utility as well as marginal costs, implicit prices derived from hedonic models char-
acterise equilibrium between supply and demand in the market for a product characteristics. This
is similar to the identication problem related to demand and supply functions as illustrated by
Working (1927). Price-quantity observations represent equilibria of demand and supply and only
under special circumstances can regressions of price on quantity or of quantity on price be used to
infer anything about the underlying supply and/or demand functions. Rosen argues that essentially
the same identication problem exists for hedonic price functions, where in general, the coecients
in the estimated hedonic regression reect both supply and demand considerations, both producers'
costs and consumers' preferences.
To overcome this identication problem, Rosen (1974) outlines a two-step procedure. In the
rst step, one needs to estimate the implicit prices of product characteristics by the usual hedonic
method, i.e., regressing observed dierentiated product prices on all their characteristics using
the best tting functional form, without regard to demand-side shifters (such as income, taste
variables) and supply-side shifters (such as, producers' characteristics, technological dierences
between producers etc.). In the second step, one needs to use the computed implicit marginal prices
of product characteristics (from the rst step) in the simultaneous estimation of market demand
and supply functions to trace out the supply and demand functions (involving usual demand-supply
function identication strategies).
Subsequently, Brown and Rosen (1982) argue that Rosen's original procedure is awed. The
implicit prices estimated in Rosen's rst-step cannot play the same role in estimation that direct
observations on the implicit prices would play if available. As the implicit prices in Rosen's rst-
step are created only from observed sample quantities, any new information that they may provide
can only come from a priori restrictions placed on the functional form of the price function. In the
absence of such restrictions, as Brown and Rosen demonstrate (with the example of a quadratic
hedonic price function), the second-stage structural estimation of the demand and supply functions
as suggested by Rosen may only reproduce the information already provided by the rst-stage
estimation of the price function.
As Brown and Rosen argue, a way-out from this problem, is to rst estimate the hedonic price
function separately for spatially distinct markets, and then to estimate the common structural
demand and supply functions for all the markets. By doing so, the price function would not only
depend on the common demand and supply vectors associated with the observations, but also upon
other market-specic factors. If one is then to impose the condition that the structural demand
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and supply parameters be identical across markets, even though the hedonic price loci are not,
the identication can be achieved12. One added advantage of this strategy, as Palmquist (1984)
noted, is that the hedonic regressions need not be arbitrarily restricted to be non-linear for demand
estimation.
Nerlove (1995) argues that, similar to Working's analysis, in hedonic analysis it may be possible
to identify the hedonic price function exclusively with factors reecting consumers preferences or
solely reecting costs of productions and supply conditions. As is well-known, if the quantity
supplied shifts exogenously independently of the shifts in the demand function, a regression of price
on quantity will estimate the price elasticity of demand (Schultz, 1938). Conversely, if prices are
exogenously determined such as in the world markets, for a small group of consumers purchasing
in a local market with supplies perfectly elastic at world prices, the regression of quantity on price
may arguably be used to estimate the demand elasticity (Stone, 1954).
Thus, as Nerlove (1995) discusses, there are two polar cases in which consumers' valuation of
attributes can be inferred from the hedonic price function. Polar case 1 is the situation in which
supplies of product varieties are exogenously determined. This is typically applied in the hedonic
price functions for environmental amenities, automobile options, or computer characteristics, in
which it is often argued that supplies are exogenously determined. Polar case 2 is the situation in
which product prices and their attributes may be taken as exogenous. Nerlove uses the polar case 2
set-up in estimating Swedish wine consumers' preferences for various wine attributes. His underlying
assumption is that the prices of dierent wine varieties are exogenous to Swedish consumers, and are
determined in the world market. He thus estimates consumers' valuation for dierent wine attributes
not from a hedonic price function13, but from a wine demand function for Swedish consumers (i.e.,
regressing quantity sold/purchased on exogenously determined prices of wine variety and dierent
wine attributes), whose tastes, arguably dier from those of the world market at large, and who
exert no appreciable inuence on prices. Nerlove further showes that estimates of implicit prices
of attributes obtained from wine demand function vary substantially from those obtained from the
hedonic price function.
5.3 Theoretical Framework
The underlying theoretical framework for my analysis is a food characteristics demand frame-
work grounded in the work of Lancaster (1966, 1971); Gorman (1980); Ladd and Suvannunt (1976),
among others. Unlike traditional consumer theory in which utility is derived from the commodity,
12Although they did not note it, Witte et al. (1979) applied this strategy by estimating hedonic price function
separately for four dierent cities. On the other hand, as an identication strategy, Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978)
imposed restrictions on the functional form of the price function. Epple (1987) provided a critical analysis of these
various identication strategies
13Notice that, the usual hedonic price regression in which unit variety prices are regressed on unit quality charac-
teristics can be carried out using the Swedish data, but the coecients in such regressions reect a mixture of world
consumers preferences and the world supply considerations.
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in this framework a consumer derives utility not from the commodity itself, but from the charac-
teristics that a commodity or a commodity bundle possesses.
So, suppose there are k dierent nutritional characteristics (such as energy, protein, minerals,
vitamins, etc.) and t dierent non-nutrient characteristics, such as taste, texture, aroma, smell,
etc. available in some or all food items from which a household derives utility. Generally, a food
item posseses more than one characteristics and many characteristics are shared by more than one
commodity. Let n be the total number of food items consumed by a household with both k  n
and t  n.
Let q1; q2; :::qn are the quantities of n dierent food items consumed by the household and
there corresponding market prices (per unit) are p1; p2; :::pn. I further assume that households are
price taker and do not have inuence on market prices of these commodities. Dierent nutritional
characteristics are available in xed amount in per unit of a food item. Let ajk be the amount of
nutrient k available in per unit of commodity j. Therefore, the total nutrient intake of a household
can be represented by the following equation:
z = Aq
where, z is a vector of k dierent nutrient intakes by the household, q is a vector of quantities
of n dierent commodities consumed by the household, and A is a matrix of nutrient contents
common to all consumers in which the entry ajk implies the amount of nutrient k available in one
unit of commodity j.
If food is weakly separable from nonfood, the household food consumption decision becomes:
(5.2) Max uf (z; t; c)
subject to the household budget constraint:
p0q  yf ;
z = Aq;
t = t(q);
where, uf (:) is the household subutility function for food in which c represents a vector of
household characteristics that accounts for dierences in utility functions across households, q is
a vector of quantities of dierent food items consumed by the household, t is a vector of non-
nutrient commodity specic characteristics such as taste, aroma, associated with some or all of
the food items14, p is a market price vector of dierent food items, and yf is the household food
expenditure.
14The objective function with commodity specic characteristics is based on, among others, the work of Prato and
Bagali (1976); Pudney (1981). As already discussed in the previous section, a number of studies involving traditional
consumer demand analysis framework also found evidence for people's preferences for non-nutrient characteristics of
food even at a low income level.
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Thus the Lagrangian for the household utility maximization becomes:
(5.3) L = uf (z; t; c)  (p0q  yf )
The rst-order necessary conditions for the maximization of (5.3) yields the hedonic price func-
tion which decomposes the price of a commodity into its implicit values of the characteristics:
(5.4) pj = [(
@uf
@zk
) 1]ajk + [(
@uf
@tj
) 1]bj
where,  is the marginal utility of food expenditures, (
@uf
@zk
) is a vector of marginal utility of k
nutrients, ajk =
@zk
@qj
is vector of nutrient contents per unit of food item j.
The term, [(
@uf
@zk
) 1] is a vector of marginal implicit prices of k nutrients. This is a vector of
monetized values of the marginal utilities with respect to the k nutrients as represented by the ratio
of the marginal utilities of the nutrients to the marginal utility of money (i.e., food expenditure).
Similarly, the term, [(
@uf
@tj
) 1] is a vector of marginal implicit prices of nonnutrient or commodity-
specic characteristics, and bj =
@tj
@qj
is a vector of nonnutrient contents per unit of commodity j.
Thus the term [(
@uf
@tj
) 1]bj represents value attributed to the characteristics specic to commodity
j, or in other words, represents the "food" eect. Equation 5.4 thus decomposes the market price
per unit of a food item into implicit market prices for characteristics.
Let  be the vector of implicit market prices of characteristics. Substituting these market prices
of characteristics into the market prices of commodities in the consumer budget constraint (using
equation 5.4), the rst order necessary conditions of the consumer utility maximization problem
also yield the household's demand equations for k nutrients:
(5.5) zk = f(yf ;; c)
Observations on market prices per unit of n dierent food items, on k dierent nutrients in per
unit of n dierent food items, and the usual information of household characteristics enable one to
empirically estimate both equations 5.4 and 5.5.
5.4 Data
I use the household survey data of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) as
used and discussed in the previous chapters. The data was collected from 47 villages located in
four dierent districts in rural Bangladesh15. Four rounds of surveys were conducted in every four
months between June 1996 and September 1997. The questionnaire was administered to about 5,541
individuals in 955 rural households in each round, and collected detailed information on household
15Bangladesh is divided into 6 divisions. A division is then divided into districts. A district is composed of several
thanas. Thanas are divided into unions. A union is composed of several villages.
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and individual characteristics including demography, agricultural production and other income-
earning activities, food and non-food expenditure, individual food intakes, health, education, and
morbidity status. As illustrated in Chapter 2, the basic summary statistics of the sample indicate
that the sample broadly represents the characteristics of the rural Bangladeshi households.
Two features of the survey are particularly useful for my analysis: household expenditure on a
wide range of food items, and individual intakes of these food items. As Deaton (1997) notes, in
developed countries almost all the identifying price variations in demand analysis come from price
changes over time, while in developing countries, in addition to intertemporal variation in prices
there is often spatial variations in prices that is not typically available in developed economies.
This is due to the absence of the highly developed infrastructure, transport and distribution system
in many developing countries. Moreover, lack of competition and fragmented agricultural input
markets for seeds, irrigation equipments, fertiliser, etc. also contribute to variation in agricultural
production costs in dierent geographical locations in many poor countries like Bangladesh. Thus,
the household surveys, such as the one used here, that collect information on the expenditure and
quantity purchased of dierent food items often provide a useful source of food price data in terms
of unit values.
Altogether, the IFPRI survey has information on household expenditure and quantity purchased
of more than 300 nely disaggregated food items in 47 villages. However, a great number of these
items are not consumed in all 47 villages and in all rounds, and also not by all households in the
same village in a given round. Eliminating those items that consumed by only a small number of
households in a few villages in a particular round, I am left with more than 100 dierent food items.
Based on the dietary pattern of the rural Bangladeshi households, these food items are then broadly
categorised into 17 dierent food groups: rice, wheat and wheat sources, other cereals, potatoes,
lentils, leafy green vegetables, other vegetables, fruits, meat, milk, egg, big sh, small sh, oil,
spices, sugar and sweets, and miscellaneous (which contains items like tea, betel leafs, etc.).
To analyse the spatial variation of food prices across villages, I rst calculate unit value of
each of the food items purchased by dierent households by dividing expenditure by the quantity
purchased. Then, following Deaton and Grimard (1992); Deaton et al. (1994), I run a regression
of the logarithm of unit value on dummies for each village for each of the 17 broadly dened food
groups. The F-tests and R2 statistics of these regressions are presented in the left panel of table
5.1. Obviously, a village drops out from this regression for a given food group or food item, if no
household in that village purchased that item at the time of the survey. The focus of investigation
here is whether or not there is the evidence that unit values are informative about prices. Since
prices should not vary much within villages in the short-run, there should be signicant F-statistics
for the village eects. As can be seen from table 5.1, the F-statistics are highly signicant for each
of the food groups. With the exception of potatoes, for all other relatively more homogeneous food
groups, such as rice, cereals, lentils, etc., the village eect explains 10-20% of the total variance in
the logarithms of unit values. One should also keep in mind that there is typically strong political
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pressure on the government to always equalise the prices of key food items, such as rice, potatoes16,
etc. in the country. Despite this, it appears that there is a signicant variation of prices of these
items across villages.
While for some of the more heterogenous food groups, such as vegetables, fruits, sh, meat, etc.,
the R2 statistic is very low, I nd relatively high R2 when I focus on specic food items within
each of these food groups commonly consumed in most of the villages. To illustrate this further,
the right panel of table 5.1 presents the F and R2 statistics for a few specic food items. While
the village eects explain about 18% of total variance of the logarithm of the unit values for the
leafy green vegetable group, for more common food items within this group, such as for cabbage
or palang-shak (a local variety of spinach), the village eects explain about 39% and 42% of the
total variance, respectively. Similarly, for the "other vegetable" group the R2 is very low while for
more specic food items within this group, such as bitter gourd, the village eects explain nearly
60% of the total variance of the logarithm of unit values. Similar phenomenon is evident for other
food groups as well. Thus, the results in this table provides indication that there is spatial price
variation for nely dened food items and that the variation in unit values provides a proxy to the
spatial variation in village prices17.
However, there are two problems associated with treating these unit values as village prices: the
choice of quality and measurement errors (Deaton, 1997). As unit values are computed by dividing
expenditures by physical quantity, high quality items or mixtures that have a relatively large share
of high quality items will have higher unit prices. Unlike market prices, over which the household
has no control, quality is chosen by the household. Consequently, a unit value is chosen to some
extent. Hence, there is a risk of a simultaneity bias if the unit values are used in a straightforward
way to explain the patterns of demand.
The severity of this bias depends on the size of the quality eects, which in turn can be assessed
by running regressions of the logarithm of unit value on the logarithm of total expenditure, house-
hold size and demographic composition. Since better-o households tend to buy higher-quality
goods, unit values will be positively related to incomes or total expenditure. Prais and Houthakker
(1955) rst estimated this type of regression to measure the expenditure elasticity of quality for
dierent food items consumed by the British households.
Ideally, such a regression function should also include market prices and in the absence of that
control for village eects. The analysis of Deaton and Grimard (1992) for Pakistan and Deaton
et al. (1994) for Maharashtra, India show modest quality elasticities for important cereal categories
(4-10%), but relatively high quality elasticity for heterogeneous meat category (15-18%) in rural
India and Pakistan. Based on these and the previous work of Deaton (1988, 1990), Deaton (1997)
16Dierent political regimes have made concerted eorts to encourage people to use potatoes as a key substitute
for rice
17I run the village eect regression for each food item and nd that for most of the common and widely consumed
food items across villages, the village eects explain a substantial share of total variance of the logarithm of unit
values.
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summarizes that the quality eects are real but modest and provides a method to control for quality
eect and measurement errors in estimating price elasticity of demand using unit values.
To assess the quality eect in IFPRI data, I run a similar regression of the following form
(equation 5.6), rst, for each of the food groups, and then for each of the nely disaggregated
food item as Deaton (1997) argues that ultimately the quality eect will be absent for a nely
disaggregated homogeneous food item:
(5.6) ln = 1 + 1lnx+ 2lnn+ c 3 +
X
v
vdv +
X
r
rtr + u1
where  is the unit value, x is the monthly per adult equivalent real household expenditure
(nominal expenditure deated by village rice price of a given round), n is the adult equivalent
household size, c is a vector of household characteristics, such as age, education, and occupation of
the household head and his/her spouse, d is the village dummy, t is the dummy for survey round,
and u1 is the error term. The coecient 1, which measures the expenditure elasticity of quality
for dierent food groups and specic food items are summarized in table 5.2.
I nd that the quality eect is not signicant for the important food groups that provide bulk
of the energy requirements for the rural households, such as, rice, wheat and wheat products,
potatoes, and lentils. For more heterogeneous food groups, such as sh and meat, the quality eect
is signicant but modest, while the eect is somewhat high for the milk group.
However, investigation of the quality eect for each of the nely disaggregated food item reveals
that these quality eects for milk, sh, meat, sugar (that includes also sweets), and other food
groups are primarily because of the bunching of a variety of heterogenous commodities under each
group. At a more disaggregated level, for most of the commonly consumed food items within each
of this food group, the quality eect is nonexistent. This is further illustrated in the right panel of
table 5.2. Among the broadly dened food groups, the expenditure elasticity of quality seems to be
highest for milk and milk products (17%). Disaggregating this category into the specic food items,
it appears that the quality elasticity is modest (only 2%) for unpasteurised cow milk and signicant
only at 10% level, while for the ice-cream, it is not signicant. Similarly, for the heterogenous meat
group, the quality elasticity is 3.5%, which is modest. But disaggregating this group into specic
meat types, i.e., beef, chicken, and mutton, it appears that the quality eect is nonexistent for any
of these food items. For the fruit group as well, for majority of the commonly consumed fruits,
such as, mango, papaya, guava, pineapple, etc. the quality eect is absent, while for a few fruits,
such as jackfruit, banana, and coconut, it is substantial. A similar phenomenon is seen in the sh
group (and also for most of the other groups, the results for which are not shown).
The absence of (or modest) quality eect for most of the widely consumed food items is consistent
with the phenomenon of lack of product dierentiation in rural markets due to lack of technological
advancement and the relatively underdeveloped agro-processing industry in the country. Typically,
most of the food items are purchased in raw, unrened, or unprocessed form from the local bazaar
(markets) for household cooking and food preparation purposes. Hence, while the beef and chicken
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are two dierent types of meat, it is the same raw beef or chicken that the households of dierent
income levels and in dierent villages purchased for consumption.
To proxy for village price for each of the nely disaggregated food items, I average the unit
values of a given food item consumed by all the households in a given village in a given round. This
averaging procedure is expected to minimise the measurement error in the data and eliminate any
potential quality eect (although as discussed above for most of the food items such an eect is
absent). The mean unit values at dierent villages in dierent rounds for a few key food items are
presented in gures 5.1 - 5.6.
These gures illustrate at least three points. First, even for primary staple rice, there is both
spatial variation in price across villages and seasonal variation within a particular village. For
instance, the minimum mean unit value of rice is Tk 8.5 in village 46 in round 1 while it is Tk
12.5 in village 6 in the same round. In terms of seasonality, for instance in village 3, the price per
kilogram drops by almost 42% between rounds 3 and 4. Second, compared with rice, the spatial
and seasonal variation is relatively higher for some other food items like sh, meat, and milk. In
round 1, the mean price of rice per kilogram across all the villages are about 10 taka with a standard
deviation of 0.88, while for instance that of chicken in the same round is Tk 76 with a standard
deviation of 12.5. Third, as the graphs show, the seasonal uctuation varies among villages, in
some villages it is more prominent than in others. Exploiting these features of the mean unit values
(proxy for village prices), I estimate the hedonic price function in the next section.
The other feature of the survey, which is used in previous chapters, is the individual food
intake data. As discussed in the previous chapters, the survey provides information on individuals'
food intakes. Using the Berkeley Food Composition Table, individual intakes of various foods are
converted into intakes of calories and its decomposition into macronutrients, i.e., protein, fat, and
carbohydrate, and into intakes of a set of micronutrients, vitamin a, vitamin c, vitamin d, niacin,
riboavin, thiamine, folate, iron, zinc, and calcium. While there are more nutrients in dierent
foods that are not brought into the analysis, the intakes of these nutrients are critical (as discussed
in chapter 1) and was also analysed in the previous literature, such as in Behrman and Deolalikar
(1990).
As many of the nutrients are present, albeit in dierent quantities in dierent foods, and as
an individual consumes dierent foods, the individual intake of dierent nutrients are correlated.
Table 5.3 provides the correlation matrix of individuals' nutrient intakes, in which the intake of
each individual nutrient is expressed as per unit of calorie. As is well-known, calorie is a linear
combination of three macronutrients: protein, fat, and carbohydrate18. A key nding from the
correlation matrix is that higher share of carbohydrate in one's total calorie intake appears to be
negatively correlated with two other macronutrients and the set of micronutrients. Among the
micronutrients, intakes of zinc, iron, and thiamine per unit of calorie also seem to be relatively
18Per gram of carbohydrate, fat, and protein roughly yield 4 kilocalorie (kcal), 9 kcal, and 4 kcal, respectively. In
this chapter, as in other literature, the calorie is loosely used as kilocalorie, i.e., 1 calorie=1kcal.
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highly correlated19.
In the next section, I further explore how responsive are individual intakes of various nutrients
with respect to the implicit price of nutrients after distilling out the so called food or product eect
in terms of taste, texture, aroma, etc.
5.5 Empirical Analysis
5.5.1 Hedonic Food Price Regression
Based on the above discussion related to various nutritive and non-nutritive characteristics of
a food item that may inuence people's demand for food, the rst step is to estimate the implicit
prices of nutrients by separating out the "food" eects, i.e., non-nutritive characteristics of a given
food item. This is done by estimating a hedonic price regression by regressing the logarithm of
mean village unit values of dierent food items on their nutritive characteristics, controlling for
the unobserved product eects through food dummies and unobserved village eect through village
dummies.
I follow an estimation strategy similar to Brown and Rosen (1982) as discussed in section 5.2.
Each village in a specic survey round is viewed as a spatially distinct market. Exploiting the
features of spatial variation in prices, combined that with the limited or no evidence of quality
eect, and averaging out the quality eect (if there is any) and the measurement error in the unit
values at the household level, I use the mean village-level unit value of a given food item as the
proxy for village price for that item. Using these proxy village prices for dierent food items in
dierent rounds, I identify the implicit nutrient prices in dierent villages at dierent time periods.
More specically, let V be a set of villages, J be a set of dierent food items and Cj be the
vector of all the nutrients embodied in per unit of food j where j 2 J. Let pj be the price of the
food item j 2 J is pj . We assume that 8j 2 J, pj is the same within a village v 2 V but it diers
across villages, i.e., 8j 2 J, pjvm 6= pjvn8m 6= n, and pjvm = pjvn8m = n.
Thus the hedonic price regression that I estimate is:
(5.7) lnpjvt = +Cjt +
47X
v=2
vtDvCj +
47X
v=2
vtDv +
109X
j=2
jtFj + ujt
where, t is the survey round, Dv is the village dummy, Fj is the food dummy controlling for the
food eect (the omitted food item is rice), and ujt is the random error term. The coecient vector
t provides the log of implicit price of nutrients in the omitted village at time t while the implicit
19As discussed in chapter 1, for some of the nutrients, such as protein and iron the sources matter a lot. For
instance protein from meat, egg, and milk are considered as high quality and highly digestible compared to the
protein from the plant sources such as from rice. Similarly, iron from animal sources, i.e., haem iron, get easily
absorbed in the body compared to iron (known as nonhaem iron) from plant sources. Such minute distinction for
these two nutrients, however, are not further pursued here. For the purpose of empirical analysis I also drop oil,
spices, and miscellaneous food categories as actual individual intakes of these items are hard to determine. These
are used as condiments to prepare the whole meal, which is then eaten by dierent members.
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prices of the nutrient vector in a village v at time t is : t + vt. Logarithm of the village level
mean unit values of dierent food items at dierent survey rounds, as calculated and discussed in
the preceding section, are used as the dependent variable in this regression function.
I rst estimate equation 5.7 to obtain the implicit price of calorie in dierent villages at dierent
rounds. The nutrient vector Cj becomes a scalar in this case representing total calorie per unit of
food j and t is the log price of per unit of calorie in village 1 at time t. Adding it to vt, I obtain
the calorie price in village v at time t.
The implicit price of calorie is important in its own right, particularly in a number of circum-
stances. First, assume a situation where people's demand for food is primarily driven by the need to
satiate hunger. Suppose, people demand food to satisfy their energy need and also to obtain plea-
sure from its non-nutritive attributes, such as taste or aroma. Second, coupled with this demand,
assume a situation where given the low literacy level within the household limits the knowledge
about the requirements of dierent nutrients, their availability in dierent food items, and their
usefulness for healthiness and wellbeing20. In these circumstance, the households do not primarily
consume food to full various nutritional requirements, but to satisfy the energy needs of its mem-
bers. However, in this process, the requirements for some of the nutrients, are (partially) fullled
by the consumption of the food items chosen to satiate hunger as typically a food item is embodied
with dierent nutrients albeit in dierent proportions. Third, there could be a situation in which
people are aware of the importance of various nutrients, but there are short-term and long-term
issues associated with satisfying dierent nutritional requirements. Hunger is of more immediate
concern, while satisfying the calcium requirement, for example, is a relatively longer term issue.
This is because the implication of going hungry is immediate, while it takes time for the bones
to weaken due to sustained deciency of calcium over a relatively longer period of time, among
other things. In all of these circumstances, the most important nutritive aspect of a food item is
its energy content. Hence, understanding the response of individuals' intakes of calorie and other
nutrients to the implicit price of calorie is important from the policy point of view.
After estimating the implicit calorie price, I then estimate the hedonic price regression for the
whole set of macro (by decomposing calorie intake into protein, carbohydrate, and fat) and micro
nutrients (i.e., vitamins and minerals) under consideration. Detailed estimates of these series of
hedonic price regressions are not presented to conserve space, but the correlation matrix of the
implicit price of dierent nutrients in the sample are presented in table 5.4.
20In other words, if a rural Bangladeshi were asked about the amount of riboavin or niacin contained in per unit
of rice or in beef, it would not be surprising if that person did not know what riboavin or niacin was, let alone the
amounts of these nutrients that could be found in rice or in meat. Although that could make the same mistake if the
same question was asked about the amount of calories in these food items, he or she would be well aware of how full
a stomach could be from a given quantity of rice, meat or vegetable. This is the attribute of the food item, which is
linked with its calorie content.
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5.5.2 Demand for Nutrients
In this subsection, I estimate the individual nutrient intake responses to implicit nutrient prices
in rural Bangladesh. The standard reduced form demand function in the literature is:
(5.8) lnqkihvt = a+ blnPvt + clnYhvt + dlnZhv + u
k
ihvt
where, qkihvt is the intake of nutrient k of individual i living in household h in village v at time
t, Pvt is a vector of village food prices at time t, Yhvt is the current or real per capita or per adult
equivalent household income, Zhv is a vector of observed time invariant household characteristics
and ukihvt is the error term. Equation 5.8 could be further augmented by including time dummies
to explore the eect of agricultural seasonality and/or village, household, and/or individual xed
eects to control for unobserved location, household, or individual specic eects, which could be
correlated with the village food prices, income and other household characteristics.
I dier from this conventional reduced form demand equation by replacing the food price vector,
Pvt with the implicit nutrient price vector,  vt, estimated in the previous subsection. This attempt
sheds light on to what extent individuals' demand for food are driven by the nutrient contents of
the food vis-a-vis the non-nutritive attributes. Thus the reduced form demand equation that I
estimate is:
(5.9) lnqkihvt =  +$ln vt + lnYhvt + #lnZhv + 
k
ihvt
As I have four rounds of data, in order to control for agricultural seasonality, I also include
round and site dummies in equation 5.9 and perform both the OLS and individual xed eect
(FE) estimates to control for unobserved individual specic characteristics that may otherwise
contaminate the income and price elasticities. Controlling for individual xed eects also controls
for any unobserved village and household xed eects. In terms of household characteristics, I
use (log of) per capita adult equivalent household expenditure deated by the village rice price
(measured by the mean unit value of rice in a given village) as a measure of real income, its square,
log of household landholding and site dummies and log of adult equivalent household size. Individual
characteristics include age and its square and a dummy equals 1 if the individual is female and zero
otherwise. However, households' landholdings, site dummies, and gender dummy drop out in the
FE estimate.
Nutrient Intakes and Implicit Calorie Price
I rst estimate individual nutrient intake response to implicit calorie price only for reasons
already discussed above. The village level implicit calorie price is deated by the village rice price
to obtain a measure of real price for calorie. Table 5.5 reports the elasticity estimates for calorie and
its disaggregation into the macronutrients, while table 5.6 reports the estimates for micronutrients.
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Overall, individual calorie and macronutrient intakes are statistically signicant but inelastic to
implicit calorie price. The calorie intake to calorie price elasticity is only -0.06 in FE estimate.
However, decomposing calories into specic macronutrients reveal that intakes of protein and fat
compared to carbohydrate although inelastic are relatively more responsive to calorie price than
the carbohydrate intakes. The responsiveness of fat intake is almost twice of that of protein intake
in FE estimate. Finally, as the column (9)-(14) show, an individual's calorie composition changes
with the increase in calorie price. As price increases, the share of protein and fat in one's calorie
intake declines (with fat more than protein) while the share of carbohydrate increases implying
carbohydrate as a cheaper source of calorie than the two other macronutrients.
As far as the other variables are concerned, individuals' consumption of calories and each of the
macronutrients increases with household income at the lower level of income, and then at a higher
income level these consumptions tend to decline with the increase in income. In terms of calorie
composition, intakes of protein and fat increase while carbohydrate decline with the increase in
income at the low income level. Also, females (controlling for age) tend to have less calories and
the macronutrients than males.
None of the calorie price elasticities are greater than one for individuals' micronutrient con-
sumption either although some of the micronutrient intakes, such as, vitamin A, vitamin C, and
calcium, appear to be relatively more responsive to calorie price than the others. I estimate both
OLS and FE models using log of micronutrient intake as a share of calorie as the dependent variable
but to conserve space I only report the FE estimates (table 5.6). For most of the micronutrients,
the magnitude of both price and income elasticities are considerably lower in FE estimate com-
pared to the corresponding OLS estimates after eliminating unobserved location, household, and
individual specic eects. Nonetheless, compared with the calorie price responsiveness of calorie
and macronutrient intakes as a share of calorie, the magnitude of the price responsiveness of these
three micronutrient intakes are still higher. This is consistent with the dierent situations discussed
above in which calorie, and thus macronutrient consumption, becomes more important to satiate
hunger than meeting the micronutrient requirements either due to people's limited knowledge about
micronutrients and/or the relatively longer term nature of the impact of lack of micronutrient con-
sumption compared with the more immediate pain of hunger. On the other hand, a reduction in
calorie price (and micronutrient prices as discussed below) can inuence higher intakes of some of
these critical micronutrients implying price mechanism as a key policy lever to address malnutrition
issues.
In terms of income elasticity, vitamin D appears to be highly (positively) elastic at the lower
level of income. Although inelastic, vitamin A and C also appear to be sizeably responsive to
income at the lower level.
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Nutrient Intakes and Implicit Macro and Micro Nutrient Prices
After exploring the aggregate calorie price elasticity, I analyse the responsiveness of total calorie
and macronutrient intakes to implicit macronutrient prices, and the responsiveness of micronutrient
intakes to micronutrient prices21. As presented in table 5.7, focusing on FE estimate, I nd that total
calorie intake is negatively associated with the increase in protein price (an elasticity of -0.28) and
fat price (an elasticity of -0.81), while the calorie intake has high positive elasticity with respect
to carbohydrate price. This implies that protein and fat (particularly, protein) are substituted
for carbohydrate when the price of carbohydrate increases while when the price of protein and fat
increases consumption of carbohydrate tends to decline with decreased protein and fat consumption.
Altogether, this implies people's preference for protein over carbohydrate consumption.
This is further evident from the responsiveness of the absolute intakes of these three nutrients to
nutrient prices. As the table shows, individual protein intake is negative and inelastic to the increase
in protein price, closer to unitary elasticity with respect to fat price, and highly elastic (positively)
to carbohydrate price. Fat intake is elastic (negative) both to own fat price and to protein price,
while the eect with respect to carbohydrate price although substantial not statistically signicant.
Conversely, the own price elasticity of carbohydrate intake is not statistically signicant, while the
intake of carbohydrate is negatively associated with the increase in protein and fat prices. As a share
of total calorie, the own price elasticity for any of these three nutrients are not signicant. However,
protein intake as a share of total calorie is highly elastic (positive) with respect to carbohydrate
price, while carbohydrate intake as a share of total calorie is highly inelastic albeit positive with
respect to protein price. Fat intake as a share of total calorie is negatively associated with both
protein (the elasticity is close to unity) and carbohydrate price (highly elastic).
While I estimate both OLS and FE models to investigate micronutrient intake responses to
micronutrient prices, to conserve space I summarise the FE results as the unobserved location,
household, and individual eects may contaminate the OLS estimates anyway (table 5.8). The
intakes are expressed as a share of calorie intake. The own price elasticity of vitamin A and calcium
intake seem highly elastic (negative). While the own price elasticity of vitamin A is substantial,
it is not signicant. For a number of micronutrients, the cross price eects are highly elastic and
signicant. For instance, the intakes of vitamin C and calcium are highly (negatively) elastic with
respect to vitamin A price, while the intakes of niacin, thiamin, and zinc are highly (positively)
elastic with vitamin A price. Intakes of a series of critical nutrients, such as vitamin A, niacin,
riboavin, thiamin, and calcium are also highly (negatively) elastic to vitamin C price. In addition
to highly elastic and negative own price eect of folate and calcium, the prices of these nutrients
negatively aect the intakes of a number of other nutrients, and these eects are highly elastic.
Finally, even though inelastic, both the own and cross-price elasticities are sizeable for a number of
21Unlike the case of calorie price, I do not deate the nutrient prices by the village rice price, but control for the
village rice price in the regressions. This is because deating the nutrient prices by rice price creates a very high degree
of collinearity among a large number of nutrient prices, which in turn could create the problem of multicollinearity
by controlling for the set of highly collinear prices in the same regressions
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other nutrients as can be seen from table 5.8.
Nutrient Intake Behaviour of Poor and Non-Poor Households
A key topic of investigation in past food demand literature, as discussed in section 5.2, was
whether or not the poor are more responsive than the non-poor to food price changes. In the esti-
mates presented in the previous subsection, it appears that nutrient consumption is more responsive
at a relatively lower level of income. In this subsection, I analyse the nutrient intake behaviour
of individuals of poor and non-poor households by estimating equation 5.9 separately for each of
these groups by OLS and FE methods. Based on the direct calorie intake method of poverty line,
households are classied as poor in any given round if their per capita calorie consumption in that
round is below 2122 kcal. As I now split the sample between poor and non-poor group, I no longer
control for the square of the household per capita expenditure in the regression. For any given nu-
trient intake, the pattern of the dierence between poor's and non-poor's response to price, income,
and other control variables is broadly similar between OLS and FE estimates. To conserve space,
I only report the FE estimates.
Although inelastic with respect to calorie price, the poor's intakes of protein and fat (with fat
more than protein) are more responsive to price than the non-poor's intakes of these macronutrients
(table 5.9). With the increase in calorie price, the poor's share of protein and fat as a share of
total calorie decline more than the corresponding share of these nutrients in total calorie intake of
the non-poor people. For instance, a 100% increase in calorie price will lead to a 12% decline in
protein share in the total calorie for the poor, while the corresponding decline will be only 5% for
the non-poor. The magnitude of dierence is even higher for the fat consumption where the poor's
price elasticity is more than three times higher than that of the non-poor. Thus the pattern of price
responsiveness suggest that both poor and non-poor households will consume less protein and fat
and slightly more carbohydrate due to increase in calorie price while these magnitudes of decline
in protein and fat and the increase in carbohydrate (as share of total calorie) are higher for poor
people compared to non-poor. Conversely, the non-poor's income elasticity of these intakes (both in
absolute quantities and as shares of total calorie) are higher compared to that of the poor implying
that particularly to impact the macronutrient consumption of the poor people, the price-subsidy
will be a more eective instrument than the overall income enhancing policies.
For all the micronutrients (expressed as share of calorie intake), the poor's intakes are more
responsive to calorie price than that of the non-poor (table 5.11). With the exception of vitamin
D that has a positive elasticity, for all other micronutrients, the calorie price elasticity is negative
and sizeable although inelastic. For instance, the poor's calorie price elasticity for vitamin C intake
(-0.49) is 2.5 times as much as that of the non-poor's, while the poor's price elasticity for riboavin
is almost four times as much as the corresponding elasticity of the non-poor people. Moreover, all
the calorie price elasticities are statistically signicant for the poor, while some of these are not
signicant for the non-poor group.
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Using implicit macronutrient prices instead of calorie price (table 5.12), I nd that compared
with the non-poor, the poor's total calorie intake is more responsive and negatively aected by the
increase in protein and fat prices. Conversely, the non-poor's total calorie increases with the increase
in carbohydrate price (and this eect is highly elastic). This implies the non-poor's substitution
of carbohydrate for protein and fat as the carbohydrate price increases. With the increase in
carbohydrate price, the consumption of protein in absolute terms increases more for the non-poor
than for the poor, while protein as a share of total calorie increases more for the poor than for the
non-poor. This implies relatively lower total calorie intake in absolute terms for the poor compared
to the non-poor, which is already illustrated in chapter 3. All these eects are highly elastic for
both groups. In terms of own-price elasticity, only the fat price is statistically signicant for both
poor and non-poor groups. For the poor, it is elastic while for the non-poor, it is inelastic but still
of sizeable magnitude.
In terms of own price elasticity of micronutrient intakes, the poor's intakes of vitamin A, vitamin
C and calcium are highly elastic and more responsive compared with the corresponding intakes of the
non-poor (table 5.14). Prices of these nutrients and that of the folate also seem to very substantially
and signicantly aect the intakes of several other nutrients particularly for the poor. Although the
own price response is sizeable but inelastic for a number of nutrients, such as iron, both the own
and cross-price elasticity of some of these nutrients are also substantial in magnitude, particularly
for the poor.
Overall, for a large number of nutrients, the poor's responsiveness to prices are much larger than
that of the non-poor. These ndings have signicant policy implications in terms of price-subsidy
of nutrients in developing countries.
5.6 Summary and Conclusion
The ndings of the past literature on food demand analysis were mixed. Some studies claim
relatively high price elasticity of calorie and other nutrient intakes to food price changes while
others view the opposite. Given that people typically consumes hundreds of dierent food items,
which are motivated by the nutritive and non-nutritive attributes, controlling for the prices of a
few basic food items (as done in many of the studies) may not necessarily provide a good picture
of the nutrient intake behaviour of the people.
Using implicit nutrient prices, I nd that calorie, macronutrients, and a set of micronutrients are
inelastic in response to implicit calorie price. In terms of the broad order of magnitude, calorie is
the most inelastic, followed by the macronutrients, and the micronutrients. Therefore, if alleviating
hunger is a key priority of the government, the scope of addressing this issue by subsidizing prices of
calorie-dense food items may be limited. This is particularly because for both poor and non-poor,
the calorie intake is highly inelastic to implicit calorie price. Conversely, an increase in the prices
of carbohydrate-dense food items (which are basically staples in many developing countries like
Bangladesh), ceteris paribus, may have some benecial impacts of people's consumption of protein
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(although mainly for the non-poor) and a range of micronutrients as higher share of carbohydrates in
total calorie is also negatively associated with the share of protein, fat, and the set of micronutrients
considered here in individuals' calorie intakes.
More than its impact on calorie, a decrease in calorie-price, however, will have limited but
positive impact on people's consumption of a range of micronutrients. Although inelastic, the
magnitude of calorie price elasticity for the micronutrient intakes is relatively higher than the
calorie intake itself. Moreover, both in terms of macronutrients and micronutrients, the poor's
intakes while broadly inelastic are nonetheless more responsive to calorie price than the intakes
of the non-poor. Therefore, calorie price subsidy will have relatively more benecial eect on the
poorer segment of the population in Bangladesh.
In contrast with calorie price, peoples' micronutrient intakes are highly elastic to micronutrient
prices, and for a number of critical micronutrients, such as vitamin A, vitamin C, and calcium, the
poor have higher own price elasticities compared to non-poor. Furthermore, for these and some
other micronutrients the cross-price elasticities are also highly elastic and higher for poor than
non-poor.
Altogether this imply that the conventional way of addressing people's hunger and nutrition
needs by typically subsidising one or two key staples need to be revisited. Moreover, in light of
growing micronutrient malnutrition problem, food policy needs to be revisited not only in light of
hunger but also in light of meeting people's micronutrient needs. And in this connection, as the
results of this paper imply, price policy of a wide variety of food items rich in dierent micronutrients
can play an important role to meet people's, particularly poor people's nutritional need and well-
being. Obviously, in this connection, awareness also need to be built around on the importance of
various nutrients in diet and their usefulness for health and wellbeing.
Finally, beyond the price subsidy policy, people's responsiveness to dierent micronutrients and
cross-price eects of the macronutrients suggest agricultural marketing potential of various nutrient-
dense as opposed to calorie or carbohydrate-dense food items in rural Bangladesh in the long run.
With technological advancement and further development of food-processing industry, which should
increase competition and thus increased availability of nutrient-rich processed food items at lower
prices. This will eventually enhance the market mechanism to meet people's nutritional needs
and eventually reduce the role of the government's price subsidy policies to address nutritional
requirement of the people.
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Figure 5.1: Unit Value of Rice across Villages and Rounds
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Figure 5.2: Unit Value of Potato across Villages and Rounds
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Figure 5.3: Unit Value of Lentil (Khesari) across Villages and Rounds
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Figure 5.4: Unit Value of Carp (Rui Fish) across Villages and Rounds
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Figure 5.5: Unit Value of Beef across Villages and Rounds
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Figure 5.6: Unit Value of Cow Milk across Villages and Rounds
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Table 5.1: Variation in Log Unit Values of Foods in Rural Bangladesh
Food Group Analysis of Variance
F Prob > F R2
Rice 3.25 0.00 0.14
Wheat 1.73 0.01 0.19
Other cereals 2.87 0.00 0.14
Lentils 5.66 0.00 0.10
Potato 2.61 0.06
Leafy Green Vegetables 7.48 0.00 0.18
Other vegetables 3.47 0.00 0.01
Fruits 2.06 0.00 0.02
Big sh 3.69 0.00 0.05
Small Fish 6.77 0.00 0.06
Meat 1.93 0.00 0.04
Egg 2.01 0.00 0.09
Milk 12.42 0.00 0.35
Oil 2.65 0.00 0.04
Sugar and sweets 12.42 0.00 0.10
Spices 13.03 0.00 0.05
Other 24.59 0.00 0.13
Individual Food Food Group Analysis of Variance
F Prob > F R2
Flour Wheat 1.67 0.02 0.30
Cabbage Leafy green vegetables 4.29 0.00 0.39
Lal shak Leafy green vegetables 2.07 0.00 0.27
Palang-Shak Leafy green vegetables 3.18 0.00 0.42
Pui shak Leafy green vegetables 5.49 0.00 0.37
Chichinga Other vegetables 3.29 0.00 0.55
Cauliower Other vegetables 4.09 0.00 0.47
Bitter Gourd Other vegetables 21.94 0.00 0.59
Lau Other vegetables 1.91 0.00 0.22
Radish Other vegetables 3.37 0.00 0.25
Patal Other vegetables 8.50 0.00 0.37
Jack fruit Fruits 2.65 0.00 0.23
Orange Fruits 4.77 0.00 0.49
Hilsha Big sh 3.67 0.00 0.20
Silver carp Big sh 4.40 0.00 0.21
Chapila Small sh 1.62 0.05 0.34
Shrimp Small sh 3.95 0.00 0.28
Beef Meat 5.98 0.00 0.18
Chicken Meat 2.15 0.00 0.20
Mutton Meat 9.36 0.00 0.54
Duck egg Egg 4.72 0.00 0.45
Cow milk Milk 30.87 0.00 0.61
Dalda Oil 1.78 0.01 0.23
Dried Chili Spices 26.37 0.00 0.43
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Table 5.2: Expenditure Elasticity of Quality in Rural Bangladesh
Dependent Variable: Log Unit Value
Food group ln x S.E. Food group Food Items ln x S.E.
Rice 0.026 [0.019] Milk Cow milk 0.021* [0.011]
Wheat 0.181 [0.114] Milk Ice cream 0.024 [0.107]
Other Cereals 0.097 [0.099] Fruits Mango 0.093 [0.077]
Lentils 0.006 [0.013] Fruits Banana 0.121** [0.051]
Potato 0.001 [0.010] Fruits Papaya -0.030 [0.438]
Leafy green vegetables 0.046 [0.030] Fruits Orange 0.026 [0.098]
Other vegetables 0.019* [0.011] Fruits Apple -0.143 [0.207]
Fruits 0.110** [0.048] Fruits Coconut 0.091** [0.040]
Big sh 0.068*** [0.020] Fruits Jack Fruit 0.262*** [0.099]
Small Fish 0.042** [0.020] Fruits Grapefruit 0.085 [0.423]
Meat 0.035* [0.019] Fruits Grapes 0.095 [0.148]
Egg -0.025 [0.046] Fruits Lemon 0.002 [0.169]
Milk 0.170*** [0.054] Fruits Pineapple 0.058 [0.071]
Oil 0.001 [0.011] Fruits Guava 0.038 [0.202]
Sugar 0.093** [0.037] Fruits Ambada -0.486 [0.376]
Spices 0.087*** [0.020] Fruits Date 0.001 [0.062]
Other 0.014 [0.042] Fruits Olive -0.114 [0.369]
Meat Beef -0.002 [0.007]
Meat Chicken 0.016 [0.034]
Meat Mutton 0.017 [0.017]
Meat Pigeon -0.207 [0.211]
Meat Duck 0.065 [0.403]
Big Fish Rui 0.053 [0.047]
Big Fish Mrigel 0.017 [0.076]
Big Fish Katal 0.475 [0.448]
Big Fish Hilsha 0.042 [0.031]
Big Fish Silver Carp 0.063** [0.032]
Big Fish Tilapia 0.025 [0.048]
Big Fish Saulted Hilsha -0.043 [0.037]
Big Fish Carfu 0.071 [0.335]
Big Fish Ritha -0.045 [0.148]
Heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors allowing for correlation among observations
of the same household in dierent rounds are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
For description of additional controls see section 6.2.
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CHAPTER VI
Household Structure and Child Outcomes: Nuclear vs.
Extended Families { Evidence from Bangladesh
Abstract: The nuclear family has long characterized the European family. In Asia, by contrast, the
extended family has been the norm. A potentially important dierence between these family forms is the
allocation of headship: vested in a child's father in the nuclear family, but in the child's grandfather in the
extended family. This chapter utilises the fact that extended families eventually convert to nuclear families
on the death of the grandfather. Treating the death of the patriarch as an exogenous event, we ask if
children are better o in nuclear than extended families. A reason this might be the case is that the father
is more likely to be around when the child reaches adulthood and therefore better positioned to benet from
investments made in the child's human capital, than the grandfather. On the other hand, extended families
may provide better household public goods. We analyze household survey data from Bangladesh and focus
on education and health outcomes. We nd child education, but not height-for-age, to be substantially
better in nuclear families. These ndings are consistent with children in nuclear families benetting from
privileged provision of private goods, but suering from lower levels of household public goods, compared
to children in extended families. We provide both OLS and 2SLS estimates of the eects.
6.1 Introduction
The nuclear family has long characterized the \European family" (Goody, 1983). In Asia,
by contrast, the extended family has been the norm. As the terms suggest, the demographic
composition typically diers between these families, but need not. A nuclear family may well
contain grandparents and other family members. Instead, a potentially important, but largely
ignored, dierence may lie in the allocation of headship: a nuclear family is headed by the child's
father, whereas an extended family is headed by the grandfather. While the extended family is
commonly viewed as a family form that ensures support of the elderly by their adult children, little
is known about its eect on child wellbeing, the focus of this chapter.
This is an important question in the context of a developing country, where a great number of
children live under the rubric of the extended family for at least a part of their childhood. This
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chapter investigates whether and how household type, headship in particular, matters for children's
health and education outcomes in rural Bangladesh using household survey data collected by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 1996-97.
Why would allocation of headship matter? Edlund and Lagerlof (2002) argued that since a
child's father may expect to live longer than its grandfather, the father may have a greater interest
in the human capital of the child than the grandfather. Biologically motivated altruism may be
another reason why parents would devote more resources to their children than grandparents to
grandchildren. Still, sucient altruism or capital markets may render headship immaterial. Yet
another possibility is that the extended-family system has evolved precisely because it is conducive
to investments in child human capital.
We focus on child education and health. Both are important contributors to child human capital
but capture dierent mechanisms. The former is an example of a private good, while the latter is
produced by a combination of private goods (e.g., food intake, medication) and household public
goods (e.g., quarters). Following Edlund and Lagerlof (2002), we hypothesize that outcomes that
are particularly related to private goods allocation towards children, such as education, are better
in families where the father (instead of the grandfather) is the head. By contrast, headship may not
matter for child outcomes related to household public goods, such as health. If a household public
good, individual health outcomes may be determined by household wealth, not by who controls
resources. Thus, to the extent that extended families are wealthier, child health may be better in
those.
We nd that, beyond age 10, children in nuclear families tend to have higher levels of education
than their counterparts in extended families, controlling for household composition, wealth and
parental education. By contrast, nuclear families are not associated with better health outcomes
for children, a result we believe may derive from health being a household public good, as just
mentioned. We provide both OLS and 2SLS estimates. Both are motivated by the social norms
governing household formation in Bangladesh.
In Bangladesh, there is a strong presumption that adult sons continue to live under the headship
of their father until the latter's death, e.g., Amin (1996), also Foster (1993).1 Thus, children whose
(paternal) grandfather has passed away live under the headship of their father, while children whose
grandfather is alive are likely to live under his headship. This motivates the identifying assumption
for our OLS estimates: social norms in combination with mortality results in exogenous variation
in a child's exposure to extended and nuclear households.
However, we remain mindful of the potential endogeneity of household form. Although pre-
scribed, not all adult sons co-reside with their fathers. Crowding and disagreements may mar the
extended family, and the strain is likely to be particularly pronounced if there are several adult
sons. In that case, the solution may be a household partition, by which an adult son leaves the
extended family to head his own nuclear family, e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig (2002). Therefore, we
1A phenomenon well-reected in our data as well.
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also present 2SLS estimates where we instrument for household form using information on the fa-
ther's birth family: father's birth order, number of brothers of father, whether grandfather is alive,
whether grandmother is alive, whether father or his parents' choose the bride for father, father's
age at marriage, father's age when grandfather's land was divided, number of brothers of father
who inherited grandfather's land, a dummy for natural disaster; and their interactions.
These instruments are variables that we believe can be assumed to have rst order eects on
household type in Bangladesh, but not on child health or education outcomes. If the grandfather is
alive, then it is more likely that the child will be in extended households. This is particularly likely if
the father has few brothers. In the case of a partitioning prior to the death of the grandfather, birth
order may inuence who remains with the extended household and who branches o. Partitioning of
grandfather's land leads to formation of individual families of his sons and more so if the partitioning
happens after his death.
Individual consent in marriage was introduced in Europe in the Middle Ages while outside the
Western world, arranged marriages prevailed well into the 20th century, and still is the predominant
marriage form in South Asia, the Middle East and parts of Africa. Parental consent and extended
families remain important features of marriage in Bangladesh. Headship with the grandfather until
his death (extended families) is the characteristic of societies in which marriage is by parental
consent. On the other hand, headship with the father of dependent children (nuclear families) may
be linked to individual consent in marriage (see e.g., Edlund and Lagerlof (2002)). Hence, if the
father choose his bride and particularly in the absence of the patriarch (i.e., upon grandfather's
death), this provides indication of the formation of his own family. Finally, natural disaster can be
an external shock that can cause death, dislocation, and thus breaking up of an extended family.
One of the three survey sites in our sample, i.e., Saturia thana of Manikganj district, was hit by
one of the deadliest tornado in 1989 that killed about 1300 people (Sarker and Ferdousi, 2004).
Geographically, this survey site compared to the other two is also more prone to natural disasters,
such as tornado and ood and indeed later on in 1999 some of the villages of this site were devastated
by ood. We thus also use a natural disaster dummy to instrument for family types.
We, however, are concerned about the suitability of a number of our instruments, particularly,
the father's birth order, his number of brothers, and whether or not the grandfather and grand-
mother are alive. A father's birth order may inuence his family's investment on his human capital,
and his human capital is linked with his children's human capital. However, this may be less of a
critical issue as we control for the eect of a father's human capital on his children's by controlling
for father's education in the regression. A father's brothers may also aect a child's human capital.
However, the literature in the context of Bangladesh suggests that, it is typically a mother's brothers
who can positively aect her children's human capital through nancial support, and in exchange
the mother might give up her share of inheritance from her parental family for her brothers at the
time of her marriage (Hallman, 2003).
Being mindful of these concerns, we undertake redundancy test of these instruments in 2SLS es-
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timation, and the test results are strongly in support of the validity of these instruments particularly
in modeling children's education.
The chapter, however, has its limitations. Our argument that a child's health is relatively
sensitive to household public good and education is not may be invalid as there are also private
good elements to health and public good elements to education. A child's height could be inuenced
by growth nutrients through food allocation, while education can be inuenced by a household's
electricity access and quietness level. Extended families may also enjoy greater economies of scales
being bigger in size and thus could provide for more supervised learning. In future work, we attempt
to explore the relative contributions of some of these public vis-a-vis private good elements to a
child's health and education in this dataset.
Also, while our focus is on public vs private good aspect of inputs to a child human capital, there
could be also a public vs private good aspect of returns from that human capital. For example,
failing to invest in a child's health could make her more prone to infectious diseases, which in turn
could infect other members of the household and aect their earnings because of their own sickness
or because they now need to take care of the sick child. If parents are aware of market returns to
education but not this type of public good returns from health, then they may favour investing in
education over health. Also, in an agrarian economy characterised by manual labour, productivity
return from health might be more relevant than that from education, so it is not obvious why
nuclear families would invest in education but not in a child's health. All these motivate further
exploration of household behaviour regarding investment in children's human capital, which we
attempt to do in our future work.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related
literature. Section 6.2 presents the empirical analysis, and Section 6.3 concludes.
6.1.1 Related literature
This chapter is in the tradition of the literature on bargaining power and intra-family allocation
provoked by the suggestion of the former's irrelevance for the latter by Becker (1974). Bourguignon
et al. (1994) proposed an alternative framework that allows for the intra-family income distribution
to aect the allocation of consumption, subject to the outcome being ecient; and there is a growing
empirical literature that documents the importance of bargaining power for intra-household resource
allocation (e.g., Altonji et al. (1992); Lundberg et al. (1997); and Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003)).
Note that human capital may be viewed as an investment rather than consumption. Therefore
dierent levels of education may represent not only dierent points on the utility frontier, but
dierent frontiers.2
A related strand of literature concerns family form and old age support. In South Asia, the
extended family is widely viewed as a vehicle for old age support, e.g., Kochar (2000). However,
2Thus, a lower human capital investments achieved under, say, the grandfather's headship can still be Pareto
ecient, since he is less likely to be around when the children reach adulthood.
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at least theoretically, support of the elderly need not be premised on the allocation of headship
or the living arrangement. For instance, prime-age men may support their fathers (co-residing or
not) lest failure to do so would result in their own children refusing to support them in turn, as
proposed by Ehrlich and Lui (1991). While the extended family may provide for the elderly, and
result in higher provision of public goods (suggested by, e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig (2002)) the
consequences for human capital investments in children have received relatively little attention (an
exception is Foster (1993)).
The papers most closely related to ours are Foster (1993) and Joshi and Sinha (2004). In line
with our hypothesis, Foster (1993) found that within an extended family, children to the household
head did better, education-wise, than grand-children. Joshi and Sinha (2004) found that children
in a household that had partitioned did worse than the children who remained in the originating
household. If partitioning is more likely on the death of the patriarch (suggested by our data, and
Foster (1993)), their ndings are consistent with this chapter's. That is, children's doing better in
the original family may come o headship having passed from the child's grandfather to its father.
Both Foster (1993) and Joshi and Sinha (2004) were primarily concerned with household partitions.
By contrast, this chapter focusses on the devolution of headship. While correlated, these are not
synonymous events, further elaborated on below.
The prototypical household under the extended-family system goes through a life-cycle (for
references see Foster (1993)) that can be illustrated by the following example. A patriarch has two
adult sons. The sons marry and form families. These families may continue to co-reside with the
patriarch, or form their own households. Typically, at least one son stays with the patriarch, and
inherits headship on the patriarch's death. If a son does not inherit headship, but acquires headship
by forming his own household (possibly in the same bari (compound)), this is a household partition.
Hence, a son may head a household as the result of a partition or the passing of his father. The
patriarch may also voluntarily cede headship in old-age, although this is rare (as is female headship
in the presence of an adult male family member). The nuclear households of the two sons remain
nuclear until their sons, in turn, take wives, and the cycle repeats itself. Thus, the extended-family
system gives rise to both extended and nuclear families, and, consequently, dependent children may
live under the headship of their grandfather or their father.
6.2 Empirical investigation
We use household survey data collected by the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) in rural Bangladesh. The survey was conducted every four months from June 1996 to
September 1997 (four rounds) in 47 villages from three sites: Saturia, Jessore and Mymensing.
The questionnaire was administered to 5,541 individuals in 955 rural households in each round.
We restrict our analysis to Muslim households that were male-headed and monogamous (the over-
whelming majority) with children 16 years or younger.
Our outcome variables are height-for-age and class completed. Both capture important aspects
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of a child's current and future well-being and productivity. Height-for-age is a composite measure
of the child's nutritional status and morbidity. It is particularly meaningful for children of young
age, and therefore we restrict attention to children aged 0-10 years. An advantage of this measure is
that it is robust to transitory spells of disease or seasonality in diet (unlike, e.g., weight-for-height).
However, health is likely to partly be a household public good (for instance, from shared quarters or
relatedness). Height-for-age was collected in all four rounds, and we have about 3,778 child-round
observations.
A, for our purposes, useful feature of education is that it is a private good, and thus reects
resources intentionally directed to the child.3 We measure education by class completed. This
measure is only meaningful for children aged 6-16 years. This variable was collected once for each
individual, and we have about 1,297 observations.
We conceptualize the family as potentially consisting of dependent children, their parents and
grandparents. Unless otherwise specied, the terms parent and grandparent indicate relationship
to child, where we dene child to be an individual who is no more than 16 years old, is not a parent
himself/herself, and still resides with his or her birth family. Grandparents in our data are paternal.
The terms grandfather and patriarch will be used interchangeably, as will the terms household and
family.
We classify families according to headship and demographic composition. Nuclear families are
headed by the father and extended families are headed by the grandfather. Among, nuclear families,
we distinguish between those with and without co-residing grandparents (chiey grandmothers),
nuclearw and nuclearw=o respectively4. Hence, in terms of demographics, extended and nuclearw
families are similar, whereas with respect to headship, the nuclearw=o and nuclearw families are
equivalent.
The majority (68 percent) of our households are nuclearw=o. Nuclearw and extended families
make up 10 and 22 percent, respectively.5 The distribution of children across family types essentially
mirrors the above, see Table (6.1).
6.2.1 Household type and its correlates
This section examines the data in order to provide a picture of the in-sample evidence of a
household life-cycle and/or other factors inuencing household formation, in order to gauge the
likely direction of any selection or omitted variable bias.
We nd that our sample households exhibit characteristics largely consistent with a life-cycle of
households dictated by the social norms described earlier. To the extent that household types are
3Schooling is not compulsory in Bangladesh.
4If the head is the grandfather of some but the father of other children (in the household), we classify this as an
extended family. Similarly, while in an extended family parents of the grandfather may present in the household, in
the data we have only 10 such households and we drop them from the analysis. There is also no household in the
sample which a child's great grandfather is the head.
5The high fraction of nuclear households is consistent with the ndings of other studies in South Asia, e.g.,
Caldwell et al. (1984); Niranjan et al. (1998).
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systematically dierent in terms of wealth or parental education, the nuclear families, nuclearw=o
families in particular, appear poorer along a number of dimensions, which arguably works against
nding support for our hypothesis that child outcomes are better in nuclear families.
Demographic characteristics by household type Table (6.2) presents descriptive statistics
(means) of the household heads, adult sons, spouses and parents, by households types. Average
age of parents in nuclearw=o and nuclearw are similar.6 This suggests that nuclearw=o families
do not form solely from the passing of non-head grandparents (given the substantial spousal age
gap, widowers are rare), since this would predict heads in nuclearw=o families to be older. Since
presumably a fraction of nuclearw=o families form from nuclearw families, this suggest that either
junior sons form their own households at around the same time as the older son inherits headship,
or that there is a partition before the patriarch dies.
Consistent with a household life-cycle, we nd that both parents and children were signicantly
younger in extended families. Fathers were on average about nine years younger in extended
families, and children three years younger, Tables (6.1) and (6.2). Average ages of children in the
dierent family forms are not easily comparable since any additional births after the grandfather's
death lowers the average age of children in nuclear families.7
Consistent with the existing literature, we nd our modal extended family to consist of several
adult sons (of head), their wives and children; while the nuclearw=o families were rarely \laterally
extended" (not reported). Moreover, less than a quarter of children in nuclearw=o have their grand-
father and half have their grandmother. As expected, these gures are much larger for children in
extended families, Table (6.1).
Parental education We nd that parents, fathers in particular, are better educated in nuclearw
and in extended families than in nuclearw=o families, Table (6.2). Thus, it does not seem to be the
case that educated males (whose preferences for education may be higher than uneducated men's)
are more prone to form nuclear families.
Another concern is that factors liable to be correlated with grandparental mortality may also
cause high investments in child human capital. For instance, if educated men have children later
(but their fathers do not live longer), then their children may be both better educated and more
likely to grow up in nuclear families, without there being a causal interpretation to the correlation.
To check whether more educated men have children later compared to less educated men, we
estimate the following equation by OLS:
(6.1) child-ageij = 0 + 1father-eduj + 2father-agej+
6The survey collected information on marriage and parental characteristics only for the heads and their wives.
Thus, we do not have the information on age at marriage for the adult married sons in extended households.
7For each of the characteristics, we conduct an F -test to see whether two, middle, and extended families are
signicantly dierent from each other (p-values not reported but available upon request).
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1nuclear
w=o
j + 2nuclear
w
j + ij ;
where the dependent variable child-ageij is the age (in years) of child i of father j. The variable
father-eduj is the education of the father. We also account for the father's age, father-agej , since
obviously, fathers and children age at the same rate. nuclear
w=o
j and nuclear
w
j are dummies for
nuclearw=o and nuclearw households respectively, and ij is the stochastic error term. The omitted
category is the extended households. In the last specication, we interact father's education with
the dummies for nuclearw=o and nuclearw households to see whether within each household category,
more educated men tend to have children later than less educated men.
Results are in Table (6.4), panel A. In column (1) we regress child's age on father's education
and age only, in column (2) dummies for household types are added, and in column (3) we add
interactions between household type and father's education. We nd that, controlling for own age,
educated men tend to have older, not younger children. 1 is negative in all three specications,
albeit not signicant when the interaction terms are added. Children also tend to be older in nuclear
families, as would be expected if households form according to the described life-cycle.
To explore further whether a more educated father tends to have children later, we also estimate
the analogue of regression (6.1) above, for the age of the oldest child. Since we only have information
on children under 16 currently in the household, we restrict the sample to fathers aged 45 or less.
However, we nd no relationship between father's education and age of his oldest child, panel B,
Table (6.4).8
In sum, neither do we nd any evidence that more educated fathers tend to form their own
families, nor do we see that more educated men tend to marry and have children later than less
educated men. While any of these mechanisms could lead to endogeneity problems, our data are
not suggestive of such mechanisms.
Household income and wealth The pattern from land-holdings is somewhat mixed. On the
one hand, nuclearw=o families appear substantially poorer than the other family types. Landholdings
are lower in nuclearw=o families, as evidenced by both a higher fraction landless and lower average
land-holdings, Figure (6.3) and Table (6.1).9
Seemingly, this would suggest that landlessness is a factor in the decision to partition. However,
a similar pattern would result from a process in which nuclearw=o families form before the adult male
comes into his land inheritance.10 Thus, it may indicated lower current income but not necessarily
lower lifetime wealth.
On the other hand, when head's (and head's wife's) parental land-holdings are considered,
nuclearw=o families look considerably better o, Table (6.2). This measure is instructive since it is
likely to contain realized inheritance, and while it may not be indicative of the household's current
8Nor do we nd that better educated fathers have fewer children, not reported.
9Also, landlessness falls with the age of household head in nuclearw=o families, not reported.
10Female land holding is minor relative to male land-holding.
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income, it can shed light on the selection process, i.e., do nuclearw=o families form disproportionately
from land poor or rich families. Considering head's father's land-holdings, the extended families are
the wealthiest, and there are no signicant dierence between nuclearw=o and nuclearw families.11
On the other hand, with respect to head's father-in-law's land-holdings, the three family types are
strikingly similar.
In terms of mean monthly expenditure (per capita adult equivalent, discussed below), nuclear
families (nuclearw=o and nuclearw) spend more than extended families. Finally, the survey also
collected data on asset brought at marriage by husband and wife, and there were no statistically
signicant dierences across households (see bottom row of Table (6.2)).
In sum, neither do we see that heads of the nuclearw=o families are more educated or wealthier
(particularly in terms of land holding { arguably the most valuable asset in agrarian Bangladesh),
nor that educated men tend to marry or have children later. The nuclearw families appear similar
to extended families in terms of land-holdings and parental education, as would be expected if the
main dierence between the two were the presence of the grandfather (and his headship). The
nuclearw=o families, on the other hand, seem poorer than the other family forms, at least in terms
of current land-holdings and, to some extent, (grand-)parental land-holdings. Thus, it appears
that for analyzing the eect of the allocation of headship, the closest comparison is that between
extended and nuclearw families.
We now turn to the chapter's main focus: child outcomes by household type.
6.2.2 Child Outcomes and Household Types
We begin our analysis by estimating an empirical model of the form:
(6.2) yij = c+ aij + fij + aij  fij + 1nuclearj + 2(aij  nuclearj)+
Xj + aij Xj + ij ;
where the dependent variable yij is the outcome of interest of child i in household j. aij is age (in
completed years) and fij is a female dummy. nuclear is the dummy that takes on the value 1 if
the child is in a nuclear family, and ij is an error term that is assumed to be i.i.d. The omitted
category is the extended family. We interact all variables with age, as older children in nuclear
households are likely to spent more time not under the headship of their grandfather than younger
children. Thus, one would expect the dierences in child outcomes between extended and nuclear
families to be more pronounced for children of older age groups. This would be particularly relevant
for education as completed education and the time a child spend in nuclear family can only increase
with age.
11Although a higher fraction of nuclearw=o families are from poorer families. Figure (6.3) shows a higher fraction
of landless fathers-of-head in nuclearw=o families.
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Nuclear families may (nuclearw ) or may not (nuclearw=o) have co-residing grandparent(s). We
saw earlier that in terms of household structure and household wealth, the closest comparison to
the extended family were the nuclear families with a co-residing (non-head) grandparent. To allow
the eects to be dierent for the nuclearw and nuclearw=o families, we break up the nuclear dummy
accordingly and estimate the following equation:
(6.3) yij = c+ aij + fij + aij  fij + 1nuclearw=oj + 2nuclearwj +
3(aij  nuclearw=oj ) + 4(aij  nuclearwj )+
Xj + aij Xj ++ij ;
where nuclearw=o and nuclearw are dummies that take on the value 1 if the child is in a nuclearw=o
or a nuclearw family, respectively.
The key parameters for our analysis are 1 and 2 in (6.2) and from 1 through 4 in equation
(6.3). Under our hypothesis, the eect of household type increases with the child's age; i.e., 2; 3;
and 4 > 0. And the eect of being in a nuclear household instead of an extended household is
positive beyond some age less than 16; i.e., 1 + 2aij ; 1 + 3aij ; 2 + 4aij > 0 for some aij < 16.
Xj is a vector of household level control variables: adult equivalent household size, measures of
per capita (adult equivalent) income and wealth, and parental education. These are likely to
have independent eects on the outcomes at hand. The demographic composition obviously diers
between households. To account for the dierent needs arising from such dierences, we compute
the adult equivalent household size and per capita (adult equivalent) wealth measures, using the
equivalence scale (based on caloric needs by age and sex) for Bangladesh proposed by Ahmed and
Shams (1994), see Table (6.3).12
We estimate seven dierent specications of equations (6.2) and (6.3) in order to assess the
sensitivity and robustness of our key parameters of interest in the presence or absence of dierent
household controls. In the basic specication, column (1), we only control for the adult equivalent
household size. Then we introduce the controls for log of per capita (adult equivalent) wealth
measures in columns (2)-(5): land in column (2), asset (which does not including housing) in
column (3), expenditure in column (4); and all three wealth measures together in column (5).
Column (6) presents the specication with parental education but without wealth controls. Finally,
parental education and all three wealth controls are in column (7).
We provide both OLS and 2SLS estimates of equations (6.2) and (6.3). As described in the
introduction, both are motivated by the social norms governing household formation in Bangladesh.
For the OLS estimates, our identifying assumption is that nuclear families form on the death of the
grandfather, thus mortality results in exogenous variation in a child's exposure to extended and
nuclear households. As just shown in Section (6.2.1), to the extent that adult sons form nuclear
households for other reasons, the correlates of such \nuclearisation" are likely to work against
12Our results are not sensitive to this. Per capita or even per household measures yield qualitatively similar results.
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our hypothesis that children benet from headship with their father. Recognition of the potential
endogeneity of household form prompts us to also instrument for household form. For this, as
mentioned above in section 6.1, we use information on the father's birth family. Specically, the
following variables: father's birth order, number of brothers of father, whether grandfather is alive,
whether grandmother is alive, whether father or his parents' choose the bride for father, father's
age at marriage, father's age when grandfather's land was divided, number of brothers of father
who inherited grandfather's land, a dummy for natural disaster; and their interactions. As argued
in the introduction, these are variables can be assumed to have rst order eects on household
form but not child education. As our model involves interactions of age with all other explanatory
variables including the potential endogenous household types, we also interact these instruments
with age variables of the child. Table 6.13 provides rst stage estimation of the 2SLS estimation of
the most comprehensive specication (specication 7) for child's health while table 6.14 provides
that for child's education. The set of interactions among the instruments can be seen from these
tables.
While theoretically endogeneity of household type is a possibility, which motivates our 2SLS
estimates, empirically we also conduct the test of endogeneity of household types along with other
diagnostic tests reported in the following sections13. Regarding empirical models of child's education
(equation 6.2 and 6.3), almost in all the specications, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
household types can be treated as exogenous. This is also the case for equation 6.2 for child's health
(see the row "Endogeneity Test" and the corresponding p-values of the 2SLS results for education
and health). So OLS estimates as discussed below should be given due importance.
Height-for-age (ages 0-10)
We use the height-for-age z-score as our measure of health outcome of the children. Low height-
for-age indicates chronic malnutrition for which poor diet and spells of disease are key contributors.
The z-scores are computed using the height-for-age distribution of American children. On average,
children are much shorter than their US comparison group (about 2 standard deviations), see Table
(6.1). The mean z-score is signicantly better for children in extended households (-1.99) than their
counterparts in nuclearw=o and nuclearw households (with a z-score of -2.14 and -2.16, respectively).
While we hypothesized that fathers, who are heads in nuclearw=o and nuclearw families, would
like to invest more in children than the grandfathers (heads in extended households), it may be
that the hypothesized negative eect of grandfathers is oset by health being a household public
good. Extended families are wealthier and hence could aord a higher level of public goods. For
instance, plumbing, ooring, ventilation, insulation, and cleanliness of the dwelling, all correlated
with household wealth, are likely to aect the living conditions of all household members. Another
reason we might expect health outcomes for children to be better in extended households is that to
132SLS estimation and the diagnostic tests are performed using ivreg2 suite in Stata. Baum et al. (2007) provides
a comprehensive analysis of these diagnostic tests.
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the extent that there is an inherited component to health, the very presence of the grand father may
indicate predisposition towards good health. However, when we conduct the redundancy test of the
instruments father's birth order, number of brothers, and whether grandfather and grandmother
are alive or not, we fail to accept the null hypothesis that these instruments are redundant (see the
row "IV Redundancy Test" and the corresponding p-values of the 2SLS results for education and
health) for empirical model 6.214.
Tables (6.5) and (6.6) provide OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation (6.2), and Tables (6.7) and
(6.8) provide OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation (6.3) using child's height-for-age z-score as the
dependent variable. We do not nd any signicant dierence between nuclear (neither nuclearw=o
nor nuclearw) and extended families in terms of child's health outcomes. We speculate that the
failure to nd a positive eect of headship with the father may be due to a counter acting eect of
lower household public goods in nuclear households (recall, the extended households are wealthier).
The diagnostic tests in table (6.6) show substantial Shea R2 and although F-statistic are not
above 10, they are signicant at 1% level. These models are not underidentied as the p-value of
underidentication test implies. However, the null of overidentication restrictions is rejected at
95% condence interval in specication (2) and at 90% condence interval in specication (1), (3),
and (7). On the other hand, in the estimation of equation 6.3, the overidentication restrictions
cannot be rejected for any specication, and the test for redundancy of instruments: father's birth
order, number of brothers, and whether or not the grandparents are alive, suggest that we cannot
accept the null that these instruments are redundant in identifying the equation.
We now turn to children's education, an outcome that to a greater extent measures private
goods allocation within the household.
Education (ages 6-16)
We restrict the analysis to children aged 6-16.15 Schooling typically start at age 6 or 7, but is
not compulsory. Primary school encompasses grades 1-5, secondary school grades 6-10, and higher
secondary school grades 11-12. Higher secondary schooling is not common, and by the age of 16,
daughters may already have left their birth family due to marriage. We use class completed as our
measure of education. We use data from round two when estimating equation (6.2).16
Tables (6.9) and (6.10) present OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation (6.2). The results are
14Without loss of generality, the intuition behind the IV redundancy test can be simply described as follows. If x
is an endogenous variable and Z is a set of instruments in which Z1 is a set of potentially redundant instruments,
then a straightforward test of redundancy would imply regressing x on Z and test if the coecients of Z1 are zero.
For a detailed description of instrument redundancy tests, see Baum et al. (2007).
15In the preliminary analysis we used the age group 6-15 and the results were similar. Also in extended families
children of age group 6-16 includes both the grand-children and children of the household head. We included dummy
for children in extended families to see whether their outcome is signicantly dierent from the grand-children, but
we did not nd any signicant dierence (results are not reported).
16The school year in Bangladesh starts in January/February and ends in November/December. Thus round two
is the last round for which the recorded completed schooling of new entrants into the survey is comparable to the
completed schooling of earlier entrants.
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supportive of the hypothesized positive eect of headship with the father (as opposed to the grand-
father). For all variables, level eects are negative and age interactions positive, in line with the
observation that the class completed can only increase with child's age. The 2SLS estimates are in
line with the OLS estimates and the diagnostic statistics imply that the strength of the instruments
are much stronger than observed in the case of health regressions. Both the Shea R2 and F-statistic
are substantial and the hypothesis of underidentication is strongly rejected in all specications.
Similarly, the hypothesis of redundancy of the instruments: father's birth order, number of brothers,
and whether or not grandparents are living are also strongly rejected. We cannot reject the overi-
dentication restrictions either with the exception of specication 3 and 5. More importantly, the
endogeneity test of the household types indicate that household type can be treated as exogenous
variable, suggesting due importance of the OLS estimates.
In the most comprehensive specication { where we control for adult equivalent household size,
per capita (adult equivalent) wealth and income measures and parental education { children nine
years or older have higher level of education in nuclear families than children of the corresponding
age in extended families, Table (6.9), column (7). When we instrument household type, the coe-
cients on the nuclear family dummy and its interaction with age are marginally higher and of the
expected sign suggestive of a negative bias in the OLS estimates as hypothesized earlier. Children
11 years or older now do better in terms of education in nuclear families than their counterpart in
extended families, Table (6.10).
Next, we disaggregate nuclear families into nuclearw=o and nuclearw families, and repeat the
above analysis. In the case of the OLS estimation, children eight years or older do signicantly
better in nuclearw families compared to their counterpart in the extended family, see Table (6.11),
column (7). Both the coecients on the nuclearw dummy and its interaction with child's age are
signicant at the 5% and the 1% level respectively in all seven specications. In the case of the
2SLS estimation, column (7), the estimates imply that children 11 years or older are better o in
nuclearw families than in extended families. Again both the nuclearw dummy and its interaction
with age is signicant at least at 10% level throughout in all of the specications (and at 5% level
or less in most of the cases), Table (6.12).
Thus it appears that it is nuclear households with co-residing grandmothers that compares most
favorably to the extended family. This is interesting considering that it may be the household type
most readily comparable to the extended household. A potential caveat when interpreting this
result is that the grandmother may be matched to the household (among her adult sons) that can
best accommodate her, presumably the most auent. Still, there is no reason to think such a
mechanism would confound a comparison between nuclear and extended families. Moreover, the
results for nuclearw are strengthened rather than weakened when household type is instrumented
for.
With the exception of specications 3 and 5, in all other specications, the instruments satisfy
the overidentication test of the validity of instruments. All other diagnostic tests are also support-
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ive of the hypotheses that the models are not underidentied, and the subset of instruments-father's
birth order, grand parents alive or not, and father's number of brothers are not redundant against
our concerns discussed in the introduction. Finally, the endogeneity tests again suggest that house-
hold types can be treated as exogenous variables indicating that the OLS results should be given
due importance.
6.3 Concluding remarks
The organization of the family varies across cultures along a number of dimensions. This chapter
has been concerned with the dierence between the so called extended and nuclear family, the former
being more prominent in Asia, and the latter in Europe. A potentially important dierence between
the two is the allocation of headship { with the father in nuclear families but the grandfather in
extended families. While the literature has noted that the extended family provides for the elderly,
its consequences for investments in child human capital, the focus of this chapter, has received
relatively little attention.
We hypothesized that outcomes that are particularly related to private goods allocation towards
children, such as education, are better in families headed by the father (instead of the grandfather).
By contrast, headship may not matter for outcomes mainly determined by household public goods,
health being a case in point. Analyzing Bangladeshi household survey data, we found child educa-
tion to be better in families headed by the child's father, but found no signicant dierence between
household types in terms of child health (measured by height-for-age). We interpreted these ndings
to be consistent with children in nuclear families benetting from privileged provision of private
goods, but suering from lower levels of household public goods, compared to children in extended
families. We provided both OLS and 2SLS estimates, where number of brothers, birth order and
parental mortality of the child's father served as instruments for household type.
However, our hypothesis has weaknesses as health could be also inuenced by private good
allocations, such as food, while education can be inuenced by public good elements in a household,
such as scale economies, electricity, quietness, etc. In an agrarian economy, health may inuence
productivity of manual labour more than education, so it is not obvious why nuclear family would
want to invest more on a child's education but not on a child's health. In future analysis, we
attempt to investigate the strength of various public vs private good inputs to a child's health and
education and household behaviour related to investing in children to further assess the validity of
our hypothesis.
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Figure 6.1: Land holdings, by household type. Clock-wise from top left: nuclearw=o, nuclearw, and
extended.
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Figure 6.2: Land holdings of head's father, by household type. Clock-wise from top left: nuclearw=o,
nuclearw, and extended.
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Table 6.3: Adult Equivalence Weights by Age and Sex
Ages (years)
From To Females Males
0 1 0.25 0.25
1 2 0.36 0.37
2 3 0.4 0.42
3 4 0.43 0.46
4 5 0.46 0.49
5 6 0.48 0.53
6 7 0.49 0.56
7 8 0.49 0.58
8 9 0.49 0.58
9 10 0.49 0.58
10 11 0.64 0.70
11 12 0.64 0.71
12 13 0.66 0.73
13 14 0.68 0.77
14 15 0.7 0.81
15 16 0.7 0.85
16 17 0.72 0.89
17 18 0.75 0.92
18 30 0.82 1.03
30 60 0.83 1.03
60 { 0.61 0.68
Source: Ahmed and Shams (1994).
177
Table 6.4: Father's Education, Age and Number of Children
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable:
Panel A. Child's age
Father's education 0.050** 0.048** 0.017
[0.023] [0.024] [0.053]
Father's age 0.271*** 0.275*** 0.274***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Nuclearw=o 0.648** 0.488
[0.255] [0.329]
Nuclearw 0.844** 0.881
[0.370] [0.551]
Father's education 0.046
 Nuclearw=o [0.061]
Father's education 0.001
 Nuclearw [0.083]
Observations 1634 1634 1634
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.29
Panel B. Age of oldest childa
Father's education -0.011 0.008 -0.12
[0.037] [0.038] [0.081]
Father's age 0.703*** 0.684*** 0.681***
[0.027] [0.029] [0.029]
Nuclearw=o 0.809** 0.141
[0.382] [0.537]
Nuclearw 0.579 -0.185
[0.562] [0.823]
Father's education 0.162*
 Nuclearw=o [0.093]
Father's education 0.169
 Nuclearw [0.130]
Observations 413 413 413
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.62 0.62
a The age of the oldest child under 16 in the household is likely to be a poor measure of the age of oldest child for older
men, therefore we restricted the sample to fathers 45 years or younger.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 6.6: Child's Height-for-Age z-score, Nuclear vs Extended Families { 2SLS
Dependent Variable: Child's height-for-age z-score (0-10 years)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
nuclear -0.030 -0.138 -0.082 -0.176 -0.236 -0.080 -0.401
[0.373] [0.358] [0.371] [0.380] [0.369] [0.417] [0.409]
nuclearage -0.015 -0.005 -0.011 -0.001 0.006 -0.026 0.012
[0.059] [0.057] [0.058] [0.060] [0.059] [0.063] [0.063]
log (adult equivalent 0.386 0.132 0.303 0.280 0.113 0.364 0.018
household size) [0.359] [0.390] [0.373] [0.368] [0.387] [0.389] [0.391]
log (adult equivalent -0.040 -0.015 -0.035 -0.028 -0.011 -0.061 -0.015
household size)age [0.058] [0.063] [0.060] [0.059] [0.063] [0.062] [0.063]
log(land, per 0.147* 0.122 0.132
capita adult equivalent) [0.086] [0.089] [0.089]
log(land, per capita -0.012 -0.012 -0.014
adult equivalent)age [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]
log(asset, per capita 0.083 -0.036 -0.018
adult equivalent) [0.094] [0.108] [0.110]
log(asset, per capita -0.005 0.004 -0.003
adult equivalent)age [0.014] [0.015] [0.016]
log(expenditure, per capita 0.404** 0.344* 0.374*
adult equivalent) [0.178] [0.203] [0.223]
log(expenditure, per capita -0.023 -0.019 -0.031
adult equivalent)age [0.026] [0.031] [0.033]
father's education 0.019 0.012
(class completed) [0.028] [0.028]
father's education -0.001 0.000
(class completed)age [0.004] [0.004]
mother's education -0.039 -0.063
(class completed) [0.043] [0.043]
mother's education 0.011* 0.014**
(class completed)age [0.006] [0.006]
constant -2.876*** -2.823*** -3.298*** -5.218*** -4.617*** -2.795*** -4.604***
[0.782] [0.781] [0.940] [1.279] [1.308] [0.830] [1.441]
adj R2 0.009 0.016 0.011 0.022 0.020 0.016 0.025
observations 725 725 725 725 725 691 691
Diagnostic Statistics
First Stage Summary Statistics Shea Partial R2
nuclear 0.54 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.56 0.51 0.52
nuclearage 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.49 0.50
F -Statistic
nuclear 8.34 8.79 8.76 8.25 8.83 7.41 7.89
nuclearage 7.91 8.17 8.06 7.92 8.19 6.67 6.63
IV Diagnostic Tests P-Value
Underidentication Test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IV Redundancy Test 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.05
Endogeneity Test 0.36 0.57 0.43 0.30 0.08 0.11 0.63
Overidentication Test 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.48 0.46 0.09
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered at the household level are in parentheses. The omitted household
category is the extended family. All regressions include child's age (completed in years) female dummy, and their
interaction with child's age. See section 6.2.2 for the detailed list of instruments. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%;
*** signicant at 1%.
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Table 6.8: Child's Height-for-Age z-score by Family Type{2SLS
Dependent Variable: Child's height-for-age z-score (0-10 years)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
nuclearw=o -0.030 -0.092 -0.064 -0.164 -0.193 -0.085 -0.368
[0.392] [0.384] [0.394] [0.397] [0.393] [0.425] [0.422]
nuclearw=oage -0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.011 0.013 -0.010 0.022
[0.061] [0.060] [0.061] [0.062] [0.061] [0.065] [0.065]
nuclearw 0.003 -0.349 -0.141 -0.228 -0.444 -0.108 -0.705
[0.593] [0.557] [0.566] [0.590] [0.560] [0.646] [0.614]
nuclearwage -0.088 -0.050 -0.071 -0.059 -0.035 -0.096 -0.021
[0.090] [0.085] [0.087] [0.090] [0.086] [0.094] [0.091]
log (adult equivalent 0.382 0.151 0.316 0.286 0.131 0.355 0.031
household size) [0.376] [0.412] [0.393] [0.385] [0.406] [0.396] [0.404]
log (adult equivalent -0.022 -0.001 -0.021 -0.012 0.002 -0.039 0.003
household size)age [0.060] [0.065] [0.063] [0.061] [0.065] [0.064] [0.065]
log(land, per 0.162* 0.140 0.151*
capita adult equivalent) [0.087] [0.090] [0.091]
log(land, per capita -0.013 -0.013 -0.016
adult equivalent)age [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]
log(asset, per capita 0.085 -0.044 -0.032
adult equivalent) [0.094] [0.109] [0.112]
log(asset, per capita -0.004 0.006 -0.000
adult equivalent)age [0.013] [0.016] [0.016]
log(expenditure, per capita 0.408** 0.346* 0.379*
adult equivalent) [0.179] [0.206] [0.228]
log(expenditure, per capita -0.024 -0.021 -0.034
adult equivalent)age [0.026] [0.031] [0.033]
father's education 0.023 0.020
(class completed) [0.029] [0.030]
father's education -0.001 -0.001
(class completed)age [0.004] [0.004]
mother's education -0.042 -0.066
(class completed) [0.044] [0.043]
mother's education 0.011* 0.013**
(class completed)age [0.006] [0.006]
constant -2.868*** -2.880*** -3.320*** -5.243*** -4.640*** -2.771*** -4.593***
[0.798] [0.809] [0.959] [1.304] [1.342] [0.834] [1.475]
adj R2 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.002
observations 725 725 725 725 725 691 691
Diagnostic Statistics
First Stage Summary Statistics Shea Partial R2
nuclearw=o 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.55 0.56
nuclearw 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.28
nuclearw=oage 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.52 0.53
nuclearwage 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.29
F-Statistic
nuclearw=o 9.27 9.88 9.21 9.11 9.43 8.98 8.53
nuclearw 2.02 2.02 2.04 2.02 2.04 2.12 2.18
nuclearw=oage 8.66 9.39 8.71 8.32 8.99 7.57 7.49
nuclearwage 2.15 2.14 2.17 2.18 2.21 2.33 2.46
IV Diagnostic Tests P-Value
Underidentication Test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
IV Redundancy Test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Endogeneity Test 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.02
Overidentication Test 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.27 0.19 0.37 0.28
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered at the household level are in parentheses. The omitted household
category is the extended family. Other controls and instruments are same as Table (6.6).* signicant at 10%; ** signicant
at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 6.12: Child's Education by Family Type { 2SLS
Dependent Variable: Class Completed (6-16 years)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
nuclearw=o -1.163* -0.789 -0.677 -0.811 -0.560 -1.092 -0.990
[0.688] [0.623] [0.612] [0.653] [0.585] [0.856] [0.770]
nuclearw=oage 0.172** 0.125* 0.107* 0.126* 0.092 0.103 0.088
[0.074] [0.067] [0.064] [0.071] [0.062] [0.083] [0.072]
nuclearw -2.241** -1.997** -1.833** -2.107** -1.828** -2.405** -2.859***
[0.973] [0.978] [0.890] [0.930] [0.887] [1.068] [1.049]
nuclearwage 0.270*** 0.240** 0.221** 0.253*** 0.219** 0.221** 0.269***
[0.101] [0.099] [0.088] [0.095] [0.088] [0.104] [0.099]
log (adult equivalent -1.687** -1.300* -0.704 -1.463** -0.775 -1.424* -1.096
household size) [0.720] [0.666] [0.614] [0.678] [0.598] [0.788] [0.670]
log (adult equivalent 0.200** 0.139* 0.063 0.174** 0.072 0.135 0.094
household size)age [0.081] [0.074] [0.067] [0.078] [0.066] [0.083] [0.070]
log(land, per -0.475*** 0.033 0.054
capita adult equivalent) [0.168] [0.192] [0.185]
log(land, per capita 0.072*** 0.007 0.000
adult equivalent)age [0.019] [0.022] [0.021]
log(asset, per capita -0.809*** -0.770*** -0.648***
adult equivalent) [0.140] [0.181] [0.205]
log(asset, per capita 0.112*** 0.098*** 0.067***
adult equivalent)age [0.015] [0.020] [0.022]
log(expenditure, per capita -1.091*** -0.291 -0.579
adult equivalent) [0.359] [0.377] [0.396]
log(expenditure, per capita 0.168*** 0.059 0.088**
adult equivalent)age [0.041] [0.042] [0.043]
father's education -0.088* -0.005
(class completed) [0.053] [0.055]
father's education 0.014** 0.005
(class completed)age [0.006] [0.006]
mother's education -0.154** -0.097
(class completed) [0.072] [0.071]
mother's education 0.028*** 0.021***
(class completed)age [0.008] [0.008]
constant 0.041 0.636 4.040*** 6.641*** 5.648** 0.265 7.644***
[1.478] [1.318] [1.329] [2.526] [2.284] [1.722] [2.750]
adj R2 0.543 0.578 0.617 0.580 0.624 0.628 0.653
observations 945 945 945 945 945 832 832
Diagnostic Statistics
First Stage Summary Statistics Shea Partial R2
nuclearw=o 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.49 0.49
nuclearw 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
nuclearw=oage 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.52 0.52
nuclearwage 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.33
F-Statistic
nuclearw=o 22.69 23.33 24.67 19.91 22.09 10.37 10.34
nuclearw 2.36 2.38 2.33 2.35 2.38 2.24 2.29
nuclearw=oage 18.66 19.24 20.11 16.8 18.68 10.1 9.98
nuclearwage 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.28 2.3 2.18 2.22
Tests P-value
Underidentication Test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IV Redundancy Test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
Endogeneity Test 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.17 0.46
Overidentication Test 0.27 0.13 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.61 0.28
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered at the household level are in parentheses. The omitted household
category is the extended family. Other controls and instruments are same as Table (6.10).* signicant at 10%; **
signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 6.13: First Stage of 2SLS: Child's Height-for-Age z-score
VARIABLES nuclear nuclearage nuclearw=o nuclearw=oage nuclearw nuclearwage
age -0.052 0.980*** -0.005 1.671*** -0.048 -0.691*
[0.047] [0.363] [0.061] [0.511] [0.054] [0.381]
female -0.069** -0.228* -0.028 -0.199 -0.041 -0.028
[0.031] [0.126] [0.044] [0.171] [0.045] [0.154]
femaleage 0.010** 0.046 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.035
[0.005] [0.033] [0.007] [0.048] [0.007] [0.044]
log (household size, -0.421*** -0.013 -0.532*** -0.048 0.112 0.035
adult equivalent) [0.057] [0.201] [0.085] [0.260] [0.091] [0.247]
log (household size, adult 0.008 -0.360*** 0.004 -0.492*** 0.004 0.131
equivalent)age [0.009] [0.072] [0.011] [0.091] [0.011] [0.082]
log (land, per capita adult -0.049** -0.072 -0.035 -0.159 -0.014 0.087
equivalent) [0.020] [0.063] [0.028] [0.098] [0.032] [0.096]
log (land, per capita adult 0.004 -0.007 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.009
equivalent)age [0.003] [0.020] [0.004] [0.031] [0.004] [0.028]
ln (asset, per capita adult -0.023 0.004 0.009 0.151 -0.032 -0.148
equivalent) [0.020] [0.065] [0.031] [0.093] [0.031] [0.092]
ln (asset, per capita adult 0.001 -0.015 -0.005 -0.053* 0.006 0.038
equivalent)age [0.003] [0.021] [0.004] [0.028] [0.004] [0.025]
ln (expenditure, per capita 0.067** 0.023 0.026 -0.003 0.041 0.026
adult equivalent) [0.030] [0.118] [0.058] [0.223] [0.060] [0.193]
ln (expenditure, per capita -0.005 0.021 0.001 0.028 -0.006 -0.007
adult equivalent)age [0.005] [0.043] [0.009] [0.074] [0.008] [0.057]
father's education 0.013*** 0.021 -0.008 -0.021 0.021** 0.041*
(class completed) [0.005] [0.016] [0.007] [0.021] [0.008] [0.021]
father's education (class -0.001 0.005 0.001 0.006 -0.002* -0.000
completed)age [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.007]
mother's education -0.019*** -0.045** -0.009 -0.020 -0.009 -0.025
(class completed) [0.006] [0.021] [0.008] [0.029] [0.010] [0.029]
mother's education (class 0.002* 0.004 0.003* 0.013 -0.001 -0.009
completed)age [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011]
father's number of brothers -0.066** -0.087 -0.116*** -0.032 0.050 -0.055
[0.031] [0.137] [0.044] [0.150] [0.044] [0.101]
father's number 0.003 -0.030 0.006 -0.061 -0.004 0.031
of brothersage [0.005] [0.041] [0.006] [0.045] [0.004] [0.027]
father's birth order -0.016 -0.105 -0.058** -0.201** 0.042 0.096
[0.020] [0.079] [0.029] [0.102] [0.033] [0.095]
father's birth order 0.004 0.027 0.009** 0.042 -0.005 -0.014
age [0.003] [0.023] [0.004] [0.030] [0.004] [0.024]
grand father alive -0.448* -1.536* -0.883** -2.486* 0.435 0.950
[0.244] [0.922] [0.388] [1.395] [0.409] [1.261]
grand father alive 0.041 0.100 0.062 -0.033 -0.021 0.133
age [0.033] [0.249] [0.050] [0.374] [0.053] [0.349]
grand mother alive -0.169 -0.886 0.014 1.395 -0.183 -2.281**
[0.179] [0.728] [0.325] [1.172] [0.350] [1.048]
grand mother alive 0.009 0.050 -0.016 -0.355 0.025 0.405
age [0.030] [0.237] [0.046] [0.359] [0.046] [0.318]
father's number of brothers 0.007 0.028 0.016** 0.039 -0.009 -0.011
father's birth order [0.006] [0.022] [0.007] [0.025] [0.007] [0.023]
father's number of brothers -0.001 -0.004 -0.002** -0.005 0.001 0.001
father's birth orderage [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.006]
grand father alive -0.164* 0.071 0.237 -0.029 -0.401*** 0.101
grand mother alive [0.089] [0.322] [0.157] [0.444] [0.153] [0.343]
grand father alive 0.006 -0.139 -0.018 0.098 0.025 -0.236*
grand mother aliveage [0.012] [0.095] [0.017] [0.143] [0.016] [0.125]
father's number of brothers 0.118*** 0.073 0.101** 0.043 0.018 0.029
grand father alive [0.042] [0.114] [0.041] [0.132] [0.045] [0.134]
father's number of brothers -0.005 0.068 -0.003 0.079 -0.003 -0.012
grand father aliveage [0.006] [0.042] [0.006] [0.050] [0.006] [0.048]
father's number of brothers -0.042* 0.014 0.024 -0.044 -0.066 0.058
grand mother alive [0.022] [0.106] [0.040] [0.130] [0.041] [0.111]
father's number of brothers 0.001 -0.040 -0.002 0.018 0.002 -0.058*
grand mother aliveage [0.004] [0.032] [0.005] [0.036] [0.005] [0.035]
father's birth order 0.017 -0.004 0.014 0.084 0.003 -0.087
 grand father alive [0.044] [0.138] [0.045] [0.146] [0.050] [0.146]
father's birth order  0.006 0.059 -0.003 -0.014 0.009 0.073
grand father alive  age [0.007] [0.049] [0.008] [0.064] [0.008] [0.056]
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Table 6.13: First Stage of 2SLS: Child's Height-for-Age z-score
VARIABLES nuclear nuclearage nuclearw=o nuclearw=oage nuclearw nuclearwage
father's birth order -0.011 -0.003 -0.013 -0.010 0.002 0.007
father's number of brothers grand fa-
ther alive
[0.012] [0.036] [0.012] [0.037] [0.012] [0.036]
father's birth order father's number of -0.001 -0.017 0.000 -0.011 -0.001 -0.006
brothersgrand father aliveage [0.002] [0.012] [0.002] [0.015] [0.002] [0.013]
father's self choice of bride -0.063 -0.476** 0.036 -0.394 -0.099 -0.082
[0.057] [0.225] [0.087] [0.293] [0.082] [0.224]
father's self choice of bride age 0.015* 0.126** 0.006 0.140** 0.010 -0.014
[0.008] [0.061] [0.011] [0.071] [0.009] [0.043]
father's age at marriage -0.016*** -0.055 -0.008 -0.011 -0.008 -0.044
[0.006] [0.041] [0.009] [0.049] [0.009] [0.030]
father's age at marriage  age 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.013 0.002 0.011*
[0.002] [0.014] [0.002] [0.015] [0.001] [0.006]
father's number of brothers inherited 0.083*** -0.028 0.090*** -0.100 -0.007 0.072
grand father's land [0.016] [0.051] [0.022] [0.066] [0.023] [0.064]
father's number of brothers inherited 0.001 0.094*** 0.002 0.121*** -0.001 -0.027
grand father's land age [0.002] [0.018] [0.003] [0.021] [0.003] [0.024]
father's age at marriage  0.007 0.039 0.025 0.090 -0.018 -0.051
grand father alive [0.009] [0.036] [0.015] [0.057] [0.017] [0.051]
father's age at marriage  -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.008
grand father alive age [0.001] [0.008] [0.002] [0.015] [0.002] [0.014]
father's age at marriage 0.009 0.023 -0.015 -0.056 0.024* 0.079*
grand mother alive [0.007] [0.029] [0.012] [0.049] [0.014] [0.043]
father's age at marriage 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.004
grand mother aliveage [0.001] [0.010] [0.002] [0.016] [0.002] [0.013]
father's age at marriage father's age 0.000** 0.002** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
when grand father land was divided [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
father's age at marriage father's age
when
-0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
grand father land was divided  age [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
father's self choice of bride 0.013 0.320 0.020 0.482 -0.006 -0.162
grand father alive [0.078] [0.248] [0.111] [0.373] [0.138] [0.388]
father's self choice of bride  0.003 -0.020 -0.016 -0.156 0.019 0.137
grand father alive age [0.012] [0.089] [0.014] [0.120] [0.015] [0.112]
father's self choice of bride 0.073 0.490* -0.146 -0.114 0.218* 0.604*
grand mother alive [0.075] [0.261] [0.113] [0.365] [0.123] [0.330]
father's self choice of bride -0.025** -0.191*** 0.019 0.009 -0.044*** -0.200*
grand mother alive age [0.010] [0.074] [0.014] [0.117] [0.014] [0.106]
father's age when grand -0.006 -0.064*** 0.005 -0.017 -0.011 -0.047
father land was divided [0.005] [0.024] [0.009] [0.034] [0.011] [0.030]
father's age when grand father land 0.002** 0.017** -0.000 0.004 0.002* 0.013*
was dividedage [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.007]
natural disaster dummy -0.047 -0.106 -0.142*** -0.284* 0.096* 0.179
[0.036] [0.126] [0.053] [0.163] [0.058] [0.155]
natural disaster dummyage 0.005 0.001 0.019*** 0.053 -0.015* -0.052
[0.006] [0.042] [0.007] [0.056] [0.008] [0.054]
constant 1.727*** 2.299* 1.771*** 0.516 -0.043 1.783
[0.294] [1.208] [0.390] [1.584] [0.425] [1.348]
adj R2 0.694 0.851 0.573 0.717 0.166 0.199
observations 746 746 746 746 746 746
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.14: First Stage of 2SLS: Education
VARIABLES nuclear nuclearage nuclearw=o nuclearw=oage nuclearw nuclearwage
age -0.159*** -0.718 -0.190*** -1.114 0.031 0.396
[0.050] [0.642] [0.058] [0.745] [0.045] [0.558]
female 0.058 0.693 -0.079 -0.896 0.137 1.589*
[0.058] [0.639] [0.082] [0.874] [0.086] [0.886]
log (household size, -0.429*** -1.098 -0.722*** -3.199** 0.294** 2.101*
adult equivalent) [0.120] [1.182] [0.144] [1.340] [0.139] [1.257]
femaleage -0.007 -0.087 0.004 0.051 -0.011 -0.138*
[0.005] [0.064] [0.007] [0.086] [0.007] [0.083]
log (household size, adult 0.007 -0.250** 0.022** -0.171 -0.015 -0.079
equivalent)age [0.010] [0.126] [0.011] [0.139] [0.010] [0.122]
log (land, per capita adult 0.015 0.181 -0.020 0.107 0.035 0.074
equivalent) [0.030] [0.333] [0.040] [0.414] [0.037] [0.379]
log (land, per capita adult -0.003 -0.030 0.000 -0.028 -0.003 -0.002
equivalent)age [0.003] [0.039] [0.004] [0.048] [0.003] [0.044]
ln (asset, per capita adult -0.048 -0.409 -0.044 -0.221 -0.003 -0.188
equivalent) [0.035] [0.344] [0.041] [0.388] [0.035] [0.338]
ln (asset, per capita adult 0.003 0.027 0.001 -0.017 0.002 0.043
equivalent)age [0.003] [0.037] [0.003] [0.042] [0.003] [0.036]
ln (expenditure, per capita -0.023 -0.449 -0.024 -1.238 0.001 0.790
adult equivalent) [0.067] [0.725] [0.086] [0.886] [0.077] [0.769]
ln (expenditure, per capita 0.005 0.075 0.007 0.173* -0.002 -0.098
adult equivalent)age [0.006] [0.083] [0.007] [0.095] [0.006] [0.078]
father's education 0.019** 0.150 0.001 0.050 0.017 0.100
(class completed) [0.009] [0.097] [0.013] [0.119] [0.011] [0.106]
father's education (class -0.001 -0.009 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007
completed)age [0.001] [0.010] [0.001] [0.013] [0.001] [0.012]
mother's education -0.012 -0.109 0.015 0.050 -0.027 -0.159
(class completed) [0.013] [0.139] [0.017] [0.164] [0.017] [0.141]
mother's education (class 0.001 0.014 -0.000 0.007 0.002 0.006
completed)age [0.001] [0.016] [0.001] [0.018] [0.001] [0.014]
father's number of brothers -0.042 0.212 -0.049 0.361 0.006 -0.149
[0.055] [0.503] [0.063] [0.554] [0.048] [0.390]
father's total number -0.002 -0.090* -0.004 -0.129** 0.002 0.039
of brothersage [0.004] [0.048] [0.005] [0.052] [0.003] [0.031]
father's birth order -0.001 -0.214 0.021 0.245 -0.023 -0.459
[0.032] [0.326] [0.042] [0.367] [0.035] [0.291]
father's birth order 0.001 0.031 -0.002 -0.030 0.004 0.062**
age [0.003] [0.036] [0.003] [0.038] [0.002] [0.031]
grand father alive -1.409** -16.066** -1.916*** -19.894*** 0.507 3.828
[0.656] [7.727] [0.687] [7.243] [0.834] [9.138]
grand father alive 0.140** 1.685** 0.161** 1.773** -0.022 -0.088
 age [0.064] [0.852] [0.063] [0.795] [0.075] [0.931]
grand mother alive -0.464 -3.380 0.065 2.661 -0.528 -6.041
[0.365] [3.727] [0.489] [4.625] [0.463] [4.875]
grand mother alive 0.034 0.241 -0.027 -0.509 0.062 0.750
age [0.031] [0.398] [0.039] [0.480] [0.039] [0.526]
father's number of brothers 0.003 0.021 0.000 -0.051 0.002 0.072
father's birth order [0.008] [0.077] [0.010] [0.086] [0.009] [0.069]
father's number of brothers -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.012 -0.001 -0.011*
father's birth orderage [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.007]
grand father alive 0.028 2.197 0.187 1.736 -0.159 0.461
grand mother alive [0.177] [2.064] [0.228] [2.411] [0.217] [2.037]
grand father alive -0.016 -0.360 -0.010 -0.088 -0.006 -0.272
grand mother aliveage [0.018] [0.244] [0.021] [0.295] [0.018] [0.231]
father's number of brothers 0.166 0.839 0.193** 1.451* -0.027 -0.612
grand father alive [0.102] [1.018] [0.082] [0.848] [0.080] [0.756]
father's number of brothers -0.007 0.004 -0.012 -0.077 0.005 0.081
grand father aliveage [0.010] [0.115] [0.008] [0.100] [0.007] [0.078]
father's number of brothers -0.039 -0.139 0.004 -0.163 -0.043 0.024
grand mother alive [0.038] [0.375] [0.049] [0.470] [0.047] [0.468]
father's number of brothers 0.002 -0.007 0.003 0.058 -0.002 -0.065
grand mother aliveage [0.003] [0.042] [0.004] [0.051] [0.004] [0.053]
father's birth order 0.134 0.740 0.192 2.537 -0.058 -1.797
 grand father alive [0.133] [1.528] [0.160] [1.981] [0.129] [1.404]
father's birth order  -0.004 0.020 -0.019 -0.262 0.015 0.282
grand father alive  age [0.014] [0.185] [0.019] [0.251] [0.014] [0.174]
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VARIABLES nuclear nuclearage nuclearw=o nuclearw=oage nuclearw nuclearwage
father's birth order -0.050 -0.289 -0.064* -0.651* 0.014 0.362
father's number of brothers grand fa-
ther alive
[0.031] [0.319] [0.034] [0.387] [0.028] [0.288]
father's birth order father's number of 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.052 -0.003 -0.049
brothersgrand father aliveage [0.003] [0.036] [0.003] [0.046] [0.003] [0.032]
father's self choice of bride 0.177 2.261** 0.144 1.783 0.033 0.478
[0.119] [1.144] [0.126] [1.261] [0.070] [0.630]
father's self choice of bride age -0.017* -0.233** -0.011 -0.148 -0.006 -0.085
[0.010] [0.114] [0.010] [0.128] [0.005] [0.061]
father's age at marriage -0.038** -0.323** -0.045*** -0.371*** 0.007 0.047
[0.017] [0.147] [0.016] [0.140] [0.011] [0.097]
father's age at marriage  age 0.003** 0.029** 0.004*** 0.031** -0.000 -0.002
[0.001] [0.015] [0.001] [0.014] [0.001] [0.009]
father's number of brothers inherited 0.060** -0.513* 0.059* -0.599* 0.001 0.086
grand father's land [0.027] [0.263] [0.034] [0.316] [0.039] [0.313]
father's number of brothers inherited 0.004* 0.154*** 0.005* 0.167*** -0.001 -0.014
grand father's land age [0.002] [0.027] [0.003] [0.032] [0.002] [0.026]
father's age at marriage  0.035 0.456 0.053** 0.475* -0.018 -0.019
grand father alive [0.023] [0.286] [0.026] [0.288] [0.034] [0.389]
father's age at marriage  -0.004* -0.055* -0.004* -0.037 -0.000 -0.018
grand father alive age [0.002] [0.032] [0.002] [0.032] [0.003] [0.040]
father's age at marriage 0.023 0.091 -0.011 -0.073 0.035* 0.164
grand mother alive [0.015] [0.150] [0.020] [0.192] [0.020] [0.219]
father's age at marriage -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.001
grand mother aliveage [0.001] [0.016] [0.002] [0.021] [0.002] [0.024]
father's age at marriage father's age 0.000 0.004 0.001** 0.013** -0.001** -0.010*
when grand father land was divided [0.000] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.000] [0.005]
father's age at marriage father's age
when
-0.000 -0.001 -0.000*** -0.001** 0.000** 0.001
grand father land was divided  age [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
father's self choice of bride -0.001 -1.387 -0.228 -1.192 0.228 -0.195
grand father alive [0.162] [1.846] [0.211] [2.081] [0.224] [1.888]
father's self choice of bride  0.007 0.212 0.015 0.057 -0.008 0.155
grand father alive age [0.016] [0.223] [0.019] [0.249] [0.018] [0.198]
father's self choice of bride -0.243* -1.856 -0.262 -4.403** 0.019 2.547
grand mother alive [0.129] [1.343] [0.177] [1.845] [0.150] [1.552]
father's self choice of bride 0.016 0.112 0.032* 0.510** -0.016 -0.398**
grand mother alive age [0.012] [0.152] [0.016] [0.218] [0.014] [0.185]
father's age when grand -0.007 -0.174 -0.029** -0.385*** 0.022* 0.211*
father land was divided [0.011] [0.118] [0.014] [0.134] [0.012] [0.122]
father's age when grand father land 0.002* 0.029** 0.003*** 0.046*** -0.002* -0.017
was dividedage [0.001] [0.012] [0.001] [0.013] [0.001] [0.012]
natural disaster dummy 0.078 0.847 0.004 -0.111 0.074 0.958
[0.069] [0.742] [0.093] [0.863] [0.085] [0.729]
natural disaster dummyage -0.008 -0.091 0.003 0.053 -0.011* -0.144**
[0.006] [0.081] [0.008] [0.089] [0.006] [0.071]
constant 2.804*** 18.149*** 3.445*** 25.703*** -0.641 -7.555
[0.577] [6.084] [0.697] [7.264] [0.566] [5.641]
adj R2 0.669 0.713 0.544 0.576 0.233 0.269
observations 835 835 835 835 835 835
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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